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INT R O DUCTION
The use of property as a regulatory mechanism in the telecommunica

tions sector is hardly novel. Since the early twentieth century, policy mak
ers and regulators in the United States have experimented with different

mechanisms for al locating private rights in the radio spectrum. 1 In 1959,
Ronald Coase proposed that the FCC auction rights in the broadcast specI. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Right

w

Radio Spectrum U<;ers:

Whv Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years:;, 41 J.L. & EcoN. 529. 532-33 ( 1 998)
(hereinafter Hazlett. Assigning Property Rights] (noting how the idea began in 19 1 2 and
identifying four approaches that were adopted). See also Thomas W. Hazlett, The Ra
tionality of U.S. Regu/01ion o( Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECO'i. 133 ( 1990); Law
rence J. White, "Proper�v;:ing .. the Electromagnecic SpecLmm: J-Vh_1· il ·s fmponan1 and
.
How to Begin, in COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION AND FCC' Rt.;r-oRM 111 {Jeffrey A.
Eisenach & Randolph .f. May eds., 200 I).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=963940
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2
trum and convert broadcast licenses into tradable commodities. However,
it was not until very recently that the FCC implemented Coase's idea . At
least pa11 of the reason for the long delay in implementing this seemingly
efficient mechanism lay in the public nature of broadcasting and the per
3
ceived trade-offs between the "public interest" and private control.
Since its creation, the FCC has regulated the grant of broadcast li
4
censes using the rubric of "publ i c interest." All the same. the FCC's ideal
of"public interest' ' and its conception of what a property right is have var
5
ied over time. Historically, the well-documented taxonomical categories
o f ownership have included the privilege-based model, the "social com
pact" or "public tTusteeship" model, and, more recently, the expansive
6
market-oriented model.
Spectrum allocation. however, is far from being the only area where
property rights have been deployed to regulate broadcasting. Content pro
ducers have long enjoyed copyright protection over individual content that
7
is broadcast over the spectrum. Additionally, many countries around the
world recognize that broadcasters hold a property right in their content
carrying broadcast signals, independent of the copyright in the underlying
8
content . ReferTed to as ·'broadcasters' rights'· , the purp01ted justification
for their existence derives from the need to equip broadcasters with
mechanisms to prevent others from free-riding on their investment of time,
9
skill, and effort in working the i n frastructure of the television industry.

2.

R.H. Coase,

The Federal Communicmions Commi.�sivn. 2 J.L. & Eco ·. I

( 1 959).
3.

See William H. Melody. Radio Speurum Allocation: Role o.fthe Markel. 70 Atvl.

Eco 1. REv. 393. 394 ( 1980) (characterizing the broadcast specrrum as a fom1 of "social

property'').

umcrous other competing explanations exist for this anomaly and are con

sidered in detail by Thomas Hazlett in his study. See Hazlett. Ass1gning Property Riglus.

supra note I. lntcrestmgly, Coase. the original proponent of the idea, would later charac
terize the public interest argument as ·'syrupy talk.'' Ronald H. Coase. El•tduution ld'Pub
lic Polic�1· Rela!tng 1o Rudio and Tele1•isivn Broadcasting: Social wul J::cvnomic Issues.
4 I LAND ECON. 16 1 . 167 ( 1965 ).

4. 47 U.-.C. � 309(:1) (2000) (USIIlg the phrase "public interest. conveni(:nCe. and

necessity''). See dtscusston infra Section JV.C.
5.

Hazlett. .·1.\·.\i�ntng Properry Rig/us. supra note I, :.�t -3 �-3 7.

6.

!d.

7.

17 U.S.C.�

g_

This i ·a consequence of the Rome Convention. otherwise known as the Interna

I 02(a)(6) (2000).

tional Convention for the Protection of Performers. Producer:. or Phonograms and Broad
casting Orgamzations. brought into force in 1961.

9.

CLAltDL M.\�OlYE. \.VORLD lNTJ:LLH.'TUAL PROP. OR<, fWIPO), GtTJDL TO THI·

R0!\11 COr-i\'f.:NTIO� ..\ND TO THE Pl i O •OGRAMS CON\'I:xTICJ

19� I l.

(William Wallace trans . .
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Structured analogously to traditional copyri.ght. these rights (together with
certain others) are often characterized as ··neighboring" or '·related"
.
I0
nghts.
The idea of broadcasters' rights, however, never found much favor in
the United States. As early as 1930, decades before the idea of broadcast
ers' rights assumed international impot1ance, Louis Caldwell, General
Counsel of the Federal Radio Commission (the predecessor to the FCC),
argued that the idea of granting broadcasters prope11y rights in their pro
gram-carrying signals was likely to pose innumerable conceptual, doc
"
trinal, and practical problems. Specifically, he argued that "the 'juridical
concept of broadcaster's proprietorship' might seem overly radical in the
American context, where audiences had become accustomed to receiving
12
broadcasts for ·free. "' For over seven decades since, the United States
13
has stayed clear of adopting a system of open-ended broadcasters' rights.
Since 1 998, however, the United States has been pushing for the adop
tion of a new treaty at the WIPO that would grant broadcasters and cable
14
Titled

casters independent property rights in their transmission signals.

the "WIPO Broadcasting Treaty", this new instrument would update the
existing international regime governing broadcasters' rights and extend it
to the digital world.
The creation of new property interests in intangible and informational
goods (i.e., intellectual property rights) has been the subject matter of in
15
tense debate for quite some time now. In a similar vein, many have ques-

I 0. See, e.g.. George H .C. Bodenhausen, Protection of "Neighboring Rights", 1 9
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 5 6 (1 9 5 4) .
1 1 . Louis G. Caldwell. Piracy of Broadcast Programs, 30 CO LU M . L. REv. 1087,
1 101, 1 1 1 0 - 1 2 ( 1 930). For an overview of Caldwell's attempted reform of the broadcast
ing industry as a whole. see Robert W. McChesney, Free Speech and Democracy! Louis

G. Caldwell, the American Bar AssociaEion and the Debate Over the Free Speech lmpli
cations ofBroadcasr Regulation, 1928-1938,35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 351 ( 1 99 1 ) .
12. Caldwell, supra note I I , at 1 1 I 2-14.
13. The United States did not ratify the Rome Convention, despite pariicipating ac
tively during the actual negotiations. The reasons for this remain somewhat unclear.
14. Discussions on the treaty commenced in 1998 at the WIPO and the United
States delegation submi tted a detailed proposal in 2002. WIPO, Protection of the Rights
of Broadcasting Organi::.ations, WIPO Doc. No. SCCR/817 ( Oct. 2 I , 2002). avaiLable at
http://www. wipo. int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_8/ sccr_8_7 .pdf.
1 5 . For a sample of this literature, see PETER DRAHOS & JOl-IN BRAITHWAITE, IN
FORMATION fEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002); EXPANDING
THE BOUNDARIES Or INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWL
EDGE SOCIETY (Rochelle Dreyfuss et aL eds., 200 l ): James Boyle. A Politics of lntellec
tual Property: E111•ironmentalism for the Net?, 47 DU K E L. .J. 87 ( 1 997); Richard A. Pos-
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tioned the wisdom of the \VIPO Broadcasting Treaty and it potential im
pact on television broadcasting. 16 These debate tend to ignore the reality
that while the United States never recognized open-ended broadcasters'

rights as several other countries did, it nevertheles did grant the indu try's
main player

(broadcasters, cable companies, and content producers)

tenuated exclusion01�y protection,

at

or limited property rights, believing that

this grant would optimize competition to create a balanced. workable sys
tem. Television broadca t and cable revenues have continued to ri e stead
ily under this system and there remains little reason to believe that broad
casting as a whole has suffered in any way.17
What, then, prompted the shift in the United States' position on broad
casters' rights, and what benefit, if any, is the new property regime likely
to confer on national television broadcasting? More importantly, will the
introduction of a new fmm of property remain compatible with the exist
ing structural and functional attribute

of the indu try. which for decades

has committed itself to the "public interest" and operated on a

ystem of

limited exclu ionary protection?
This Article examines the implication
cablecasters open-ended property rights (a
ary privileges) in their tran mi

ion

ignal

of granting broadcasters and
opposed to

limi1ed

exclusion

(as contemplated under the

new WIPO Broadca t Treaty regime), specifically in the context of the
United States television industry. It argue that while the gains as ociated
with the e rights are not readily identifiable, the regime i

nevertheless

likely to have significant costs.
Part 1 1 of the Article provides an overview of the ideu of broadcasters'

rights in their signaL. Jt examines the genesis of the idea at the Rome
Convention, then outlines the basic idea behind the WIPO Broadcast
Treaty and concludes with a conceptual discussion of the po sible justifi
cations that might exi t for these rights. Part IlJ examines the exi ting
structure of the U.S. broadcast indu try and the myriad property rights rener,

Intellectual Property: The Lu11 and EconomiC\ Approach. 19 .I.L. & ECON. PER P. 57

(2005).
16.
26.

SC'e. e.g. . Jam�s Boyle. More Rig/us are II rong .for ll'ehcosten. FT.COi\1. Sep.

200�,

hnp: W\\\\.ft.com.cm:.�441306be-2eb6-llda-9a�J-00000c2511c'.hrml:
Adam R. Tarosky. The Constiwnonaliry of II'!PO·., Broadcll\flll.!!. 7 nmty. 7he Originallt:'·

and Lumted Times Rt!qttireme1lls r�f £he CoJl.rriglll Clause. 2006 DL H L. & TECH. RE\.
0016.
17.

For an oven tew or re\ cnue:. in the televi:.ion bro::tdca:,ttng sector. �ee 12 FI:D.

(OMM( "N:-. CoMrvt'

/\1\N. A -,-;F.SSM[NT OF TilE. lt\TUS

Or Cor-.1PI

11110\i IN THI: MARHT

rHt- Or! I\ l:RY 01- VIDt-0 PRO<iR;\MI\liN(j 4 (2006), m·ai/ah/e of http://tjallfos:..
Jcc.govtcdoc� pub! ic'attachmatch' FCC -06-1 1 A I .pdf [hcre111a fkr FCC Asscs�M 1: T]
I-OR

(nottng that the market ha� continued to grow).
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gimes that govern interactions between the di fferent players therein. Part

LV examines the possible effects that the new property regime is I ikely to
have on the new user dynamic that has begun to emerge on the intemet, on
the ideal of greater authorial control over dissemination, and lastly on the
public interest ideal that has remained central to communications regula
tion.
Pa1i V argues that if broadcasters' arguments for property rights do
have any merit, they derive from the principle of "unjust enrichment." It
then goes on to suggest a staggered two-phase approach to implementing
broadcasters' exclusionary privileges against commercial webcasters with
the intention of recreating a level playing field and at the same time ena
bling the intemet to develop as an independent distribution channel .
II.

O P E N-ENDED P R O P E RTY PROTECTION FOR
BROADCAST SIGNALS: THE CURRENT AND PROPOSED
INTE RNATIONAL REGIMES

The concept of broadcasters' rights has been in existence for at least
18
four decades now.
In spite of this, however, as an idea it remains rela
tively unknown in the United States. What does it mean to recognize

property rights in broadcast signals, independent of the copyright in the
underlying content?
Consider the fol lowing hypothetical: Walter. a film producer, produces
a documentary on earthquakes entitled

Quakes. Under the terms of both

domestic and international copyright law, he obtains copyright in the
19
documentaty. Walter then licenses the use o f the documentary to XBC
Inc., a private broadcasting corporation that agrees to broadcast the docu
mentary. Under the traditional model, XBC merely acquires the right of
20
public performance over Quakes that Walter originally had (either exclu
sively or non-exclusively) . Under a broadcasters' rights model, however.
XBC would also acquire, in addition to the right it licenses from Walter,
an independent set o f rights over its own broadcast signals canying

Quakes. The regtme thus effectively converts XBC's contractually ac-

1 8 . See International Convention for the Protection o f Performers. Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1 96 I , 496 U . .T.S. 43, art. I
[hereinafter Rome Convention).
19. See 1 7 U.S.C. § I 02(a)(6) (2000); Beme Convention for the Protection of liter
ary and Artistic Works, Sept 9, 1 886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1 9 7 1 . 828
U. .T.S. 22 1 . art. 2( I) [hereinafter Beme Conventi o n]
20. 1 7 U.S.C. � 1 06(4) (2000); Beme Convention, supra note 1 9, at art. I I his.
.
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quired right into a full-blown set of right that ari e independent of XBC'
licen e with Walter.
Now, if DBC Inc .. another broadca ter, were to intercept XBC's trans
mission of

Quakes

and re-broadcast it a it

own, what rights would Wal

ter and XBC have against DBC? What if Bori . a viewer, made a re
cording of

Quakes

from the broadcast at home and later sold copies of his

recording to the public? A broadcaster ' rights regime purports to deal
with prcci ely these types of situations.

O r i g in s of the Idea: The Rome Convention

A.

At the Brussels Revision Conference of the Berne Convention, mem
ber states ·ettled on the idea of extending copyright to performers, phono
21
Following the conference, actual
gram producers, and broadcasters.
work on a new instrument came to be delegated to three intemational or
ganization -the BTRPl (predecessor to the WJPO), the ILO, and
::!::!
UNE CO.
After going through several draft . the three organizations

together finally convened a Diplomatic Conference at Rome in 196 1 . re
23
sulting in the Rome Convention.
Intcre tingly, each of the rights protected under the Convention is de

rivative of traditional literary and ar1istic work . the ·ubject matter of
1.
copyright. . 1 Performers pe1j"orm musical or dramatic work ; phonogram
producer

are responsible for the .fi.raJion of mu ical performances; and

broadcasters facilitate the public distribution of audiovi ual works. The
activities covered by the Convention are thu

"related to" creative works

covered by copyright, but are rarely ever directly creative themselves.
They do little more than facilitate the process by which creative works are
21.

St�l.! DOC U\•ICNTS DE

LA CO 1FI':RENCI- Rf:t..; IJF A 8RUXI�l Ll:

· DU

5 AU 26

JUI!'X

194!\. -.t25-29 ( 1951 ) ; MASOUYE, supra note 9. at R; AM RICKI·"I SON & JANf- C. Gl'JS.
BLRC•. I run�AliO\lAL COP'l RIGHT A. · o , Et<.HI:H1URJN<; RIGHTS: THI· BI:.RNI: Co' \T:'\·

TIO' A D BI·YO
22.

0

(2d ed. 2006).

2 RICKE1<-;0N & GINSBL'RG. supra m11e 21. at 1211-12. WIPO stands for the

\.\'orld Int e llectua l Propeny Organization. ILO for
and Ul'r TO for the Umted ' a rion Educauonal
23.

the l ntcma tio n al

ctcnttlic and

It!

Labor Organization.
Cultur<�l Organtzatton.

or ··rel ate d·· nght . It 1:- of
course op�n to debate as to why these nghts haYe not formed the !>Ub.J ec t matter <..'i" tradt
tional cor� nght. especiall� g i, ·en that copyright co' ers a wtde . pcctrum of propcny-like
nghts O\ cr c\presst,·e acu,·iue:;. One answer t' that hi ·torically. tn mo-;t European coun
tries v<ith a civil law tradition. copyright or droir cl"outeur is re:-.tncted to authorial nghts
anJ rcqutrc-.. the tdcntification of a creative author for the grnnt or property proteL·tion.
Conscqul'mly. the necJ emerged to move ;:t\\<.l) fi·om !he tradiuonnl conccption or copy
right. Sel' Rudolf i\'loma. The Concepr v(Cop1nght !'ersus the /)mil d"...Juteur. :r� S. CAL.
I.RI\ 177tllJSlJ).
2-L

.\e( ul. at 1206-7. Hence the name

""netghboring'"
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produced and disseminated publicly, with the obvious consequence that

the traditional justifications for copyright do not automatically carry over.

The Convention clarifies that the protection accorded under it does not

detract from traditional copyright protection afforded to the underlying
25
In relation to broadcasters' rights, it defines broad
work independe ntly.

casting as the "transmission by wireless means for public reception" of the
audiovisual work, 26 and thus excludes from its scope transmission over
27
wires-i.e., cable transmissions. This is explained by the fact that cable

television emerged as a commercially significant player only after the ac

tual adoption o f the treaty.

The Convention grants broadcasters the "right to authorize or prohibit"
28
a series of activities in relation to their broadcasts. lt does not use the

phrase "exclusive right" commonly used in re lation to copyright holders'
29
rights over their works. While the element of exclusivity may be inherent
in the acts o f authorizing or prohibiting, the absence of any express refer

ence to it does enable the creation of overlapping rights over the same sub

ject matter vested in multiple parties. This is probably a recognition of the
fact that broadcasts are derivative resources and that copyright holders can

already exercise some of these rights under traditional copyright law.

The Convention rights incl ude: ( i ) rebroadcasting the broadcasts in

question; ( i i ) fixation of the broadcasts; ( i i i ) reproducing the fixations so

made; and (iv) communicating the broadcasts to the public, when made in
0
a publicly accessible place. 3 Much like copyright, the duration of these
11
rights is limited, but to twenty years from the year o f the first broadcast.-

25. Rome Convention, supra note 1 8 , at art. I .
26. !d. at art. 3( f).
27. See 2 RICKETSOt & GI SBURG, supra note 2 1 , at 1 216. Ricketson & Ginsburg
also argue that it is likely that the protection does not extend to encrypted wireless broad
casts, given that such broadcasts are not meant for public reception i n the traditional
sense, but rather for reception by a defined subscriber base.
28. Rome Convention. supra note 1 8 , at art. 1 3 .
29 . See, e.g., Beme Convention, supra note 19, at arts. 8. 9, I I, I I bis, 1 2 .
30. Rome Convention, supra note 1 8, at art. 1 3(a)-(d). Rebroadcasting is defined in
art. 3(g) to include only the simultaneous retransmission of one broadcasting organiza
tion's broadcasts by another and is therefore distinct from the right to communicate to the
public. Tbe right to communicate the broadcast to the public is also known as the "televi
sion exhibition right" and was the subject of some debate during the Diplomatic Confer
ence. See Abraham L. Kaminstein, Report of the Rapporteur-General, in RECORDS or
THE DIPLOMA TIC CONf-ERENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIO 1 OF PERFORMERS,
PRODUCERS OF PHONOGRAMS AND BROADCAST! G 0RGAt IZATIONS, ROME, I 0 TO 26
OCTOBER 1961, at 33, 49-5 1 ( 1968).
31. Rome Convention . supra note 1 8, at art. 14( c ) .
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These rights extend not just to the ephemeral transmission, but to sub�2

sequent fixations as wetl.-> The broadcaster thus gets to control uses of the
broadcast beyond the actual broadca t it elf. Thus, in relation to our earlier
hypothetical, XBC is now equipped with claims against both DBC for

communicating its broadcasts to the public and against Boris for .fixing the
broadcast and reproducing the fixation. The rights thus operate to give
broadcasters a cause of action against competitors (i.e., XBC against
DBC) as well as a mechanism to control revenue generation from uses o f
their broadcasts after its transmission ( i .e., XBC against Boris). This dis
tinction is critical when examining the justification for these rights.
Perhaps most interestingly, though, the Convention avoids defining
with any degree of precision what exactly a "broadcast" is. During the
Diplomatic Conference, it appears that countries interpreted the tenn to
33
cover transmissions by "hertzian waves or other wireless means." No
where during the conference did countries consider problematic the fact
that broadcasts (or transmissions) derive their physical existence and
commercial significance exclusively from the underlying content that re
main

the subject matter of copyright. Conceivably, they may have be

l i eved that the independence safeguard in Article 1 was sufficient to take
34
care o f this.
At the Rome Conference, the U . S . delegation was by far one of the
35
largest. The bead of the delegation. Abraham Kaminstein, then bead o f
the Copyright Office, also served as Rappo11eur-General to the Confer
36
ence. The United States participated rather actively through the drafting
process and at the actual conference . Specifically, in relation to the broad
casters' rights provisions, it proposed alternative definitions of ''broad
,
cast'' and ·'broadcasting organizations' and even proposed extending the

32.

!d. at art. 1 3(b).

33.

Kaminstein, supra note 30, at 40. This emerged consequent to an Austrian pro

po:;al that broadcasting be defined to cover transmissions over wire as \veil. v.-hich the
Conference ulti mately rejected

.

)·e"' CDJ?!4Y Austria, in RECORDS Of· THI:. DI PL<Xvl \TIC

•

CONrF.IO:NCF. ON TH I� lNTERNL\TIONAI

PROTL:.CTION OF PERFORMERS. PRODl,CLR:-. or

PHONOGRAM<) -\l\ID BROAD( ASTING 0R<1ANIZATIONS, ROME.

I0

TO

26 0CTOBFR 1 9 6 I . at

209 ( 1 9Mq.
34.

5iee Rome Convenr1on, supra note I

'

. at art. I (''Protection granted under 1h1s

Convention shall leave intact and shall in no way affect the protect ion of copyright i n
l i terary and arti!'tic works. Consequently. n o provi ion of this Convention may h�:.· inter
preted as pr�judicing such protection ... ) .
35.

3(J.

Consisting o f twenty members.

.'lei.' R!-:< ORO$

OF

T H F D t PLOiviA rt<." CONrERJ-NCE 0 . T I I F INl t=RN.l.T!OI\: \1. P RO

I ECl iOi\ I ll Pt RJ-ORi\H:RS. P tW DU U:. R�

01·

P I ION()(d(.-\ ".1S /\NI) BtW:\D( !\STII'\(

7AT[lJN-... . R or-- 1 1 . 10 · r o 2<, Ocr oHI:: R 1 96 1 . ut �R. 32

(

19oR).

I

OR< t -\NI-
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37
period o f protection to fifty years.· Yet when it came to actually signing
the convention, the head of the U . S . delegation placed on record the fact
that he had yet to receive authority to sign the Convention from h i s gov
eJnment and had come merely with instructions to "return with the Final
8
act."3 To this day, the exact reasons for the United States not signing the
Rome Convention (either in 1 96 1 or since), despite its active role in the
drafting process, remain a mystery.
Following the adoption of the Rome Convention, many common law
countries (other than the United States) amended their copyright laws to
include broadcasts within the category of protected subject matter and
thereby granted broadcasters rights analogous to those given to content
9
producers. 3
The Rome Convention thus laid the foundation for the idea of copy

right-like protection for broadcast signals. By fa iling to ( i ) specify the na
ture of the resource over which the right is to be exercised; or ( i i ) delineate
the exact manner in which the new rights would interact with traditional
copyright, the Convention avoided having to get into the broader regula
40
tory implications o f the new regime. More importantly, though, the re
gime also avoided specifying the parties against whom these rights would
operate. As technology developed and new means of distribution emerged,
the Convention came to be viewed as largely outdated, although its gen
eral idea o f property rights in broadcasts fmmed the basis for a newer,
more expansive proposal .

B.

Open-ended Property Protection: The WIPO Broadcast Treaty
Beginning in the 1 990s, the WIPO embarked on the project of updat

ing the existing international copyright and related rights regimes to adapt
them to the digital age. The WTPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) updated tradi
tional (authorial) copyright mechanisms, while the W l PO Performances &

Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) involved an analogous updating o f perform-

37. See id. at 67, 209, 225-26 ( 1968).
38. !d. at 134. Interestingly, though, the records seem to indicate that the United
States did indeed sign the Final Act, but not the actual Convention. See id. at 20.
39. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 6, 9, 14, 1 6, 1 9 ,
20, 35 (U.K.); Copyright Act, 1968, c. 1 33, § § 8 7 , 91, 95, 99 (Austl.). For an overview of
the Australian regime and an interpretation of the provisions involved, see ctwork Ten
Pty. Ltd. v. TCN Channel Nine Pty. Lrd. (2004) 2 1 8 C.L.R. 273 (Austl.).
40. See generally Gillian Davies, The Rome Convention 1 961 -A BriefSummwy of
its Development and Prospects, 2 EUR. 1NTELL. PROP. RE v. 1 54 ( 1 979}: Andre Kerever,
Should the Rome Convention He Revised and. !{So. Is This 1he Right Mome111?. 25 COPY
RIGHT BULL. 4 ( 1 99 1 ).
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41
ers· and phonogram producers· rights. Given that the Rome Convention
dealt with pcrf01mers, phonogram producers. and broadca. ter. . when dis
cussion

on the WPPT began. many countries felt that the in trument

needed to include provisions protecting the rights o f broadca ter as
42
well. However, most countries ultimately concluded that further analysis
wa neces ary before treaty language could be propo ed. and a. a re ult,
discus ion on broadcasters' rights were put off until the WPPT was
43
adopted. With the adoption of the WPPT in 1 995, the W I PO began dis
cus ion on a new instrument on broadcasters' rights in 1 99

in its expert

body on copyright, called the Standing Committee on Copyright and Re
44
lated Rights ( SC C R ) . I n i tially several countries proposed including these
rights a an additional protocol to the WPPT, but eventually this idea was
dropped and work began on drafting an altogether independent instru
4'i
ment.
A fter about fifteen

CCR sessions over seven year , the W T PO Gen

eral A· cmbly called for two fw1her special SCCR .e
lowed by

a

Diplomatic Conference in

2007.'H' At

ions. to be fol

the fir t spec ial

e sion.

mo.t countrie agreed that ..signal protection'· remained the objecti\e. Yet

4 1 . for a general overvie'' of Ihe WCT. the WPPT. and the r:.H.Iu.:.ll chang�s they
introduced, sec MIHALY FIC"OR. THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT Al\D THI: I' 11-R,ET: THr 1 996

WI PO TRF.Al ll . . THEIK. INTI::RPRF.TATION AND I M PLI:ME '1 A I lOt\ (2002): .IORG
Rtl BUIIIF & SILK[ VOj Ll·WI'\SKI. THF WIPO TREATIE 1 996: Till \\' I PO COPYR IG H r
TRFATY Aj D THI. W I PO P :RFOR
11\NCES & PHO OGRAt-.IS TREA 1 'l : (OI\ 1\IL '1 -\RY -\ D
I
LFG-\L A ALYSIS (2002). For analyses of their impact on U. . . domestll.: law see Julie E.

Cohen.

F111r Use Sur
Pamela . amuclson. The U. S. Oigital

WIPO CopyriP,ht Trealy lmplemenwlion in !he Uni1ed Swte,·: II 'til

,.;,•e?. 2 1 l:.UR. I N rEt.L. PROP. REv. 236 ( 1999):

.·lgenda al WIPO. 37 VA. J . INT'L L. 269 ( 1 997).
42. Wl PO. £.\iSiing lnrernmronal. Regional and Na!Wiwl l.egi,fauon Coll('l.!/'lling
o.
rhi! Pmlt!Ction of the Rights of Broadcasring Organi:::auon.,, an. I . W I PO Doc.
SCCR, 1 '3 ( cpt. 7, 1998), cwailah/e at http:l/www.w ipo.mt/edocst�ndnc:- copynglll'cn/

ccr_l /sccr 1_3. pdf.
43

ld

44. WI PO. Report ofthe Thtrd Si!<;sion <?/ the Standing Commlllt!e on ( 'op1nghr ami
Relared Rigltts. at 1 7 - 1 . WIP0 Doc. SCCR 3 I I ( 0cc. l . l 999}.
45. See ul.
46. 5)ee \\' I PO. Prote('/ivn vi Broadca'iting Or!c!,alll:::ations. \\ IPO Doc. 'o.
\\ IPO GA 33 -1 ( <.!pl. 22. 2006). amilahle at http: •\\ w\\ .\\ 1p0.1111 cdol.:� mdoc:,

go\bOd) en wo_ga 331wo_ga_�3_-Ldoc fseuing the date' for the D•plomauc Confer
ence): tanding Commil!ee on Copy1ig.ht ami Related Rig.hb. Re,·i.\l!cl /)ra{r Bo.\ic · Pm
powl fhr rhe WI PO Trear_Y on rhe Proten ion of Broadcasung 01p,wu:::arwn'i. �CCR 1 5 2
tJuly 3 1 . 2006). ai'Ctilahle til Imp· " "'" .wipo.inUcdoc:. mdocs,sccr•en ...ccr 1 5 seer_ 1 5_
1.pdf rhercinaf"ter Re1Fed /)raj; Ba.,ic Proposal]. Si!e al.\o 'v\i lll1am l C\\ . 11'/PO Broud
( tl\'ling rrellfy .ld1'(/I/CC'S Post DI.\£/?,IW'/11('11h', IN1 FLL. PRCIP. W \ I ( H. :-.ep. 1-+. 2006.
hnp:!/ip-watch.or� wcblog wp-1rackbacl-.. . php?p""'l95.
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considerable ambiguity seemed to persist over

[Vol.

exactly hml'

protection-based instrument ought to be structured.

-l7

22: U03

a signal

By the second spe

c i a l session, it became clear that countries could not quite agree on the
real objectives and scope of the treaty. Consequently, parties concluded
thar more time was needed before a Diplomatic Conference could be con
-!-'
Yet the treaty is to remain on the WIPO's agenda and is unlikely
vened.
.
.
to d t appear a I toget h er m t h e near future.-19
The product of these discussions, called the draft WlPO Broadcast
50
Treaty ( WBT), builds on the basic framework of the Rome Convention

but expands on the nature of protection afforded to broadcasters. 51 One of

the major changes in the Rome Convention framework that the W B T in
troduce · is in extending protection to cablecasters as well . I t retains the
classic definition of broadcasting as encompassing a wireless transmis
sion, 52 but at the same time i n troduces the concept of "cablecasting,"

which refers specifically to wire transmissions. 53 This is an obvious rec

ognition o f the emergence o f cable TV as a major player in the television
industry and the perceived need for analogous protection in this segment.

-+7. See lnt'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Governments Remain Divided on
W!PO Broadcast Treary, BRIDGES: WEEKLY, Jan. 24, 2007, a£ 4. available at
http:! www.ic£sd.org/weekly/07-0 1 -24/ B R I DGES Week ly l l -02.pdf; William New, Ques
tions Looll/ (or W!PO Broadcasting Negotimion, I NTEL L . PROP. WATCH. Jan. 23. 2007,
http:// www. ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=S i l & res= I 024_ ff&print=O.
48. See W l PO CONCLUSIONS OF THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSI01 OF THE SCCR ON
THE PROTECTION OF BROADCASTING 0RGA 'IZATIO S (2007).
49. !d. at 2.
50. ft is worth mentioning that during discussions, more than one draft proposal was
considered. The final official version that incorporated them all was the one of Feb. 8 ,
2006. See Revised Draft Basic Proposal, supra note 46. During the special sessions of the
SCCR. however, £he Chairman was entrusted wi£h the responsibility of modifying this
version infonnally, in an attemp£ to generate consensus among countries. The version that
re ulted from this came to be described as the '·non-paper" version of the treaty. Given i£s
unofticial status, the Revised Draft Basic Proposal continued to form the baseline for the
negotiations. See WI PO, supra note 48. Where the non-paper veTsion introduced signifi
cant changes ro the treaty's ideas that were noteworthy, special mention is made in this
Article of it
5 1 . For an overview of the scheme in very general detail, see MEGUMI OGAWA,
PROTECTIO ' OF BROADCASTERS' RIGHTS 73- 1 1 3 (2006).
52. Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, Revised Draft Basic
Proposalfor rhe WIPO Treaty on the Proteclion of Broadcas1ing Organizations, art. 5(a),
SCCR/ 1 5 2 (July 3 1 , 2006) (hereinafter WIPO Broadcast Treaty], available at hnp://
www. INipo. int/edocs/mdocs/sccr/enlsccr_ l 5/sccr_ I 5_2.pdf.
5 3 . WIPO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52, at art. 5(b). I t is interesting to no£e £ha£
the definitions of both broadcasting and cablecasting exclude the concep£ of wcbcast
ing- the transmission of signals over computer networks such as the internet- from £heir
coverag�.
,
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Protection under the treaty is restricted to broadcasting and cablecasting

organizations-defined as entities that take the initiative and have the re
sponsibility for the transmission, assembly, and scheduling of content.
Thus,

individuals

54

engaged i n the same activities are not entitled to the

benefits of the treaty.
U n l ike the Rome Convention, the WBT explicitly defines its protect
able subject matter. I t provides in no unce1ta i n terms that protection '·ex
tends only to signals" used for transmission and not to the underlying con
55
tent that they caTTy. The WBT goes beyond the Rome Convention in that
i t grants broadcasters and cablecasters a set of seven expansive "exclusive
5
rights" in relation to their transmission signals. 6 These are the right to
authorize:
57

I)

retransmission, by any means, of their broadcasts;

2)

communication t o t h e public o f t h e i r broadcasts;

3)

fixations of their signals;

4)

0
reproduction (direct or indirect) o f the fixations;6

5)

distribution o f the original and copies of the fixations� 6

6)

6
transmission to the public o f the broadcasts fo llowing fixation: 2

58

5Y

1

and
7)

making available to the public of the fixations through broad63
casts.

54. !d. ar arts. 5(c) & 5(d). See also Re1·ised Draji Basic Proposal. supra note 46. at
26-27.
55. WIPO Broadcas1 Ji-eary, supru narc 52, at an. 6( I ).
56. The non-paper of April 20, 2007 sought to move away from enumerating these
rights individually, providing instead that broadcasters were to have the exclusive right to
authorize the '"retTansmission of their broadcasts.. and "deferred transm1ssion . . of fixed
broadcasts. I t omitted the fixation right� of the original proposal. However, given that
f·ixation was protected under the Rome Convention. see supra note 30. this omission
proved to be unacceptable. with many countrie, viev.,ing it as doctrinally retrograde )·ee
WIPO. Non-puper on 1he WfPO Treary on the Pr01ection ofBroadcasling Organi:£1/ions.
art. 7. W I PO Doc. No. SCCR/ S l /WWW[75352) ( Apr. 20. 2007), avai/uh/1:' a1 Imp://
www.wipo. intfedocs/mdocs/sccr/en/sccr_s 1 t sccr_s I_"':ww_75352.doc.
y. supra no1e 52. a1 art. 9 .
57. WJPO Bmadcas1 Trear
5 8 . /d. at an. I 0 .
59. /d. at art. I I .
60. /d. at an. 1 2 .
6 1 . /d. a t an. 1 3 .
62. /d. at art. 1 4.
.
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Together, these seven rights would give broadcasters and cablecasters

near-complete control over the use and fixation of their transmission sig
nals. ln addition, the WBT mandates that countries recognize technologi

cal protection measures and grant rights -holders adequate legal remedies

to e nforce them.6-l It requires countries to create a cause o f action against
any person who c ircumvents a technological protection measure that pre
5
vents the access to and copying of broadcasters' signals.6 From the struc
ture of the treaty and the inclusion of the technological protection meas

ures mandate, it is abundantly clear that the rights are meant to operate
both against competitors

and consumers.

While the treaty does not explicitly say so, the default assumption ap

pears to be that these rights are to operate in rem, along the lines of tradi
tional property rights.66 Also, the theme of "anti-piracy" is a recunent one
7
throughout the treaty.6 Furthermore, the rights would persist for a period
68
o f fifty years after the broadcast.
Going back then to our earlier hypothetical, X B C Inc., under this new

regime, would have a larger bundle of rights to exercise against DBC and
Boris. I n addition to being able ro preclude Boris from fixing its signals,

XBC now obtains absolute control over the uses of the recording o f

Quakes

from its broadcast. J f X B C were t o encrypt its transmission using

digital technology, and Boris were to decrypt the transmission to view

Quakes

without X B C ' s authorization, XBC could then initiate a circum

vention action against Boris. Further, if Boris were to distribute his re

cording o f

63.
64.
65.
Dean S.

Quakes

over the internet, this too would give X B C a cause o f

fd. at art. 1 5 .

!d. at art. I 9.

For an overview of the WCT and WPPT's technical protection measures, see
Marks & Bruce H. Tumbull, Technical Protection Measures: The Intersection of
Technology, Law and Commercial Licenses. WIPO Doc. No. WCT-W PPT/IMP/3 ( Dec.
3, 1999). For a general overview of their implementation under U.S. and E.U. law, see
Terese Foged, U.S v. E. U. Anti-Circu11n·enlion Legislation: Preserving the Public ·s
Pri1·ileges in the Digital Age?, 24 EUR. INH:LL. P ROP. REV. 525 (2002).
66. The Revised Draft Proposal provision on limitations and exceptions to the rights
granted contains four altematives, each with varying degrees of specificiw Three out of
the four proposals contain an express exception for "private use"-thereby making it
clear that individual users making unauthorized use of the broadcast signals would ordi
narily be liable under the treaty. See Re1·ised Draft Basic Proposal, supra note 46, at 6570. For more discussion of in rem rights. see also infra Par1 Ill.
67. See W!PO Broadcast Trearv. supra note 52, Preamble (noting the ·'anti-piracy''
function of the treaty) . See also DARRFLL PA ETHIER£, THE PERS ISTEN C E OF PIRt\CY:
CONSEQUENCES FOR CREATIVITY, FOR C't: LTURE, AND FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
I 7 -I 8 ( 2005 ), http:i/unesdoc.unesco.org/ i mages/00 1 3/00 1 396/ 1 3 965 1 e.pd f.
68. 'YV!PO Broadcasf Treaty, supra note 52. at art. 1 8.
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action again t him. Thus XBC is g1ven near-ab olutc control over its
tran. mission o r Quakes.
O\v

a

ume CC, a cablecaster. enters the picture and provides its own

content to it
retran mit
CC i

subscribers. In addition. CC records XBC'

broadcast and

i t to its own subscriber at a later date. Under the new regime,

given property rights over it

tran mission

analogous to XBC's

right

over its tran mission of Quakes. XBC now al o has a claim against

CC'

recording and retransmission of its broadcast. This latter claim as

sumes special relevance in the U . S . broadca ting context, as w i l l be seen
later.
The WI3T thus seeks to create a fu ll-b lown property rights regime in
broadcast

and

cable

transmission

circumvention mandate, it enable
c

ercl

C.

a

ignals.

Coupled

with

its

anti

broadca. ters and cable operator to ex

igni ficant amount of control OYer the usc of their ignals.
Broadcasters' Rights: From Contract to Property?
.6q

Property rights can and often do minimize tran action co t
location o f a n i n rem exclusionary entitlement e x ante reduce
contractually acquire i t. Contractual acqui ition

The a l 

the need to

entail significant search.

information, and negotiation costs and im·olvc uncenaintie a sociated
711
with holdout and cognitive biases. By en. uring an optimal al location up
front and thus obviating the need for individual contracrual tran fers.
property rights can enhance overal l efficiency. 1 t might therefore be ar
gued that broadcasters' rights-a

property rights-ac hie

c

preci el y this

result.

In this understanding, broadcasters' right. do l i ttl e more than convert
right

that a broadcaster might have contractua lly obtained from the origi

nal copyright holder into a prope11y right. By vesting them in the broad-

01

(ll}, See \VJLLIA\1 M. LA'\DES & RllHARD A. PO 'NLR. THI:. ECONOt-.-11<.

•

TRL <:TURF

I'\ n I I I l fUAL PROP.:RTY
I
LA \V 1 2 - 1 3 ( 2003) ("Reducing transaction cosb 1:- the ve1y

ra1�on d'\:,trc or propcn� nghts.''). For some or the seminal l11crature seeking to establish
thi

correlation see Yo R ,\�1 13-\RZXL. E< 0'\0\lll A'\ \LY IS or PROPLRT'l RI<JHT� (2d ed.

1 9<:17): Annen /\ . Alchwn. Some l:.'cmwmiC"s o.f Pmperry Rtgl/1.\. 30 I L POI ITI< O R l 6

( 1 9 6 :' ) : llarold Dcm�etz. Tmnml u Tlu!m:1 of J>ropem· Right.\ . 57 A\ILR. 1.:.<.0'\. Rl \ . 3-P
( 1 9 67 ): Harold Dcmsct7. 7he Exclwnge and Et!/i>rcemetll c?/ Properly Rtghl\. 7 .I.L. &
[COl\. I I ( 1 964 ) : En·i!.. G. Furnbotn &
Tht�ol'l

n�tOza PejO\ 1ch. J>ropem R1glw am/ Economic

I .\.//IT(�\' C?/ Reu'lll l.lleruture. 1 0 J. t( 0!\. LJ r. 1 1 37 ( 1 972): 1 homa" \\ 0 I\terrill

& J-knr�· 1- . . llHlh. Optimal 5)tanclarcli::alion in 1he l.llll' of J>roperr.l·: The

umeru::;

Clnu:-.u::-. fJrmuple. I I 0 Y -\1.1· L.J. I (2000).

70.

.\ee generul�r Lloyd Cohen. 1/olclmtl\ am/ Free Riders. �() .1. U · < , \L 'll o. 3 5 1

( 1 99 1 ) : R 1 chard A . fpslcin. Holdmtl\. 1:.'.\femtdinl!s. and '" " Sing/<' Omu1r: One• More

Salui<' In l?onulcl Cou.w '6 . 1 . 1 . . & h ON. )53 ( 1 993 ).
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regime obviates the need for the broadcaster to con

vince the content producer to either ( i )

uc for an infringement when the

bmadcaster lacks standing: or ( i i ) transfer to it the entire copyright in the

work. 71 It thus gives XBC, a non-exclusive licensee o f the ''right to broad
cast"

Quakes

from Walter, independent ·tanding to sue both DBC and Bo

ris. This seemingly represents an obvious efficiency gain. On deeper
analysis, however, this view o erlooks evcral significant elements.

While copyright law recognizes the divisibi I ity of rights during a trans

fe r, it continues to draw a clear distinction between exclusive and non

exclusive licenses. 71 Exclusive licenses are treated as transfers of the
copyright, while non-exclusive licenses are not. 73 Therefore. on l y an ex

clusive license would give a I icensee an independent right to sue for in

fringement. Yet, even in relation to exclusive licenses, the l icensee · s
standing i s limited b y the scope of the license 74 Thus, in our hypothetical,
if XBC were to obtain a non-exclusive license from Walter to · 'broadcast

Quakes

nationally over the air." it would lack independent standing to sue

for copyright i n fringement. 75 Now i f the license were

would

e\clusive,

XBC

have standing to sue. Even with an exclusive license. though, it

would have an action only against DBC,

a

broadcaster, and not against

Boris, a copier and distributor, unless Walter transferred to XBC the ex

clusive rights to copy and distribute
cial.

Quakes.

T h i s distinction remains cru

7 1 . This analysis assumes. of course. that a broadcaster attempts to sue on either a
contract or property theory. A third alternative that may be invoked involves tort law and
in pa1ticular the claim ot' ·'tortious interference with a contract." The tort has both con
tract and property overtones, but enrai Is a strong intentionlreckles ness requirement that
might be hard to establish in simple instances of infringement. See Richard A. Epstein,
Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of Ostensible OH·ners!Jip. 1 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. I ( 1 987); Benjamin L. Fine. An Analysis of the Formalion of Proper/1' Rights Un
derlying Tor1ious fnle!ference ll'ilh Contracrs and 01her Economic Refttlions. 50 U. CHI.
L . RF.V. 1 1 1 6 ( 1 983 ) ; Mark P Gergen, Tortious lnte1jerence: How if is Engulfing Calli
merciaI Law, Why This is Not Entirely Bad, and a Pmdentia/ Response, 38 A RI Z. L. R E \ .
1 1 75 ( 1996).
72. For an overview of the doctrine of indivisibility, contained in the Copyright Act
of 1909, see 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, N IM M E R 0 COPYRIGHT: A
'

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY. MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPE R T Y . ·\ND THE PRO
TECTION OF IDEAS � 1 0 . 0 1 ( 2006); Robert A. Gom1an,

An Overview ofthe Copyright Act
uf 1976, 1 26 U. PA. L. REV. 856. 860 ( 1978); Leon Kaplan, Artistic and l.iterary Proper{}'
(Including Copyright) as Secunl\': Problems Facing the Lender, 1 9 L:\ w & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 254, 265 n.S I ( 1954).

73. See 1 7 U.S.C. * 20 I ( d ) ( 2 ) (2000); 3 NIMMER, supra note 72, at * I 0.0 2[A ) .
74. 3 t1MMER, supra note 72, at 9 10.02[8] [ 1 ] (noting how thi.s amounts to a lim
ited relention ofthe indivisibility rule).
75. !d & n. l 6.
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Additi onally, the law forbids a transfer of the mere right to sue, inde
76
pendent of a transfer of the w1derlying right. The Copyright Act allows
for a tran fer only of the exclusive rights it confers on the owner, and the
right to commence an action for infringement is treated a an "entitle
7
ment'' rather than an exclusive right. 7 Since a non-exclusive license is not

treated as a transfer, anything short of an exclu ive licen e to copy and

distribute the work would render unenforceable an independent transfer of
78
the right to sue for these actions.
In other word , baiTing a complete
transfer of the rights to broadcast, copy. and distribute, XBC would have
no action again t DBC

or Boris under copyright law.

A regime of broadcasters' full-blown property rights would now grant

the broadcaster independent causes of action against other broadcasters
and indi viduals fixing its broadcasts and using them post-fixation. ln spite
of the broadca·tcr's need for a license from the copyright holder (to avoid
9
copyright infringemene ), the nature or existence of this license and its
scope would now have

no bearing whatsoever on the broadcaster's

ability

to commence an action for use of the broadcast and its underlying cont enl .

xo

To be sure, each of the doctrinal subtleties outlined ha

a rational ba

si . To grant non-exclusi e licensees the right to sue independently would
create multiple infringement actions. Fmther, the very idea of a non76. Sl!e Sil,cr v. ony Pictures Entm't. Inc .. 402 F.Jd 8 8 1 (9th Cir. 2005) (examin
ing the statutory language, legislative history. ancl analogies to patent law and concluding
that the mere right to sue for copyright infringement cannot be as igned); Eden Toys, Inc.
v. Florekc Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 ( 2 d C1r. 1 982). I ndeed, this principle seems to
be fairly \\'ell established in the law of patent!>. having been aninned by the upreme
Coun on more than one occasion. s·ee Jndep. Wireless Tel. Co. ,. . Radio Corp. of Am.,
269 ll . . . 459 ( 1 926): Crown Die & Tool Co. v. yc Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U . . 24.
35-36 ( 1 923 ) .
77. See 1 7 U.S.C. � 5 0 \ ( b ) (2000). For a comprehensive overview of the rules of
standmg in intellectual property. see Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter. The Elusive
l.ogic oj'Stand111g Do<'frine in lntelle<'fliU! Pmpert,\ · /.all'. 74 fUL. L . Rev. 1 323 ( 2000).
78. Sc-e 3 lf\1\-IER. supra note 72. at � 1 2 .0 2 ("An exclu 1ve liccn�ee may not ue
for infringement of nghts a� to " h ich he is not licensed. e'en 1 r the ubJCCt mauer of the
infnngement is the " ork as to '" hich he 1s a licensee.").
79. See 17 U . . . C. * 106(4) ( 2000 & upp. I\' 2004).
go. It might of cour e be argued that i\rticlc I ( 2 ) of the V. BT. which spec1fically
pro,·Jdes that the trenty is m no way meant to preJ udice copynght 111 the underlymg con
t�nt. " ould require :;uch a cotTe!>pOndence between the e:-.ercisc or right..; ancl the undcrl)
mg llcen-.e. While such a correspondence mtght be necessary for the actual exercise o f
rhe exclu�l\ C right (t.c.. to acttwlly d i tribut(' reproduction� o f the fixation) t o avoid tn
fi·ingtng, the underlying cop) nght. it cl.!l1ainly \\ ould not he neccs:.ary for the exercise of
the right to innwtc an <lCtlnn, �tn<.:e rhat would 111 no way interfere with the comcnt
holder':-. nghts. ,)'<:1! IFJJ>() Hmadl·o·'' Treur.1·. ,\1/f)/'U 11otc 52. at art. I ( 2 ).
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exclusive license incorporates the basic understanding thar the value o f the

license lies in its enabling the use of the work in and of itself, not the ex 

clusive

or even

limited

use of the work ( the copyright holder being free to

create infinite non-exclusive licenses), but by the use alone.
The efficiency argument ignores altogether the reality that broadcast
ers' rights go well beyond just granting broadca ters the right to sue for
i nfringement o f any right they might have contractually obtained. A s
noted earlier, broadcasters' rights extend beyond the right t o broadcast to
::s 1
post-fixation actions.
Ln other words, they replicate several of the copy
right holder's exclusive privileges, but through the broadca ·t. Given the
inseparabi lity of the signal from its underlying content, these in turn trans
late into rights over the content. Thus, the broadcaster's exclusive right to
�.<�
authorize the ' reproduction of fixations" means little more than the right
to authorize the reproduction of the content of the broadcast, a right that is
83
also vested in the content producer. A user reproducing content obtained
via a broadcast is now subject to two potential lawsuits -one from the
copyright holder, and another from the broadcaster. Whereas avoiding
multiple lawsuits remains central to the rules surrounding copyright l i 
censing, the broadcasters' rights regime

is directed

a t creating a n addi

tional right to sue.
Broadcasters' rights thus do much more than jusL move the entitlement
from the content producer to the broadcaster, they replicate it. A mere du
plication o f the gate-keeping function might in some

iluations work to

c reate what economists call a "polyarchical" or decentralized project
84
structure. Central to realizing the efficiency gains from such a structure
is the need for the decision-making process to be substantively decentral
ized

as a

whole. 85

In other words, if an authorization from the broadcaster

were to alleviate the need for a similar or equivalent authorization from

8 I . See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
82. WIPO Broadcast Treat;v·, supra note 52, at art. 1 3.
83. See 1 7 U.S.C. s l 06( I ) (2000).
84. See Patrick Bolton & Joseph farrell, Decentralization. Ouplication. and Delay,
98 J . POL. ECON. 803 ( 1 990); Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz. Tlw Arclziteuure of
Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 76 AM. ECON. Rr: \·. 7 1 6 ( 1986). For
further l iterature focusing on this distinction, see Ruth Ben-Yashar & Shmuel itzan, The

Robustness of Optimal Organi::ational Architectures: A Note on Ilierarchies and Po(var
chies, L 8 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 1 55 (2004); Thomas Gehrig, Pien·c Regibeau & Kate
Rockett, Project Evaluation and Organizational Form. 5 REV. ECON. DF.SIG� 1 77 (2004):
and Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, CommitTees, Hierarchies. und Polyarchies. 98
ECON. J. 4 5 1 ( 1 988).
85. See Tim Wu, Intellectual Proper�r. Innovation and Oecenrrali:::ed Decisions, 92
VA. L. REV. 1 23 , 1 29 (2006) ('"[A]ny single actor's approval of a project i$ sufficient'').
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the content producer and vice versa, such that consent from either \vould
immunize a user from liability (under both regime ), the decision-making
structure then becomes truly polyarchical (i.e., with multiple gate-keepers.

any of whom are sufficient for entry/authorization). Broadcasters' rights
consciou ly rej ect such a model (of decentralized authorization), however,
in the legitimate belief that so doing would undermine the content produc
86
Thu
ers' contribution, which is central to the entire creative process.
broadca tcrs' rights contemplate a structure that is distinctly hierarchical,
detracting from the po sibility of any structural efficiency gains.
The efficiency argument thus fails on three fronts . First, broadca ters'
rights go far beyond the ideal of minimizing broadcasters' costs of con
tracting for similar rights, simply because broadcasters could not have
contracted for such rights to begin with (except by acquiring the copyright
in its entirety) . . ccond, they do not effect a mere reallocation of the enti
tlement to uc for infringement. Instead, they replicate the entitlement and
con ciou ly contemplate a multiplicity of lawsuit

for a single act of in

fringement. Third. the efficiency argument ignore the fact that transaction
7
costs exi t on both ides of the producer-consumer equation. Even if the
regime minimi7cd broadcasters· transaction costs, it multiplic u �er ' costs
by now requiring them to navigate through an additional layer of liability.
I nvc tment Protection & Piracy Prevention as a Rationale

D.

Attempts to develop coherent theoretical justification

for copyright

abound in the literature. Sfl They range from the utilitarian or law-and
economics-ba cd explanations to the more dcontological ones based on

86.

See Rom� Convenuon. supra note 1 8, at an. I : H ·1PO Broadcasl Trewr. supru

note 52, at an I . SeC' also supra text accompanying note 34.

87. In many respects this tracks the problem of an arHICOmmons. 1dcntilied by Mi
chael Jleller. Here. the creation of additional layers of propert) nghts mcreascs the trans
action cost:-. of usmg the underlying resources. thereb) detemng actual use and resultmg
in an altogether tllffercm inefficiency. See Michael A. Jleller. The Traget�, . of 1he Ami

common.\: J>ropen_,. in 1he Trunsi1ion .fi'om A1arr w 1 /orke/.\
.

.

I l l 1 1 ·\RV. L. REV. 62 1

( 199 ) : Jamc \11 . Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon. Symm<!lnc Tra�eclie.\: Commons and Ami
common\. 43 J.L. & Eco�. I (2000). The argument has been further C\tcnded to the
world of uHangiblcs. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca

.

. [i ·cnberg. Can Pa1en1s De1er

hmomriun :' 111e A n1icummons in Biomedical ResC'arch. 2XO
88.

(

ll

NCF

698 ( 1998 ).

SC'I!, e.p,. . Edw111 C. Heninger. Juslifi·mg lntelleclllal J>roperf.,.. I 8 PHIL. & PUR .

.A.I F. 3 1 ( J 9H9): 'tC\\al1 E. Sterk. Rhetoric and Rea/ill· in Copyrig/11
RJ.:\'. 1 1 97 ( 1 996):

Copyright. ComJIWtlt/icanon and Cupiwl.
(2003).

Lt/1\". 94 MICH. L .
Search .for Jusltjiccaon Theories:
C\N:�DIAt-- J L. & .IL I RISPRUDI.::-JCF.. 2 1 7

amuel E . TroSO'-\ . The 1/h/\·in!
16
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While none has proven to be unproblematic altogether, the

util itarian framework appears to be dominant in the traditional conception
90
of copyright. In this understanding, property rights are granted to authors
9
of l iterary and artistic works as an ex ante incentive for their creativity. 1
Broadcasters' rights and other related or ''neighboring" rights represent
an altogether d i fferent story because broadcasters and cablecasters never
directly engage in any creative activity, in the traditional sense of the
92
term. They nevertheless do contribute to the dissemination o f creative
works through their distribution networks. Hence, their rights remain con
ceptually related to traditional copyright. Broadcasters' rights, however,
seemingly derive from a di fferent type of utilitarian rationale--one related
93
to their investment of time, energy, and resources. As the W I PO Secre
tariat notes:
Broadcasting organizations have been gran ted protec t io n for the

result of their invest ment th ei r en tre preneurial efforts and their
,

contribution to the d i ffusion of culture and their pub l i c informa

tion service. B roadc ast i n g organizations are e n tit i es that ta ke the

For the utilitarian approaches to the topic, see Deborah Chalsty. The Economic
Logic of Cop.vright, in THE POLITICAL EC01 OMY OF LEGAL l1 FORMATION: THE EW
LANDSCAPE 145 (Samuel E. Trosow ed., 1999); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M .
Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 5 6 AM ER. Eco . REV. 42 1 ( 1966);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis a./Copyright Law, 18 J .
LEGAL S T U D . 325 ( 1 989). For the more deontological philosophical justifications, see
Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale o./ Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Re1•olutionmy France
and America, 64 TUL/\ E L. REV. 9 9 1 ( 1990); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in
89.

'

Se(F-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural La"v of lnre!lectual Property,
y, 7 7
1 0 2 YALE L.J. 1 533 ( 1993 ) ; Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of fme!!ectual Propert
GEO. L . J . 287 ( 1 9 8 8 ) ; Jeremy A. Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: fndividual Rights
and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 C!-11.-KENT L. REV . 84 1 ( 1 968).
90. Part of this justification, at least in the context of the United States, derives from
the fact that copyright derives from the Constitution, which in Article I . Section 8, pro
vides: '·To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and rnventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis
coveries.·' This clearly is a utilitarian approach to the subject.
9 1 . See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual
Property, 7 1 U. C H I . L. REV. 1 2 9 (2004).
92. 2 RICKETSO & G1 rssuRG, supra note 2 1 , at 1 2 1 2 .
93. See Werner Rumphorst, Neighbouring Rights Protection of Broadcasting Or
ganizations, 1 4 EUR. lNTELL. PROP. REV. 339, 340 ( 1992); Werner Rumphorst, The
Broadcasters ' Neighbouring Right: Impossible to Understand?, COPYRIGHT BULL., July
Sept. 2006, at I , 3 , http ://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/00 1 4/00 1 47 7/ 1 47736e.pdf ("The
broadcasters' neighbouring right is there to protect the broadcasters· entrepreneurial ef
fons and investments in the form in which they materialize as an end product from their
activity, viz. the broadcasts.").
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financial and edi to ri a l respon sibility for the selection and ar
rangement of, and investment in, the transmitted conte nt . "�
The rationale thus appears to be that since broadcasters invest a sig
nificant amount of time and resources that indirectly contribute to the
creative process, they ought to be granted property rights that enable them
to control their investment. I n a sense, this rationale is Lockean yet sig
95
n i ficantly more consequent ialist.
B u t why might such control be necessmy at a l l ? Surely not a l l invest
ments require control as a quid pro quo. This takes us to the other side of
the investment protection rationale: the piracy argument-that the unau
thorized use of broadcasters' signals results in a diminution of their reve
nue. The UNESCO, in its discussion of the treaty, seems to al lude to the
legitimacy of this justification and i ts connection to the investment ration
ale, in observing that protection is intended to "prevent third parties from
using these [signals] without . . . authorization" which could result in
"economic losses" and that the rights involved are a recognition of the
"investments [broadcasters] make . . . that benefit the eventual consum
ers. "96

The piracy argument is one that has been made ever since discussions

on a new instrument began at the WIP0.97 Broadcasters argue that w i th
94.

WIPO,

Prorecrio n

Doc. No. SCCR/8/I

F/1

<�/" Broadcasting Organizations:
(Aug.

Terms

and Concepts, WlPO

1 6, 2002). available at http://v."vw. wipo. int/edocs/

mdocs/copyright /en/sccr_8/sccr_8_in f_ l .pdf.
95.

The Lockean argument is. of course, one from labor-desert. that an individual's

expenditure of labor and cffon entitles him or her to an exclusionary right over the prod
uct of those labors. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNME 'T: A CRITICAL EDITION
WITH AN I TRODUCTIO

AND APPARATUS CRITICUS BY PETER LASLETT, �§ 25-5 1 , at 302-

5 1 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967) ( 1 690). The Lockean the01y
has been applied rather extensively i n the context of intel \ecwal propeny. especially
copyright. See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPH'. OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4 1 -72
( 1996): Richard A. Epstein. Libert.r Versus Properry? Crack., in rhe Fvundarions of"
CoP.vriglu Lu11, 42 SAN DII:GO L. REV. I . 2 J (2005): Wendy J. Gordon, Render Cop_l·
righ! un/o Ca�sar. On Taking Jnce111i1·es Seriously. 7 1 U . CHI. L . R�:.v. 75 (2004); Adam
D. Moore. A Lockean Theor
y 4 1nrellectual Property. 2 1 HAMLJNI: 1 . . RE\'. 65 ( 1 997}.
for an interesting revisionist account of the Lockean theory. applied in the context of
copyright Ia\\. see Liar Zcmer. The Making of a Ne11· Copyrigh1 Lvckean, 29 HARV. J . L .
& PUB. PoL·Y 8 9 1 (2006).
96.
No.

171

00 1 390
97.
rions.

Prmection of the Rights oj BroadcastinJ< Orguni:::ations. para. 6. U 1 E CO Doc.
F:.Xt 59 ( A pr. 8. 2005 ). avuilahle at hnp://unesdoc.unesco.org/i mages/00 1 3/
1 39057e. pdf.

Set! W I PO. Agenda lti!m 4: Proreclion (�( rhe Rig/us o( Brol/(lcusting Orguni:::o

Suhmission s Recei11ed ti·om

at 8. 'V. IPO Doc.

Nnn-Covernmentul Organi:::arions h_,. March 3 1 . 1�99.

·o. 'CCRt 2 ·6 (Apr. 7. 1 999), al'llilahle ar http: W\\\V.wipo.i n!iedocs/

mdocs/copyrightl en1sccr_2 'sccr_2_6.pdf ("Comprehensively updated imcrnational pro-
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the advent o f new technologies of digital copying, unauthorized intercep
9�
tion, fixation, and retransmission of broadcasts has become rampant.
Studies undertaken by broadcasters· col lectives to support this argument
show that there was a 1 50% increase in television piracy in 2004; that 7%
of a l l broadcast piracy occurred in the United States; and that revenue

losses from signal theft globally amounted to approximately $2 billion99.

The emergence of the internet as a distribution medium and its transna
tional nature, broadcaster
Broadcasters often use the

claim, furt her diminishes their revenues.

iCrave TV controversy

100

that erupted in 2000 to

i l lustrate the threat posed by the internet to their revenues.
The

iCrave TV

episode involved a Canadian entrepreneur capturing

over-the-air broadcast signals from the U n i ted States and Canada and
streaming them digitally over the internet, enabling others to view televi
1 01
A fter much
sion broadcasts on their computers, for a subsc1iption fee .
convincing, U.S. broadcasters managed to get copyright owners to initiate
an action against him for copyright infringement, on the premise that since
users in the United States could access the service, he was infringing their
rights in the United States. They eventua l l y succeeded in getting an in-

tection of the broadcasters' neighboring right i s the only way to ensure the possibility of
w i ft and effective action against piracy of broadcasts "): WI PO, Protection of Broad
casling Organi::.ations. at 1 5, WlPO Doc. No. SCCR./7/8 (Apr. 4, 2002). available a1
http://www.w ipo. int/edocs/mdocs/copyrigh t/en/sccr_7/sccr_7_8.pdf. See also Viviana
Munoz Tellez & Andrew Chege Waitara, A Developmen t Analysis a_(the Proposed WIPO
Treaty on the Proteclion of Broadcasting and Cablecasting Organisation 26-31 {South
Ctr. Research Paper
o. 9, Jan. 2007). C/\•ai/able at http://www.sout hcentre.org/
publications/researchpapers/Research Papers9.pdf (providing an overview of the piracy
rationale).
98. See sources cited supra note 97.
99. These tigures are from a briefing note by internet monitoring company Envi
sional in 2005, entitled TV Piracy. Broadcast unions such as the European Broadcasting
Union ( E B U ) relied upon the figures extensively to establish an increase in piracy rates
worldwide. See Will Sturgeon, 24 Reasons Why TV Piracy is Soaring, W E BW ATC H Feb.
1 7, 2005. http:l/networks.si l icon.com/webwatch/0,39024667 , 3 9 1 2 7 9 1 9,00.htm; Daisy
Whitney, SiJiraling Piracy Threatens TV, TVWEEK, Feb. 2 1 , 2005, http://www.tvweek.
com/artic le.cms'?articleld=2 730 I .
I 00. EUROPF.AN BROADCAST UN ION , SOME RECENT EXAMPLES OF B ROADCAST PI
RACY (2005). available at www.ebu.ch/CMSimages/en/leg_p_pressreports_piracy_
120905_tcm6-42762.pdf (last visited Nov. 1 3, 2006).
I 0 I . See John Borland, Broadcasrers Win Batile Agains1 iCraveTV.com, C iET
NEWS .COM Jan. 28. 2000. http://news .com.com/ 2 1 00-1 033-236255.html; John Townley.
t'vfovie. Broodmsting Compa n ies Sue iCra 11e TV INTERNET EWS.COM, Jan. 2 1 , 2000,
http://www.i memt!tnews.com/bus-news/article.php/29 I 1 3 1 .
,

,

,
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However, the case is often used to i l lustrate the

ease with which broadcast signals can be converted into digital format and
retransmitted over g.lobal networks, and broadcasters, dependence on con
tent owners to commence a n action to stop the retransmitter-the a l leged
pirate.
The anti-piracy argument, however raises an important conceptual is
sue that has signjficant practical implications. This relates to the distinc
tion that is rarely ever made between revenue losses (strictly speaking)
and lost revenue streams. A revenue loss from piracy may be said to occur
when individuals or organizations deny broadcasters a source of revenue
that they

would have had, in

the nom1a1 scheme of things. A fa iled reve

nue stream, on the other hand, represents the broadcaster being denied a
source of revenue that it would nor have ordinarily had, except in a hypo
thetical or theoret ical sense. Take the iCrave TV episode described above.

Broadcasters at the time were not yet making their content available
online. Although a broadcaster might indeed argue that online broadcast
ing was the next natural step, this argument is at best hypothetical. The
distinction is thus one o f appropriate baselines to asceriain the status quo
(and thereby losses). Broadcasters argue that a world with the entitlement
is the status quo and anything short of it is a loss, which ignores the nu
ance that the very existence o f the entitlement is at issue.

103

Computations of piracy-related losses do not seem to make thi s di tinction.

104

They operate on the assumption that a diminution of any form

o f actual and potential revenue resu lting from the use of broadcasters'

ig

nals represents a piracy-related loss. This distinction is relevant when i t
comes t o tbe piracy-related just i fication for property rights in broadcast
signals, for it is not clear that the losses jdentified merit classification as
piracy-related when broadcasters' entitlement to them is unclear a priori.
Broadcasters' open-ended definition of piracy as including all revenue
diminutions assumes that broadcasters are entitled to internalize all the
positive extemalities associated with their investment, at least insofar as
105
these externa lities are reducible to sources of revenue.
Their conception

I 02. Na1·1 Football Let1gue v . TV Radio ow Corp. . 53 U.S. P.Q.2d ( 8 1A l 1 83 1
( W .O. P<L 2000).
I 03. ror more on the usc of baselines to detcnnine harm and losses in imellecrual
properly contexts, sc� Wendy J. Gordon. q( Harms and Bene(i1s: Torrs. Reslitlllion. and
fmefll!cttw! l'mpeny, 2 1 J. LFGAL STUD. 449 ( 1 992).
I O..J. .)'ee ,.UfJrLI note 99 and accompanying rext.
I 05. For a theoretical c:xposition or this argument and its application in rhc property
tmelkctual property Jebatc. see Mark

A.

Lemley. Proper1_1 . lllleflecw(l/ PropertY.

f7ree Nicling X:1 Ti.:X. L. RF\·. 1 0] 1 (2005) . .1)ee also Mark

A.

and

Lemley, The r:nmomics o(
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o f the property right is tied intrinsically to their understanding o f piracy . 1 06

Thus, i f piracy were understood as being l imited to revenue losses. claims
should be limited to unfair competition, restricting competitors from free
r·iding on the first-mover's efforts when such free-riding lead

to a direct

loss ( for example, XBC against D RC). On the other hand. if piracy en

compasses failed revenue streams as well, a n open-ended property right
becomes necessary. A l l o f this or course depends on who broadcaster

c haracterize as "pirates," and given the general tendency to include in this
category any person making a n unauthorized use of the broadcast signal,

the usage tends to be in the direction of the widest possible interpretation.
Piracy losses ought to be under tood as revenue losses resulting from

free-riding on the efforts o f an earlier entrant into the market and as ex

cluding losses resulting from another part y ' s identification of a new reve

nue stream, even if the new stream remains in some way indirectly con

nected to the established one. Discussions of signal piracy do not, at pre

sent, reflect this distinction. lndeed, a few years before discussions com
menced at the WIPO, a prominent member o f the European Broadcasting
Union ( EB U ) observed that private copying of broadcasts by individuals

"constitute[d) unjust enrichment on the part of the private individuals car
rying out such recording [since] there i a conesponding actual loss or loss

o f opportunity to . . . license its protected material . . .

.

" 1 07

The tendency

to equate revenue losses with lost revenue streams thus dominates the de
bate.

This analysis logically leads to a case that has become i n famous in the

information property context: International News Service v. Associated
108
Press.
For quite some time now, commentators have faulted the Comt's
analysis of propetty in new

there. 109 Where the International News Ser-

lmpr01•ement in Intellectual Proper(\' Ll/11', 75

TEX. L . RE V. 989 ( 1 997); Mark A. Lemley

& Brett M. Frischmann, Spillovers, I 07 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007).
I 06.

See generally Peter K.

Yu,

Four Common Misconceptions About Copyriglu Pi

racy, 26 LOY. LA. I T'L & COMP. L. RE\·. 1 27 (2003).
1 0 7 . Moira Burnett, Thirt
y-Four Years On: High Time for Filling the Gaps in Broad
casters · ProtecTion, 6 E T. L . REV. 39, 40 ( 1995).
1 08 .

248 U . S . 2 1 5 ( 1 9 1 8) .

109. See. e.g., Douglas G . Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy
of fntemational News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 4 1 1 ( 1983 ) ; Rich
ard A. Epstein, International News Sen·ice v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as
Sources of Properry Rights in News. 78 VA. L. REV. 85 ( 1992); Dennis S. Karja1a, Mis
appropriation as a Third Intellectual Propert_v Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L . REV. 2594
( 1 994); Bmce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeal the Past: The Reemergence c�( Misappro
priation and other Common La11· Tltf!orie�· (l Protection for fntellectual Property, I I
HARV. J . L . & TECH. 401 ( l99S): Richard A. Posner, Misappropriatiun: A /)irge. 40
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is in the Court 's

attempt to understand excludability as being limited in

cope to losses

arising out of direct free-riding. In his majority opinion . Ju tice Pitney
gramed the plaintiffs a limited prope11y interest in their new toric. -one
that would operate only against competitors, wa time-specific. and would
1 10
come into existence only when there was actual ex post free-riding.
At
the root of the Court'

reasoning appears to have been a concern that one

party wa. profiting off of the investments of another, a form of unfair
competition. The Court thus recognized that an ordinary revenue lo

was

unfair, whereas losing a new revenue stream was not. I f an individual had
come along and found a way to distribute news stories freely using

a

novel

mechanism-on kite , for example-the Cou11 would probably have di al
lowed the plaintifr

claim, even though in an ideal world the plaintiff

might have een a new revenue tream in the distribution and preferred to
111
control it.
Perhap a l l of thi

piracy talk, which derives from the rhetorical force

of identifying a "pirate," is one-sided. In other word . a pirate i- but an
individual who make

unauthorized use of another'

property rights. and

con equently we ought to first identify the owner of the property right be
fore we embark on a di cu

ion about piracy and related lo

e

·.

\Vhile thi�

would ce 11ainly be the ca e for real and per onal propeny, it i not . o for
1 12
Real and personal property are at all material times en
imangibles.
dowed with the characteri tic of ownability, by vi1tuc of their being tangi
ble (or a re ). Conver ely, an intangible is converted into an ownable re.

only through a legal fiction. and its independent legal exi tcnce as a res i.

consequent upon the identification of rights individuals have in relation to
1
it. u Thus, in formation becomes property only when the legal sy tem ac
11l
cords indi' idual exclusionary entitlement over it. - The , ame is true for
Hou · . L. R 1

'

. 6 2 1 (2003 ) :

Leo .1. Raskind. The J\,fisapproprimion Docmne a_,

a

Cnmp<'lt

ltl'<' Norm o f lntl!l!l!clllal f>ruperf}·. 75 U. M l 'l . L . RE\'. 875 ( 1 9 9 1 ).
I I 0.

In!'/ \'e"·' S11n . 248 U.S. at 2-+ 1 -42.

See ul a1 239 ( "The right of 1hc pu rch aser of a smgk ne'' ...paper 10 -.pread

I I I.

\..nn\\'kdge of lb contcnb gratunousl�. for any legiumate purpose not unrca:-.onahly Jn!CI
I�ring wuh c�lmpli.ll n ant's ngh1 to make merchandise of i1. ma� be admnted.'')

See I .·\ \\'RI 'l l l - L ESSIG. FREF CL I TLRE: THF 1 \I
- LR I .'\'lD (li l t HI 01- CRL\·

1 1 2.

1 1 \ IT't 53-l\-t (2005) (prO\ 1ding

an exhau 11\e O\ CJ'\ JC\\ of the gent:·,� of Ihl' tt:'m1 Ill the

C.:IHllC'\1 or 111tCJ(ectuaJ propeny diSCOUrSeS).

.Set' . ' tephen L. Caner. 011·ning ll"ha1 Dot>sn '1 £.n,l. 1 .1 I I \R\ .I.L. & Pt B. POL.,

1 1 3.

1>9 I 1990 ).
1 1 -t.

& Pt

B.

Httl .,ee rrunk l·a:-.terbrook. llllellenua/ Proper1_1 f., S'n/1 ?mpen_, .. 1 : 1 1 -\ R \ . .I.L.

Pn1 . ,

I og ( I 990): Richard A . Epstcm. !JI!ellt!c nwl Propem

Ole/ !Jo111ularies

Clllcf .\('\1 rm/111('/'\ . 76 1'-- D. 1 .. .1. �03 (200�). Anothe r \\(IY llr ()11 '/1/11� lnlonnatinn. :-.o 10
:-orh.:a\.. .

I�

t h rnugh 11ll'C'hili11Sil1:-. o r secnx::

and here SCl'I'I?L'Y l'Oil\"CI'b the ekmenl o r de
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broadcast signals that are equally intangible. Consequently, it becomes
critical to identify the reasons upon which the justification for a propet1y
regime depends before bestowing proprietary status upon broadcast sig
nals. Since the primary justification for the property regime is the exis
tence of revenue lo ses from piracy, we need to begin from the piracy ar
gument.
Undoubtedly, the main factor driving the broadcasters' push for ex
tended prope11y rights i n their signals is the emergence of digital copying
115
In the
and with il the internet as a global medium of communication.
internet, they see a huge market from which to eventua l l y generate signifi
cant revenue. At the same time, they see it as a major source of potential
competition for their analog revenues-especially when it involves their
1 16
Creating a property regime over their signal and its .fixa
own signals.

tion enables them

to control

all uses of the signal-in both the analog and

digital worlds. This in nun ensures that until they decide to enter the world
or intemet broadcasts (or webcasts) themselves, they get to extend their
1 17
dominance in the analog world to the digital one.
Equipping broadcasters with broad exclusionary control over their
broadcast signals, which in turn derive their existence from other sources,
is bound to upset the equilibrium that currently exists between different
players in the television broadcasting industry. [t remains to be seen what
the nature and consequences o f this are l i kely to be.
ln sum, the WBT would, if implemented, give broadcasters a set of in
dependent exclusionary rights over their broadcast signals, many of which
replicate copyright owners' control over the underlying content. Rather
than move the entitlement from the content producer (i.e., copyright
owner) to the broadcaster, the WBT

replicates it, creating a system o f duaJ

liability. The WBT's sole justification seemingly derives from an open
ended view o f piracy-one that treats any inability to internalize benefits

j ure exclusivity into a de facto one . Secrecy

arguments are made most commonly in the
context of indigenous cultural property. See Michael F. Brown, Can Culture Be Copy

righted?.

39 CURRENT ANTH ROPOLOGY

193, 1 99 ( 1998).

I 1 5 . This is most apparent in the preamble to the WBT, which explicitly recognizes
the threat posed by new technologies that havc given rise to new opp01tunities for unau
thorized use of broadcasts. See W!PO Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52, Preamble.
I 1 6 . See supra text accompanying notes 96- l 0 I .
I 1 7. For a review of similar rationales in the context of Australia and Japan, see
OGAWA, supra note 5 1 , at 1 67-76. [t is interesting to note that Australia introduced
broadcasters' rights into its copyright legislation pursuant to a Free Trade Agreement
( FTA ) entered into with the Uni ted States in 2000, in order to p rovide protection for U . S .
broadcasters. ld at 122 n. 1 5.
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associated with the broadcast as a loss that detracts from broadcasters' le
gitimate entitlement.
ATT ENUATED EXCLUSIONARY RIGHTS I N T H E

III.

TELEVISION I N DUSTRY
Part J l examined the basic structure o f the property rights regime for
which broadcasters have been lobbying and which countries including the
United States seem ready to adopt at the W I PO. This Part examines the
cunent regime in place i n the United States television broadcast industry
and the nature of interactions that exist between it. di fferent players. The
basis of the regulatory regime here is a balanced system of what 1 call at

tenuated exclusionary

rights, vested in each of the primary actors. These

rights together form a regime that creates a level playing field between
di fferent interests in the i ndustry, and at the same time a i m s to preserve
the ideal o f the public interest.
A word first about the idea of ' ·attenuated rights.·· Traditionally one of

the characteristic differences between property and contractual rights i s
that property encompasses rights that operate i n rem against the world at
large, whereas contractual rights only ever operate inter se between con
1 18
The in rem/in personam distinction is often taken as the
tracting parties.
1 19
basis for characterizing certain rights as property rights or othenvise.
The regimes that exist in the current television industry are not in rem in
the absolute or traditional sense, but are restricted to the existing industry
players and are thus significantly more nuanced than the traditional ideal
of exclusionary properiy, which tends to ignore the identity o f a potential
120
In this sense, the existing property bundle re
transgressor or the right.
mains

/imi!ed. However, the concept of ''limited rights'' is today associated

almost entirely with the intel1cctual prorerty discour c and its emphasis on
temporal�,. limited rights. 1 2 1 The word "attenuated'. is therefore employed
to highlight the fact that the limits here are

operaTional rather than tempo

ral. Yet the rights remain in rem-i n that they come into existence inde
pendent of a contract or other ex ante interaction between the parties and
1 I 8. See genflra/(1· Thomas W. Men·ill & 1 -knr) E. Smith. The Propi!rl.\ . Con/rae!
.
lnt�Jface. I 0 I COLl'l\1. L. R F \ . 773 ( 200 I ). See ulso Steven N . . . Cheung.. The .)mtcll/re
u{ u Co111rac1 und 1he Them:r (�(a Non-exclusil'e Rl!source. 1 3 .I.L. & Eco . 49 ( 1 970):
Wesley

ewcomb Hohfeld. Fundoml!ll!al /.ega/ Conceptions as Applied in .Judicial Rc>u

soning. 26 Y ·\ U
: L.J. 7 I 0 ( 1 9 I 7 ).

1 1 9. Se:-1! Men-ill & Smith. supru note I 1 8.
.
I 20. Si!e .I.E. PF'I NI- R. TH 1: l 1>U1 m PROPERTY li\ LA \\ I 28 ( I 997 ).
.
I 2 I . In the: comext of rhc U . S .. at least. th1s dcri' e::, from rhe phra::,c ··Ji mited tim�s .
a� used 1n the Copyright Clrrust: ol"the Constiwrinn. l .S. Cc>NST. art. I , � X. c l . X.
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are to that extent independent o f the parties' identities. Hence the phra e
··attenuated excl usionary rights.·'
A.

A Structural Overview of the U.S. Television Industry

I.

The Basic Structure

Apart from audiences (who in some sense remain passive) and adver

tisers, the U.S. televi ion industry is today characterized by the existence

o f four primary players- program producers, networks, television stations,
1:!1
Cable television emerged as a commercial phe
and cable companies.
nomenon only in the early 1 960s, and to a large extent required the intro
123
duction o f new rules that found a place for it within the overall system.

A l l legal rights of concern here originate with the producers of an

audiovisual work such as a movie or a "television show." These program

producers are either i ndependent producers or produce programs based on
the requirements of networks.

124

I ndependent producers sell. their pro

grams to television networks and are in turn paid a royalty rate that is of
ten computed on the basis o f factors such as the number of affiliate sta

tions likely to broadcast the program and the amount of advertising reve
25
nue the network is likely to be able to keep for itself. 1
Television network are brokers whose sole purpose is the assembly of

p

television programs by purchasing content from roducers and selling the
12
At the same time, how
a sembled programming to television stations.
ever, they act as intermediaries between advertisers and television stations.

In assembling the programming, networks offer advertisers internal spots,

short time slots

·within

each program, and receive compensation for each

122. See BRUCE tv!. OWEN ET AL., TELEVISION ECONOMICS 6 ( 1 974) (profiling the
different players in the television broadcasting industry at the time). Note that this book
was published before the cable television boom and consequently does not devote signifi
cant attention to th1s segment.
1 2 3 . See 3 ERIK BAR1 OU W . A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UN!TED STATES:
THE IMAGE EMPIRE 247 ( 1 970); V I NCENT MOSCO, BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED
TATES: INNOVATIVE CHALLE .GE AND ORGAN I ZAT I ON A L CO TROL 85 ( 1 979).
1 24. See Susan C. Greene, The Cable Television Provisions of the Revised Copyright
Act, 27 Ct.\THOL!C U.L. REV. 263, 265-66 ( 1 978).
1 2 5 . Stanley M. Besen el a!., Copyright Liability for Cable Television: Compulsot)'
Licensing and the Coase Theorem, 2 1 J.L. & ECON. 67, 77 ( 1 978). In a comprehensive
review of the television program production segment of the industry, Owen et a!. demon
strate that the indust1y is characterized by ve1y high levels of competition. yet at the same
time monopolistic competition-in the sense that numerous producers produce differenti
ated products that are easily substitutable and no producer earns profits in excess of a
normal rate of return. See OWtN ET 1\L., supra note 122, at 1 7 .
126. OWEN ET AL. supra not\! 122, a t 7 .
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or the e slots, priced commensurate with the size and demographic o f the
1 27
The networks are arguably the most important
program' audience.
players in the television broadcasting industry.

Television stations, in turn, are of two kinds-affiliate and independ

ents. Affil iate are television station that are affiliated with an individual
1 28
network.
A ffiliates receive almost a l l their programming from the net

works. and affiliates in the same time zone typically receive identical pro
1
gramming paekages. 29 H owever. an affiliate is u ually granted a cer1ain

degree of exclusivity in carrying the program within each geographic mar
ket. Interestingly, though, the nen.vork compen ate

afii I iates for canying

programming, which implies the transfer of a certain portion o f a net
1
work's advertising revenue to its affiliates. 30 I t is important to remember,
though, that the only advertising slots that networks can sell and derive

in-program slots. In addition to these internal lot .
slots between individual programs, refcrTed to either a

revenue from are
ever, are time

nouncement time" or "adjacencies."

131

"an

These are controlled exclu ·ively by

the television stations. Television stations similarly
to adverli er

how

e l l these adjacencies

for revenue, detennined again by variables

uch a

viewer

ship. nature and duration of the time lot. etc. The sharing of thi. adver1is

ing revenue is unidirectional. Unlike networks who mu t ·hare their reve

nue with

rations, stations

do not

tising sales with the networks.

1 32

have to

hare their revenue

from adver

lndependents are local television stations that arc not affiliated with
1 3
any network. 3 This being the case, their primary source o f programming
13t
comes from producers in the syndication market. - This market is gener-

1 27.

tanley M. Besen & Ronald Sol igo. The Economics <�( the Nellmrk-Af/iliate

Relationship in the Telel'ision Broadcasting lndu.wy. 63 1\MCR. EcON. R L:\ . 259, 259
( 1973): Franklin M . Fisher et a!., The Audience-Revenue RelatiOnship /in· Locul Televi

sion Stations, I I BELL J. Ecor-.. 694. 695 ( 1980).

.
Regulations define a "full network station. as: ''A commercial tele\ i 1011 broad
cast �tatton that generally carries in weekly pnme time hour� 85 percent of the hours o f
progra mmi ng offered b y one o f the three major national telc\ tston networks \\ nh which it
ha a primary affiliauon ( t . e.. right of fir�t refusal or first call)." 47 C.l .R. * 76.5(j)
1 28.

( 2004 ).

Bcscn e t al.. supra note 1 25 , at 77.
1 30. Qwr £1 AL.. supra note 122. at 97- 1 00.
I 3 1 . Fi her et al.. supra note 117. at 695: 8esen & oltgo. supra note 127. at 259.
1 32. Besen & oligo. supra note 1 27, at 259.
1 3 3 . Regulattons characterize a n independen t station" a � one whtch generally ca1Tie�
no more than ten hours or programmmg per \\'eel< of'fered by the three ma.tor national
television networks during prime time. 47 C.F.R. * 76.5(1) (2004).
I 14. Greene, supm note 1 24, at 77. Regulations define a syndicated program a� ..any
program solo. l iccn�cd. distributed or of'f'ered to television station l icensees in more than
1 29 .
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a l l y regarded as the secondary market for television programs. I t is very
rare for new program ming to enter the syndicated market directly: conse

quently, the market here consists of programs that have completed their
run on the primary networks. Obviously, the revenue that these programs

generate is significantly lower than on the primary market. Occasionally,

network affi l i ates ( a ffi l iate stations) also purchase programming on the
syndicated market in order to fill non-network time. 1 3 5

Television stati ons-both affi l i ates and independents-then broadcast

the content to viewer audiences j()r .fi-ee. 0 f course, viewers do not repre

sent a direct source of revenue for content producers, broadcast networks,
1
or television stations. 16
The picture presented above is a rather simplistic model of the televi

sion broadcasting market. Two important exceptions, however, exist to the

general model. The first is that the network-affiliate relationship merely

gives affi l iate stations a first claim over a network's programming, as op
13
posed to an actual obligation to carry whatever the network gives them. 7

This exception is important, and it ensures that television stations a !so re
tain some amount of control over the content of what they broadcast. The

second is that networks retain al l the advettising revenue associated with a
pre-determ ined amount o f broadcast program time carTied by the sta1 ,8

tion. _,

2.

The Emergence of" Cable Television.

Arguably, the most important development in the television industry
prior to the digital revolution was the emergence o f cable television as a

commercial phenomenon. Cable television presented regulators and pol-

one market within the United States other than as network programming." 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.5(ii) (2004).
1 3 5 . Owen et al. analyze the syndication market and conclude that, unsurprisingly,
this market remains Jess competitive anti at the same time Jess monopolistic. They attrib
ute at least part of this effect to the t'<tct that here content producers can interact with tele
vision stations directly, thereby taking advantage of the public good nature of their prod
ucts, which producers cannot in the primary market. While the market is concentrated,
the speed with which the demand needs to be met ensures its continuing viability. See
OwEN ET AL., supra note 122, at 3 1 -35.
136. Recent years have of course seen the emergence of new subscription-based
broadcast technologies such as Direct Broadcast Service (DBS) and the Home Satellite
Dish (HSD). While these continue to grow in popularity, their penetration rates continue
to remain rather low compared to both cable and broadcast television. See FCC ASSESS
YIENT. supra note 1 7, at 36-46.
1 3 7 . See 4 7 C . F . R . § 7 6 . 5 (j ) (200-+l (''right of first refusal").
1 3 8 . Besen & Soligo, .wpm nott' 1 27. a t 259.
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icy-maker with a ho t of different issues, all or which had major implica
tions for the overall stmcture of the broadcasting indu try.
mo t ba. ic form, cable television i a hvbrid
between television
.
1
and telephone technologies. 39 Cable system u. e antenna to receive tele
ln it

vision signal

(broadcast by broadcast stations) and wires to then carry
140
While the emergence of broadcast tech
them to individual subscribers.
nology marked the move from wired communication to over-the-air com
munication, cable television reversed this trend and thus to many seemed
technologically regressive at the time.
Cable television in the U nited States began i n the late 1 940s as com

munity antenna television ( CATV)-a way of bringing broadcast signals

to remote areas ·where they would not reach directly. 1 4 1 ln the typical
setup, special antennas were installed at certain locations,
The e antenna

uch as hilltops.

received television signals, ampli1ied them, and then de

l i vered them via coaxial cables strung from utility poles to individual

home . "Cable tele i ion" has ince evolved into a generic phrase for three
different thing : J -C! ( i ) the community antenna system ju t de cribed, where
four to six channel

were captured and delivered via coaxial cable : ( i i ) the

CATV . ervice vvhich involves capturing broadca t signal

ies or location

from other cit

and transmitting it to local audience ( thereby augmenting

local transmi sions ) : and ( i i i ) an independent ervice where content gener
ated specifically for this service is delivered to a subscriber base.
In it

initial stages, cable television worked as a upplement to broad

cast television and actually enhanced broadca tcr revenues by increasing
overall viewersh ip. Cable television fir t started to run into problems when

operators began carrying signals from distant locations to local communi

ti es, and later ,.vhen they began to provide audience with program ming of
their ovln. When thi

happened, broadcasters. both local and out-of- tate.

began to worry that cable television was eating into their revenues. Ini-

1 39.

Tr \ L\i

TIO\;!:. ( 1978 ).

R. Rl\ Kl'\. A

E\\" G u J D r TO FEOfR \I ( i\13LI TF.LL \ ISJO:-- RFCiLLA·

140. Se!e g,e11crol�1· MAR'\ ALIU.: \IL\Yl-R PHILLIP\. C.\ f\': A II I�TORY 01 (Ot\lt\I L 
"!IT'\ .A. '!Tr "- \ 1 1 l F \ 1':>10'\ ( 1972): CHARLES C . WOOD-\RD. .IR . . CAUL I. TFI L \'ISIO':
A( Ql l IflO'\ \'\D OI'LR-\1 01'\ or CATV SYSTF.t\1� ( l tJ7�).
1
1 4 1 . Oav1d I . 1mon. Local Televiswn I 'ersus Cahll!: .-1 ( opynght Them:1 of Prmec
tion. 3 1 FLO. C0\1\1. L.J. 5 1 ( 1979). For an elaborate O\ l:l\ ie\\ of CATV·� early year"
and the regulatory 1ssues i t pre ented sec Note, ll' ire ,\fTrl!: The FCC a11d CA TI". 79
H:\ R \ . L. R 1 \ . 366 ( 1965 ) : John C. Palmer Jr. et at.. C.-I Tl · .)·un·�r o(a Regulutm:1· Proh
lem, 52 Gl-0. L.J. I '6- 1 37 ( 1 963 ) .
142. Do R. Li Dl •( . C.\BLF TI L.E\·r:-,tON AND 1 111 FCC: 1\ CRI�IS It'- :VILOI!\ Col\..
1 ROl 6 ( 1 973 ).
"
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tially, the FCC refused to exercise jurisdiction over cable operators. 1

4�

It

was not unti l cable began to gain significant popularity and broadcasters'

complaints i ncreased tbat the FCC eventually promulgated guidelines for
44
cable transm ission. 1
Current estimates of the National Cable & Tele
communications Association ( N CTA) indicate that the countrywide cable

penetration levels as of September 2006 are around 5 8 .9% of all house
1 5
holds with a television set. 4
The most important characteristic of cable television, for the purposes

of this Article, is that i t acquires its content from two sources. First, cable

operators retransmit basic broadcast signals. Second, in a more recent

phenomenon, they also acquire rights to content meant fo r cable systems.
.

Cable television networks have emerged much along the lines of broadcast

networks. I .J n These networks act as similar intermediaries between indi

vidual cable operators, broadcast networks, content producers, and adver
tisers. They acquire content from producers and broadcast networks, sell

advertising space to advertisers, and then put together cable programming
that is relayed to individual cable operators via satellite.

Cable networks, however, di verge from broadcast networks in one
critical respect. They sell their program ming to individual (affiliated and

independent) cable operators with the royalties they receive dependent on

the operator's subscription base, and at the same time they sell advertising
slots to advertisers. Thus, unlike broadcast networks, cable networks have
1
two independent sources of revenue. 47

ro

1 43. See Joseph

R. Fogarty & Marcia Spielholz,

Pli!IUIIY in Twenty-Five Years,

FCC Cable Jurisdiction: From Zero

37 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 1 3 , 1 1 4 ( 1 985) (noting the FCC's

initial ··unwill ingness to impose any regulatory constraints on the cable industry").

144. For an overview of the FCC's attempts to regulate cable television, see generally
ROBERT W. (RA DALL & HAROLD FURCI ITGOTT-ROTH, (ABLE TV: REGU LATI01 OR

(OMPI:TITION? ( 1996); LELAND l. JOHNSON. TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE TELEVI
SION ( 1 994): William S. Comanor & Bridger M . Mitchell, The Costs of Planning: The
FCC (lnt/ Cable Television, 1 5 J.L. & ECON. 1 77 ( 1 972); Richard A . Posner. The Appro
priate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Telel 'ision fndusLry, 3 BELL J. Eco . & MGMT.
Cl. 98 ( 1 972): Daniel J. Smith, Note. Stay the Course: A HistOty ofFCC 's Response to
Change 111 1he Cable IndustJy, 1 3 J .L. & POL . 7 1 5, 7 1 7-7 1 8 ( 1997).

145.

Nat I Cable & Telecomms. Assoc., Statistics, http://www.ncta.com/Contem
'

View .aspx'�contentid=54 (last visited Nov. 14. 2006).

1 46. 47 C.F.R. � 78.5(i) (2004) ("A cable network-entity is an organization which
produces programs available for simultaneous transmission by cable systems serving a
combined total of at least 5,000.000 subscribers and having distribution facilities or cir
cuits m a ilable to such affil iated stations or cable systems.").
147.

Museum of Broadcast Communications, Cable Networks, http://www. muscum .

r,· nn.:h ives/etv/C/htm iC/cablenetwork/cablencrwork .htm ( last visited Nov. 1 6, 2006).
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tended to transmit pro

grams previou ly aired over broadcast network , continuations of pro
grams that were not picked up by broadca t network , or a few made-for
television movies. By the 1 990s, however, cable networks began produc
148
ing original programming.
Today several basic cable networks provide
their own programming (e.g., ESPN or C-SPA

) or contract with inde
pendent producers to make movies or shows for them. In addition, many
of them contract with movie producers to air movies after theatrical re

lease. Another alternative is for cable networks to include shows that
149
broadcast networks decide are not worth giving air time.
Cable television has become a major force in the U.S. television indus
150
try, and today generates more revenue than traditional broadcasting.

B.

Exclusionary Rights Regimes in the Television i n dustry
I raving examined the structure of the television industry in tenns of

both organization and revenue flows, thi Section proceeds to examine the
various property and quasi-property regimes that curTently exist between
the different industry players. The currenr claims of broadcasters and ca
blecaster for property rights ( i . e. , "broadcasters · right ") are hardly novel
in light of the history of broadcast television regulation in the United
States. In varying degrees, the FCC and Congres
cepted the e claim

already rejected or ac

to create the cwTent sy tern. To better understand the

implications of the proposed regime, it thu becomes critical to analyze the
current exclusionary regime

that exist and the process by which they

came into existence.
The idea of property rights is general ly associated with two related but
151
Trad
somewhat independent conce pts-tradability and excludabi lity.
ability is the notion that a property right creates a market for something
and allow. the force of demand and supply to operate in ensuring its effi-

148.

!d.

149.

ld

1 50.

See n· lncluslrl Re!l"elllU!.\. in GLOB.·\I E'\TFR I AIN'vl['\ T A. D MFDI \ 0Ul LOOJ.-:

151.

lndcetl, th1� 1

2006-20 I 0. mwlahle ut http: /w\\ '' .n nev.. sday.com/ fast_ t�lcts t ,._revenue�.

a debate that ha- existed among propeny thcon ·ts for a while

no\v. For an C'\celknt O\'e" 1ew of the ideas involved. see Thom<ls W. Memll & Henry E.
mlth. ll"hut 11app�.:ned 10 Pmpt:rl_r in

LaH· und

Ecvnomtc:.. I l l Y ALf L..l. 357 (200 I ).

for conception� of proper1y ernphas1zmg the excludability element. sec J.F:.. Pt:.\JNER. THE

IDLA 01 PROPI R l 'l I� LA\\ ( 1 997): a nd Thomas W. Merrill. Property and !he Righi to

1:\c/udl!. 77

or.

L H. I

/Jiacblolw ·.,

. R1 \ .

7]() ( 1998). Bw see Carol � . Rose. Conon., o f Properr
y Talk.

. 111.\iel_r. I 0� Y-\ LF L.J. 60 I . 6] I ( 1 99 ' ) (;�rg.umg tha t the exclusivity

mc1nphor IS ··at mnsl

a

cnrtoon or l mpe·· and

ought

10

be used " ith cau110 1 1).
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ln a sense, tractabi l i ty represents a macro-conception of

prope11y rights. Excludability, however, relates to the actual functioning of

the property right and to the idea that a property right fundamentally gives

its holder (usually the owner) a right ( i n rem) to exclude the rest of the
5
world from the object over which the right operates. 1 3 It thus represents a
micro-conception of property. To a large extent, the macro- and micro

conceptions represent two sides of the same coin, in that excludability (or
exclusivity) is critical to any idea of tractability. Thus, it makes little sense
for A to s e l l

B h i s car unless

the car is A ' s to begin with, which would only

be true if A can exclude everyone else ( i nc l uding

B)

from it. But when we

move to the world of intangibles, the presumptive inseparability of the two
1 4
concepts becomes somewhat complicated. ) Part of this complexity re
lates to the very definition of property

rights

over an intangible entity, but

another part derives from the fact that property tights over intangibles are

ultimately instrumental, in that their existence does not necessarily derive
155
from the rivalrous nature of the resource in question.
I n t h e context of most property regimes, tractability and excludability

go hand in hand. However, one of them remains dominant. rn the context
of the television industry, and broadcast signals in particular, i f tractability
were the primary motive of the regime, it would hardly require the intro

duction of new rights. Copyright holders would transfe r their rights (ex

clusively or non-exclusively) to networks, which would in turn transfer

their rights to stations, and, through a chain of contracts, traditional copy

right would continue to be a tradable asset. No new rights would be

needed. Excludability thus remains the primary motive, a conclusion bol

stered b y broadcasters' reliance on p i racy-related arguments to justify the

1 5 2 . See David Berry, The Market for Tradable RenelVable EneJ�'?Y Credits, 42 Eco
LOGICAL ECON. 369 (2002) (applying the concept to renewable energy credits); Robert
W. Hahn, Market Power and Tran.�ferable Property Rights, 99 Q. J . ECON. 753 ( 1984)
(providing a conceptual overview of this idea). Cf Martin Feldstein,

Tradeable Gasoline

Rights, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2006, http://online. wsj.com/article/SB 1 1 494658844877108
O.html (extending the idea t o tradable gasoline rights for households).

Demyst({ying the Right to Ex
clude: OfProperty, Inviolability. and Automatic Injunctions, 3 1 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
(forthcoming 2008) (describing the actual functioning of excludabi I ity in property law).
154. See supra note 1 1 3 and accompanying text. Cf Christopher Kalanje, Leveraging
Intellectual Property: Beyond !he Right to Exclude, http://www. wipo.int/sme/enl
153.

For more on this, sec Shyamkrishna Balganesh,

documents/Jeveraging_ip.html (last visited

ov. 1 5, 2006) (arguing that the two go hand

in hand and that the power of one ought to be leveraged into the other to render intellec
tual property meaningfu l ) .

1 5 5 . See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B . U . L . Rev. 1 047 (2005)

(arguing that virtual property. unlike informational property, is rivalrous).
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The idea of a property regime for broadcast signals i s thus

predicated on excluding others' use of signals. These rights may indeed be
traded or transferred, but excludability remains central.
Exclusi onary rights have existed i n the U . S . television broadcast in
dustry for quite some time now. Given that excludability has been their
primary focus, it becomes critical to delineate the parties against

whom the

rights operate at each stage. The television industry reveals an i nteresting
dynamic of attenuated excl usionary rights between content producers.
broadcasters, and cable operators that operate inter se and occasionally in
rem. What follows i s an outline of each of the regimes, organized sttuctur
57
ally rather than chronologically, to i l l ustrate the dynamic . 1

1.

Content Producers ' Rights: Extending Copyright Law

Of the d i fferent players i n the television broadcast industry, the legiti
macy o f content producers' rights has remained unquestioned because of
the belief that, as authors, content producers directly contribute to the
creative process and therefore are entitled to authorial property rights i n
158
S i n c e the emergence of television broad
the work they directly create.
casting, federal law has recognized the existence of copyright in audiovis
59
ual programs. 1 The real challenge for content producers has remained.
however, in adapting these rights to new and emerging technologies.
Among the several rights granted to content producers as copyright
holders under the Copyright A c t of 1 909 was the "exclusive right" to per
160
U n t i l the I 976 revision of the Copyright Act,
fonn the work publicly.
the precise definition of "public performance" remained unclear, although
it was undi sputed that an unauthorized broadcast of a work (over the air)
61
Content producamounted to a public performance that was actionable. 1
1 56. See supra Section Jl.D. 1 £ is also interesting to note thai the WBT uses the phase
"exclusive right"' throughout the treaty. but nowhere deals in any great detail with
mechanisms through which these rights may indeed be transferred or sold.
1 5 7. For a chronological overview of the current structure. see LE DL:C. supra note
142, at 8 1 - 106. See also Stanley M. Besen & Roben W. CrandalL The Deregularion of
Cable Telel'ision. 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBe:;. 77 ( 1 98 1 ) ; Ashutosh Bhagwat, q{ Mar
kets and Mediu: The Firsr Amendmenl. rhe Ne,, · Mass tvlediu and the Pvliricul Compo
nents of Culfllre. 74 l.C. L. REV. 1 4 1 , 15 0 ( 1 99 5 ) : Ttm Wu, Copyright ·s Commrmica
tions Poli(l ', I 03 MICH. L RE\·. 27X. 3 1 I -24 (2004 ).

1 58 . Thts is the traJitional authorial conception of copyright as an incentive or re
ward system. ,)'ee. e.g. MARSHALL LEAFFER. UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGII'l LAW 58 ( 3 d
ed. I 999}.
I 59. Today. this tinds recogn ition in I 7 U . . C. * I 02(a)(6). JiscusseJ supra.
160. See Copyright Act � I . I 7 U.S.C. * I ( 1 974).
1 6 1 . Jd. � I ( d ) ("to make or procure the making o f any transcription or record thereof
by or from " hich. in -..,·hole or in pan. it may tn any manner or by any method be exhib-
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which they often invoked. As a consequence, broadcast networks began
l i censing copyrighted works from producers prior to broadcasts, which
remained a relatively uncontroversial system.
W i th the emergence of cable television, things began to change. Cable
television soon began to eat into the revenues of television broadcasting,
and initially, as discussed, cable programming mainly involved the re
6
transmission of content ca1Tied by broadcasters. 1 2 Broadcasters and con
tent producers fe l t that cable operators were free- riding o ff of their
rights-rights that the broadcasters had paid fo r. In two separate cases,
copyright holders attempted to assert their exclusionary rights under the
copyright regime against cable operators. W h i l e it remains contestable
3
whether they were motivated to do so on their own 1 6 or whether they
were acting as proxies for broadcasters, the claims were doctrinally struc
tured as assertions of copyright holders' rights .
The ftrst case was Fortnightly Corp. v. United A rtists Television.
64
Inc. 1 The plaintiff was a production company that held the copyright in
various motion pictures it had l i censed to television broadcasters. The de
fendant operated a CATV service that captured the signals of five broad
casters (to whom the plaintiff had licensed its copyright) and retransmitted
5
the unedited content to its own subscribers through wire. 16 The plaintiff
argued that the defendant's retransmission amounted to a "performance"
under copyright law that infringed its exclusive rights in the work. 166
Drawing a distinction between the role of a broadcaster and that of a
viewer (who uses "equipment to convert electronic signals into audible
6
sound and visible i mages" 1 7 ), the Court concluded that CATV fell on the
"viewer's side of the l i ne" and went on to conclude that cable operators

a

(CATV operators) did not perform the work in uestion when they re
6
8
transmitted it. 1 6 In h i s forcefu l l y worded dissent, 1 Justice Fortas admon-

ited, delivered. pres ented produced, or rep roduced ; and to play or perfonn i t in public for
.

profit, and to exhibit, represent, p roduce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method
whatsoever"). The Act goes on w draw a distinction between intentional and uninten

tional i nfringement by "broadcasters;' thus making it clear thal broadcasting was indeed

covered by its express tem1s .

162.
163.
1 64.
1 65.
1 66.
1 67.
16S.

See supra Section l l l . A 2 .
.

W u , supra note 1 5 7 . at 3 1 7 (noting that this was indeed a broadcasters' attack).
392 U . S . 390 ( 1968).
!d. at 392.

!d.
!d. at 398.
!d. at 399-40 I .
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i hed the majority for "attempt[ing] to fo ter the development" of cable
170
Arguing
and abandoning precedent on the meaning of "performance."
71
1
that the majority characterization was overly impli tic , he concluded
that cable retran mission was indeed a perfom1ance under the Act and
. c: .
.
I 71
th ere fiore constituted an mtrmgement. While Ju tice Fortas' suggestion that the majority was driven by the
need to develop cable may seem extreme, it is piau ible that it was at least
influenced by the adveJiising model that broadcast television operated on
and was therefore skeptical of any harm actually ensuing. 1 73 The

nightly majority opinion

Fort

adopted a bipartite classification that does indeed

seem overly simplistic and ignores the technical details of how cable tele. .
174
.
v1s1on actua1 1 y fu nctwns.
The second case on the same subject matter, decided six years later,
was

Teleprompter Corp.

v.

Columbia Broadcasting System. lnc. 175

Here

the plaintiffs owned copyright in several television programs and com
menced an action against the defendant. a cable operator that was retrans
mitting its program

from distant area

to it

own

ubscriber . While the
7
District Court had found for the defendant (relying on Fortnightly). 1 6 the
Second Circuit divided the defendant's activities into two categories- one
involving the wire retransmission of broadca t
within the range of the actual broadca t signal

ignal

to

ubscriber

and the other involving the

retran mi sion of signals to areas where the signaL were not directed
and found the defendant's activities to amount to a ··performance" in the

latter, though not in the former. 1 77 The Supreme Court rejected this rea
soning. concluding that merely "by importing signals that could not nor
mally be received with current technology in the community it
CATV
169.

erves, a

ystem does not, for copyright purposes, alter the function it per/d. at 402 ("This case calls not for the judgment or olomon but for the dexterity

of Houdim:' ).
170.

!d. at 404-05.

171.

/d. at 405.

172. !d. at 408.
173.

/d. at 400 { usmg the phrase ··addirirmal ,.,ewer ·") (em pha. is added).

174.

The.: Court relied on the Forrnighrz,· reasoning in another case 1n' olving the re

transmiSSIOn of a radio broadcast over a speaker system. Twentieth CcntuJ) \1usic Corp.
v.

Aiken. 422 LJ. � . 1 51 ( 1975). See Greene. supra note 124. a t 271 {characterizing

liS

u.e

as precedent a� a "disrupti'e consequence'').
175.
176.

Teleprompter Corp. ' . Columbia Broad. Sys .. Inc., 4 1 5 U . . 394 ( 1974 ).
Columbra Broad . . ys.. Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp .. 355 F. :upp. 6 1 8 (S.D.J\.Y.

1972), n?l' .rl in pan. 476

F.2d 338 (2d Cir.

1 973).

Sec ( olumbia Bro<1d . . ·y. .. Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp .. 476 J-.2d 3"8. 350 (2d
Ctr. 1 973 ). rc•1 'din par!. T ekprompt er Corp. v. Collrmbia Broad . y:-. . Inc . . 4 1 5 U . .'. 3li4
.
( I 974 ).
177.
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The Court accordingly found for the defen-

d ant, as m 1 ortrugh tIy.

Most interest ingly, though, the Court seems to have been directly in
fluenced by the revenue model that broadcast television operated on, in
particular the fac t that copyright holders and broadcasters were compen
sated by advertising revenue and never directly by subscribers. ft went on
to not"e:
Unlike propagators of other copyrighted material . . . holders of
copyrights for television programs or their l icensees are not paid
d i rectly by those who ultimately enjoy the publ ication of the ma
terial-that is. the television viewers-but by advertisers who
usc

the drawing power of the copyrighted material to promote

their goods and services.
By

e x tend i ng

the range of viewabi l ity of a broadcast program,

CATV systems thus do not interfere in any traditional sense with
the copyright holders' means of extracting recompense for their
creativity or labor 1 80
.

The Cou11 thus appears to have been implying that broadcasters should
find mechanisms to internalize the benefits of this enhancement i n viewer
8
hip rather than stifle technological development. 1 1
As a direct consequence o f these decisions, Congress amended the
copyright law to extend content producers' exclusionary rights to cable
x
television . 1 2 The Copyright Act o f 1 976, which replaced the 1 909 Act,
defined

a

"pub! ic performance» as including any transmission or commu

nication and, to clarify, defined "transmit" as including transmission by
83
"any device or process." 1 Cable transmissions by wire are thus expressly
x4
covered. 1
A d i rect consequence o f this amendment was that cable opera-

1 78.
1 79 .

Teleprompter Corp. , 4 1 5

U.S. at 408.

ld

at 41 l - 1 2.
For analyses of the decision see Gil lis L. Heller, Regulatory Versus Property
Rig/us Solutions /or the Cable Television Problem, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 527 ( 1 9 8 1 ); Note.
CA TV and Copyright Liability: Teleprompter Corp . v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. and the Consensus Agreement, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1 507 ( 1 974). See also Note, Cable
Television and Copyright Royalties, 83 YALE L.J. 553 ( I 974) (analyzing the Second Cir
cuit's dec iston).
t 82 . Copyright Law Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § I 0 I , 9 0 Stat. 2541 ( 1976).
1 80.
181.

/d.

183.

1 7 u.s.c. * 1 0 1 (2000).

1 84. Sec: I I.R. Rt:: P. No. 94-1 476, at 63 { 1976) ("'[A] cable television system is per
forming when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers.'').
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as opposed to re

b·ansmitting broadcast signa]s, were now subject to content producers' ex
clusionary rights.
I n relation to retransmissions, however, the Act introduced a some
what complex mechanism. For cable retransmissions, referred to as "sec
ondary transmissions," the Act introduced a statutory licensing regime.
Under this new licensing regime, cable systems are permitted to retransmit
copyright content can·ied by broadcasters, upon the payment of a statuto
185
The royalty received under this statutory
rily determined license fee.
license is then distributed to copyright holders through a mechanism in
1 86
volving the Copyright Royalty Tribunal.
The Act thus introduced an
exclusionary entitlement vested in content producers but subjected it to a
1 87
liability (as opposed to property) rule.
Scholars have called into ques
tion the efficiency of this mechanism, arguing that it stifles the free nego
188
With the emergence of new services such as Direct
tiation o f royalties.
Broadcasting ( DB S ) and satellite broadcasting, the same statutory license
189
mechani m came to be extended there as well.
Even in relation to cable retransmissions, however, cable operators
that are mere ''passive carriers" of broadcast signals (i.e., those who exer
cise no editorial control over the selection and carriage of content) are ex
190
empted from any liability, including the payment of a licensing fee.
Thus, cable operators that merely pick up a broadcaster's signals and carry
1 91
However, the law
them to sub. cribers are not subject to the regime.

�

makes a cable operator liable for infringement if it alters either rogram
'
ming content or commercial adve11ising in the broadcast signal. 2 In such

1 85.

1 7 U.S.C. � I l l ( c ) ( 2000).

1 7 U.S.C. � l l l (d)(4) (2000). For a n elaborate overview of this mechanism and
functioning.
see 2 MELVILLE B. N I M M E R & DA\' ID ·llviMER, I M M F. R ON COPYRIGHT:
its
1 86 .

ON THC. LAW OF LITERARY,
PROTECTION 01-- I DC.:\S. � 8 . 1 8 (2006 ).

A TRE.\11�f:.

MUSIC,\L AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY. AND

TifF.

In the Calabresi-Mclamed formulation. See Guido Calabresi & A Douglas
Melamed. Pmpcrr_,. Rules. Liahiliry Rules. and lnalienabili�l".- One Vie11 · of The Cathedral.
1 87 .

85

I-J AR\". L. Rr- v. I 0�9 ( 1972).

1 88.

S11e e.g. , Bescn et al.. supra nore 1 2 5.

at

68. 94-95 (concluding that the long run

impact of rhe mecha111sm will be de1rimemal 10 1hc overall supply of programs and that a
ful l copyngh1 hability regime \vould present <.1 much better solution to the free-rider prob
lem): Greene. "upra note 1 24, at 264-65 (noting that the Act is likely to generate exten
sive lit 1gation owing to its complex procedures).
1 89 . )'ee 1 7 U.S.C. *� 1 1 9. 1 22 ( 2000 ) . .)"ef! af.,o H.R. REP. 0. 1 08-660, at I (2004).
190. See 1 7 U.S.C. � l l l ( a ) ( 3 ) (2000).
.

191.

Se<' Huhban.l Broad .. Inc. ' . S. SatcllitL" Sy� .. Inc.. 593 F. Supp. 808. 8 1 7- 1 8 ( D .

Mum. 1 9, 4 ) .
1 92. 1 7 U.S.C. � l l l ( c l( J ) (2000).
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a scenario, the operator is clearly no longer a ''passive" conduit. This ntle
is thus designed primarily to safeguard broadcasters' main source o f reve
nue-advertising. Much like the Supreme Court, Congress structured the
liability regime around the centrality o f the advertising model to the sys193
tem.
Content producers are today protected by a l i mited set of property
rights against broadcasters, cable companies, and third parties, such as
other producers who might reproduce their content. Through a mix o f
property and liabi lity rules, their rights operate against a l l the other major
incumbents in the television industry.

2.

Broadcasters ' Exclusionary Rights: Beneficial Ownership and
Retransmission Consent

Unlike content producers, broadcasters in the U n i ted States were
194
Under the rules applicable to radio broadcasts
originally without rights.

under the Communications Act o f 1 934, prohibitions existed on the re
broadcasting of one station's programming by another without the original

broadcast station ' s authorization. 195 This regime thus operated between
broadcasters inter se and prohibited one broadcaster from free-riding on
another's programs. With the introduction of television broadcasting,
courts applied the open-ended language of the rule to television broadcasts
196
as well.
193.

See H.R. REP.

No. 94-1 476. at 93-94 ( 1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.

5659, 5708-09. It notes:
Ln the Committee's view, any wil lful deletion, substitution, or insertion
of commercial adve11isements of any nature by a cable system or
changes in the program content of the primary transmission, signifi
cantly alters the basic nature of the cable retransmission service, and
makes its function similar to that of a broadcaster. Further, the place
ment of substitute adve11ising in a program by a cable system on a "lo
cal" signal ha1ms the advertiser and, in tum, the copyright owner,
whose compensation for the work is directly related to the size of the
audience that the advertiser's message is calculated to reach.
The phrase broadcasters' rights as used here i s not to be confused with the con

194.
cept of "broadcasters' rights" as used in connection with the rights proposed under the
new regime. Here, they refer merely to the limited exclusionary rights granted to them as
part of the overall regulatory structme.
1 9 5 . 4 7 U.S.C. § 325(a) (2000) ("[N]or shall any broadcasting station rebroadcast the

program or any part thereof of another broadcasting station without the express authority
of the originating station."). See Frontier Broad. Co. v. FCC, 4 1 2 F.2d 1 62 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
196. See United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1 1 73, 1 1 76 (D.C. Cir. 1 989) (noting
that the section forbids a broadcast station from rebroadcasting another broadcast sta
tion's signal without pem1ission in rhe context of video tTansmission::; as w�ll ).
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With the emergence of cable television, however, broadcasters began

to see their signals being retTa nsmitted into both local and distant markets.

More importantly, though, they noticed that cable operators were making
significant profits from their subscribers,

using

broadcasters' program

carrying signals. They bega J1 to make the argument that this constituted a
form o f unfair competition. since they were required to pay the content
producers for content, while cable operators were not. 197 But since

§ 325(a) was restricted in its operation to a "broadcasting station ..'' they

were seemingly without a statutory cause of action. As a consequence,
they initially raised d i fferent common law claims as substitutes.

Intermountain Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. Idaho Micro
wave Inc., 198 a group o f television stations (network affiliates) initiated an
In

action against Idaho-based cable operators who carried their signals to

subscribers located in the same geographi c area over which they held ex
clusive contracts from their networks to carry the programm ing. 1 99 The

plaintiffs here claimed that the defendants had engaged in a form of "un
fai r competition" and "unjust enrichment" and ought to be restrained

through injunctive relief along the lines of the Supreme Court's decision
.

.

?UU

liT
servtce.t. n Jn ternatz onaI JVews

ln refusing to extend the doctrine of "unfair competition" to cable re
transmissions, the court proceeded to deny the plaintiffs any relief. 2 0 1 In
addition, it seemingly restricted the operative scope of § 325(a) by holding

that the provision did not grant broadcasters a
against a re-broadcaster:

property

right of any kind

[T]he stat utory requirement (Sec. 325(a)), of consent before re
broadcast is not based upon. or intended to recognize any prop

erty right of the originating tation in its broadcast signal a
I t was designed only
such person

as

uch.

a means for safeguarding the interests o r

as might have propet1y rights i n program conret1t

which would be protectible under established law, a. . for cxmn

ple, statutory or common law copyright or exclusive license ar
rangements protect iblc under the doctrine o f unfair competition.

1 97.

At one point. the National Association of Broadcasters ( N A B ) ns:::erted thm the

broadcasting industry as a whole rnnd abow 25% or its gross revenues ror copynghted
material. See Greene. supru note 1 24. at 26 7 n. 1 6.
1 9X .

1 96 F . . upp. 5 1 5 (

1 99.

/d. at 3 1 7-20.

200. ld
20 I .

at 32 1 .

/d. at �26.

. D . Idaho 1 96 1 ).
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The Commi ·sion po i n ts out that. since Sec . 3 2 5 ( a ) doc, not p ur

po11 to alter or define the property ri g ht s in program material. in

some c ases the consent given u n de r the section may be of l i t t le

value as a ut h o ri ty for the rebroadcast of a program because of
the ·ration · · lack of authority to give consent to a third pany for
'(I'

the Lt-e of someone el e's prope11y.- -

It is, of course, open to dispute whether the court's inteqJretation of

� 3 25( a ) is correct, given the express statutory language in question and

other ca es applying that language to television broadcasts. What i s impor
tant to note, however, is the court ' s Hat refusal to restrain defendants'

transmission of content-carrying signals, even if transmission amounted to
free-riding and even i f the defendants were making a
.

.
1Q3
from sue11 acttvtty.-

Tn

Cable Vision, lnc. v. KUTV, inc. ,204

i gni ficant profit

brought the very next year, a

group o f cable operators brought an antitrust action against a local televi

sion station. In its counterclaim, the station a l l eged both to1iious interfer
ence with its exclusive contractual rights and unfair competition.105 The

district court initially found for the defendant and enjoined the plain
ti ffs.206 The Ninth Circuit reversed, concludi.ng that since the television
station had failed to establish the existence of a "protectible interest " by
virtue of copyright law or other Congressional enactment, the court was
forbidden from laying down a rule that would restrict access to the public

domain without legislative authorization .207

A direct consequence of these decisions was that broadcasters could

not exclude cable operators from retransmitting their signals. Immediately
after

ter,

Cablevision,

the Supreme Court decided

Fortnightly and Telepromp

which together el i minated even the possibility o f broadcasters initiat

ing copyright i n fringement claims through content producers. Interest
ingly, studies show that broadcasters failed to maintain a cohesive position

202.

!d. at 327.

203.

!d. at 328 ("The Court does not helieve that the mere profit-purpose o�· defen

dants' rendition of an identical service to the owners would transform the operation into
unfair competition with plaintiffs.").
204.

2 1 1 F. Supp. 47 (S.D. Idaho 1 962).

205.

fd. at 50.

206.

fd. at 60-6 1 .

207.

Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc . 335 F.2d 348. 354 (9th Cir. 1 964) ("In con
.

clusion. we hold that unless appellees are ahle to demonstrate a protectible interest by
virtue of the copyright laws or bring themselves within the contemplation of some other
recognized exception to the policy promoting free access to all matter in the public do
main. they cannot prevail.").
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Some were more intere ted in obtaining

cable franchise , while others genuinely wanted to eliminate competition
209
from cable television.
This again brings to the forefront the reasons for
which the property idea is deployed.
When Congre

amended the copyright laws subsequent to Telepromp

ter, it did more than just give copyright holders rights against cable opera
tors. In giving a "legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right, the right
to initiate an action for infringement, Congre

went on to provide that

broadcast stations (as licensees or assignees) were entitled to initiate ac
tions for infri ngement against cable systems that retransmitted their sig
nals, but only when such retransmission occuLTed within their local service
2 10
Thus, local broadcasters could restrict cable operators from re
area.
transmitting their signals into the same area they service. Broadcasters
were given absolutely no control over cable operator

that pick up their

signals and retransmit them to other areas. This seems logical. If the real

reason broadcasters seek to curb cable retransmis ions is because cable
operators compete with their source of revenue. then they should not ob
ject to operators who make profits by tran mitting their programming to
other areas becau e new area represent new, rather than existing, revenue
streams, given that broadcasters' revenues derive entirely from local ad-

. .

ll l

verttsmg.

Broadca ter were also given the right to commence an action against
cable operators that alter the content of their signals to modify the pro
2 1 :!
gramming or ubstitute the advertisements between such programming.
Once again, this right was i n recognition o f the centrality of the advertis
ing model to broadcasters.
Even after the 1 976 Act, broadcasters were not g i ven a property right

I n 1 984, CongTe s deregulated cable rate across the coUJ13
try in an effort to timulate competition ? 1 In the years t'ollowing the 1 984
in their signal

.

deregulation, cable subscription prices in the Un ited States rose by an av-

20 .

See Lr Dt'C. supra note 1 -+2 . at 134 (noung that 1 3% or all cable )Stems 111

1965 were o�ned b) broadcasters and that the members of NAB often exh1bited more
b1t1erness to each other than to cable tcle' ision rival ).
209.
2 1 0.
211

/d.

1 7 U . . C. � 5 0 1 ( c ) ( 2000).
.

See David r. S i mon. Local TeleviSIOII flen/1.\ Cahle· A Cop,·rig./11 Tlu:m:\·

0/

Prmecuon. 3 1 Fl D. CO!v\11.1. L.J. 5 1 . 5 7 ( 1 978) (noting 1ha1 the protection of local hroad
ca�ting wa� central to the pro' isions introduced in 1976).
2 1 2.
2 1 3.

17 U

..

.

C. � 50 I (d)(i) (2000).

Cabk Communications Policy Act. Pub. L. t o. <.JH-549. � 60 I . 9� Stat. 2779.

27XO (codi lied at -17 U

..

. C � 52 1 ( 1 9H4 ) ).
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erage of 56%, alarming pol icy makers and regulators.

� ��

�

[V o l . 22:1JOJ

Ln response, Con

gre s passed the Cable Act of 1 992.-us Among its provisions were regula
tions granting b roadca, ters fu rther property- I ike protection over their sig
nal .
Referred to as the ''retransmission consent" provisions, these new rules
now required cable operators that sought to retransmit broadcasters' pro
gramming to obtain the express con ent o f the broadcast station originat
216
In effect, these rules gave broadcasters control over the
ing the signals.
distant transmission of their signals via wire by cable operators, even
when the recipients were not in their local service area. The rationale was
no longer that the retransmission affected their advertising revenue, but
rather that as originators o f the

ignals they were entitled to control the

revenue that cable operators were making off of their

signals.

Once again

we see the explicit resurgence o f propetty talk.
At the hearings before the Senate sub-committee prior to the passage
o f the Act, broadcasters were vocal about their reasons for the protec
217
Edward Fritts, then president of the NAB, noted that broadcasters
tion.
were merely seeking the right to control '\1ses" of their signal and speci"fi
cally requested the committee to include retransmissjon consent in the
21 8
On another occasion before the House of Representatives,
original b i l 1 .

signal

which
219
Dur
belongs to the broadcaster" making the ownership claim explicit.
Fritts speci fica l l y noted that there existed an "i nterest i n the

ing the FCC ' s mlemaking proceedings fol l owing the Act's passage, the

2 14. See Gregory S. Crawford, The fmpact of the I 992 Cable Act on Household De
mand and Welfare. 3 1 RAt D J . ECON. 422, 422 (2000). See also G EN . ACCOUNTING OF
FICE, 1991 SURVEY OF CABLE TELEVISIOt RATES AND SERVICES ( 1 99 1 ); THOMAS W.
HAZLETT & M.L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS
OF RATE CONTROLS ( 1 997).

2 1 5 . Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, Pub. L. No. I 02385, l 06 Stat. 1460 ( 1992). For an exhaustive study of the legislative history surrounding
the Act, see Nicholas W. Allard. The 1992 Cable Act: Just the Beginning, I S HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 305 ( 1 993).
2 1 6. 47 U.S.C. � 325(b) ( 2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
2 1 7. For an elaborate overview of the legislative history surrounding the retransmis
sion consent provisions of the Act, see Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission
Consent: An Examination o(lhe Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U. S. C. § 325(b))
ofthe 1992 Cable Act,49 FED. COMM. L.J. 99 ( 1 996).
2 1 8. Cable TV Consumer Protection Acl of / 99 1 : Hearings on S. 12 Before the Sub
comnz. on Communications (�/ tlze S. Comm. on Commerce. Science and Transportation,
l 02d Cong. 199. 254 ( l 99 1 ).
2 1 9. Cable Tele1•ision Regulation: Hearings 011 H.R. I 303 and 2546 Before the Sub
comm. on Telecommunicwions and Finance of the H. Comm. 011 Energy and Commerce,
l 02d Cong. 774 ( 1 9 9 1 ).
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FCC specifica lly noted that "Congress created a n '"' communications

right in the broadcaster's signal, completely eparatc from the program
220
ming!'
This rhetoric suggests that retransmi sian con cnt 'vas intended
as an independent property 1ight that broadcaster

sion signal .

The retransmission consent provisions were

had in their transmis

tructured in such a way

that broadcaster were given the option of negotiating a royalty with cable
operators

choosing to have them carry

their programming in return
1
for the permission to cany some, called the must-carry altemative ? 2 Ne
::!2
gotiations were meant to happen every three year . 2 In the first round of

or

all

negotiations since the provisions' introduction in

1 992, most stations

chose retransmission consent with a royalty in tead of the mu t-carry op
3
tion. 22
The retransmission consent provisions also make it clear that they do

not affect the compulsory copyright licensing mechanism introduced in
4
1 976.22 Neverthele s, some remain skeptical about the ability of broad

ca ters to u

e

the mechanism to extract revenue

from cable operator
without also affecting the copyright licen ing mechanisms. 225 Further

more, although the Telecommunication

Act of 1 996

ought to futiher de

regulate telecommunications, it left intact the retransmi
. .
226
V I S IO n .

ion consent pro-

As thi ngs stand today, then, broadcaster· arc equipped with l i mited

property rights against other broadca ters, local cable operator . and dis

tant cable operators.

220.

In re Implementation of the Cable felcvision Con:-umcr Prot. & Compcrition

Act of 1992,
22 1 .

F.C.C. R. 2965 �I 1 73 ( 1993 ) .

See 47 U . .C. � 325(b)(3) (2000).

222.

lei. § 325(b)(3)(8) (2000).

223.

/vlost Stutt0/1\ St!ek Pay jor Must-Can}·.

. F. CIIRO'- .. .lui) 1 6. 1 993. at C4. See

also Lubin ky. supra note 2 1 7. at 146.
224.

47 u . . C. * 325(b)(6) (2000).

225.

See. e.g . Patrick Murphy. Note. Retrvn�mts.,ton Conwnt. A ,\lixt!d Stgnvl for

Cable Copynght. 1 7 COLU�1.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 237 ( 1 99 .. ). See a/\0 L om a
Ne11·sco�ts as Propern

craldi.

Will Retransmi�sion Consent StimulaTe /)roduction of Afore l.o

ca/ TeJe,•ision Ne11·s.l. 46

FED. COtvl t\1. L.J. 469, 489-90 ( 1 99-1 ):

PrOJCCI, Ref:!ulatOIT Re

form in the Cah/e lndustt}': The £.f
f ecr <�/ the 19Y1 Cahle A<'t ·., Mwr Can:, · and l?errans
mts.,ion Con. l!111 l?ule., un the Jndusn:r and 1he Comumer. 47 Af)l\111\1. L . Rl·\ . 5l:<7. 604
( 1995) (noting that the regime produced no ··new bountiful revenue ::.tn�Jms").
226.

See Telc�.: ommunJ carions Act of 1996. Pub. L. 104-10-1. 1 I 0 . tat. )(, ( 1 99(1).
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Cahle Operators ' Rights: Service Thejt

Of the three main players i n the television industry, the law provides
cable operators with the fewe t rights and the widest protection. The Cable

Communications Policy Act of 1 984 introduced a provision aimed specifi
22
cally at the theft of cable service. 7 Specifically, it prohibits the "unau
thorized interception or rcce[ption] . . . [of] any communication service''
2 !<
o ffered over a cable system. 2 The provision also allows a cable operator
229
to bring a c i v i l cl ai m fo r an injunction or compensation.
The cable operator is not granted an explicit property right in the Grdi
nary sense of the term, but for al l practical purposes, the regime operates

analogously. The cable operators' "authorization" i, the equivalent of a
tradable right in the prope11y sense, which is protected by a property rule.
The provi ion is purportedly directed at individual users who might gain
access to cable television without authorization, but would obviously op
erate against other as well (e.g ., one operator seeking to access another's
230
service to retransmit).
Thus, although cable operators are not explicitly granted property pro
tection over the content of their transmissions or over their signals, their
service remains protected through property-rule-type remedies.
The pre ent system thus represents a complex balance between the i n 
terests o f content producers, broadcasters, and cable companies-interests
manifested in the grant of limi ted exclusionary rights, or their analogs.

Figure 1 summarizes the cun·ent regime and its equil ibrium, identifying

the party in whom the exclusi onary right is vested and against whom it can
be exercised. It is clear that content producers have by far the most expan
sive set of rights, under traditional copyright, whi l e broadcasters have a
more attenuated set o f rights. Cable companies, on the other hand, are pro
vided with mere propet1y-analogs. The boxes in gray represent areas
where full-blown exclusionary protection is absent, and for good reason.

227. Cable Communications Policy Act, Pub. L. o. 98-549, § 633, 98 Stat. 2779.
2796-97 ( 1 984).
228. 47 U.S.C. � 553(a)( 1 ) (2000). Assisting is also prohibited. 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2)
(2000).
229. 47 U.S.C. � 553(c) (2000).
230. See generally MARTI GREEN, THEFT Or CABLE SERVICE ( 1990): Kevin W.
Grillo, Electronic PiraGy: Can the Cable Television Industry Prevent Unauthorized In
terceptions, 1 3 ST. MARY'S L.J. 587 ( 1 982); Paul J . Mass & Carl S . von Mehren, Cable
Theft: The Prvhlem. rhe Need.for Useful State Legislation. and a Proposed Solurion .for
Georgia, 3 5 EMORY L.J. 643 ( 1 986). See also 74 AM. JuR. 2o Telecommunications � 190

(2006).
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Figure I : Excl usionary Rights Regimes in the Television I n dustry
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The Ideal ofBalance: A Meta-Narrative ofProper(l'

The system o f limited property rights described i s thus characterized
by one uni fying characteristic-balance. The efficient fu nctioning o f the
television broadcasting industry required limiting individual players· ex
clusi onary rights and simul taneously ensuring that all the players in ques
tion were granted some kind of protection, even i f only quasi-property in
nature.
From one perspective. these l i m itations may appear artificial and wirh
our any rational basis. for example, consider the compulsory licensing
mechanisms that Congress i ntroduced for cable operator
Scholars have criticized these provision

in

1 9 76 .

231

as resulting in the creation of an

unfair and inefficient system. 232 However, the rationale for the mecha-

2.1 I .

1 7 U.S.C. � I l l ( c ) (2000).
232. ."iee Bescn et al.. supm note 1 25 ( identifying the problems assoc tated with the

ltc�n ·ing :;ystcm): Heller.
l iabi lity ).

supru note I R I ( arguing for the imposition of

ful l Ct)pyright
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nisms was never
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efficiency-driven, but rather involved the balanc

ing of competing intcre ts.
Thomas Streeter. in his interesting sociological analysis of the broad
cast indu ··try, characterized the property regimes that exist in the tele
communications sector as a form of postmodem property, where the con
cepts of ··property'' and ''markets" are simulated through bureaucratic
mechanisms. 23 3 He additionally observes. in a related context, that
"[ w ]hen faced with the absence or breakdown of traditional market rela
tions, our bureaucratically structured bu iness world sometimes sets out to

e

·tablish an administrative counterpart to property, a simulation of prop
234
[n t h i undererty using the language and procedures o f bmeaucracy."
tanding, much o f what goes by the title of property in the broadcast world
i . merely a metaphor for some kind of regulation aimed at a set of some

broader aggregate goals. What is apparent from the previous discussion o f
individual incumbents' tights i s that one such goal i s the notion o f bal

ance.
Balance of course has a speci fie meaning within this context. I t is the
idea that:

I ) The effective functioning of the industry requires providing ade
quate fi nancial and regulatory incentives to d ifferent participants.
These incentives must relate to individual players' abilit ies to

111-

ternalize revenue streams associated with their activities.

2)

The incentives provided to o n e segment could prove to operate a s a
disincentive to another.

3)

These systems o f incentives and disincentives tend to exhi.bit varia
tions in efficiency as technology develops.

The current exclusionary rights framework that exists between the d i f
ferent p l ayers represents this basic ideal: content producers need incen
tives, but ones that do not stifle broadcast and cable distribution; broad
casters need similar mechanisms, but ones that do not stifle cable or eat
into content producers' incenti ves, and so on.

233.

THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE f\ I K : A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF COMMER

CIAL BRO/\DCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 208 ( 1996). Part of Streeter's thesis involved
the rejection of the functionalist approach to property rights in certain areas. a view that
believes that prope11y rights are justified because they are needed to achieve the purpose
they serve.
234.

Thomas Streeter, Broadcas1 Cop_l'rtghl and Bureaucralization l?[ Proper!_\". I 0

C:.'\ RD070 ARTS & E "T. L.J.

567. 589 ( 1 �92).
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f n addition to the basic rights framework laid out before, the FCC had

for several years prescribed regulations governing the activities o f cable

and broadcast companies. A l l of the e mechanisms supplemented the re
gimes discussed above and were structured as exclusionary regimes,

thereby tracking the general prope11y structure in place. Taken together,

they provide an ideal i l l ustration of Streeter's point on simulated property.

What they also represent, however, is a set of regulations that operate i n

the interstices of the property regimes, directed a t introducing a sense o f
balance into the system. Their periodic modification (and eventual aboli
tion) merely represents a series o f attempts to remedy perceived imbal

ances in the system.

The FCC's first set of regulatory rules for cable television was prom

ulgated in J 965. 235 Since then, it ha

developed four primary sets of rules

to govern the balance between content producers, broadcasters, and cable
operators.236 The first were the "'mandatory carriage rules," which required
cable sy terns to can·y

all of the

local broadcast stations' content over wire

in their service areas.237 The e rules highlighted the FCC's emphasis on
local i m in broadcast

ervices and the belief that local stations formed the
backbone o f the public televi ion y tem. 238 Second were the ·'network
non-duplication rules." 239 These rules forbade cable operators from im
po11i ng broadcast signals from distant markets if the program

were shown

simultaneously (or near-simultaneously) on a local broadcast tation. and
were intended to protect network exclusivity.240 Third were the infamous

"distant-signa l-carriage rules." 2-l1 These rules placed limitations on the
number of distant broadcast signa I

the "syndicated-exclusivity" rule

cable

y tcms could imp011. Lastly,

afforded syndicated program

(carried

by independent stations) the same protection that the non-duplication rules
4
afforded network ones. 2 2

A I I of these regulations represented a balance between the interests o f

content producers. broadcasters. and cable operator . I n the I 9 Os . the

235.

,)·ee hr-t Report and Order m Dockets 14895 and 1 5233. 3( f.C.C. 683. 7 1 6

( 1 965).

.Jec·fs of 1he Dl!regulalicm of
Jtnon. The Co/lap.\e (�/ Consensus: !:)
Cuhle Tc!leli.\J0/1, 8 1 Cot l �I. L . R L \ . 6 1 2. 6 1 6- 1 7 ( 1 98 1 ) ( idcnti fying five maJOr rules.
but not1ng that one of them applie only to spons broadca t�).
237. Set! .n C. I- .R. s* 76.5 I -.55 < 1 9�0).
2.H L For an overvie'" of the FCC's localism arguments. sec tanky \11 . Besen. The
f.'mnmmc., ol ll1e Cahle Tele1·ision ··comenws ··. 1 7 J .L. & !-.<.. ON �9. 49-50 ( 1974 ).
23l). .'ie<!
' 47 C'.f.R. *." 76.92 -.94 (2004).
240. /d.
236.

Sl!e Jules F.

2-1 1 .

Sl!t> 47 C.I · .R. � � 76.57-.65 ( 1 979) ( repealed

2-12.

1 9RO).

Se<' .n c.r. R . � � 76. 1 5 1 - . 1 6 1 ( 1 97l)) (repealeo l lJXO ).
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FCC e l i m inated altogether the distant-signa l-carriage and syndicated
2-13
exclusivity rules.
Over the years, the FCC has made modifications to
the other rules as well to reflect Congressional changes i n pol icy and ad
2..14
vancements in technology.
The system thus consisted of a complex in
terplay between the FCC's regulatory rules and Congre sional grants o f
rights, both o f which remained i ntegral to the exc lusionary regimes. Ever
since the Supreme Court a ffirmed the FCC'

authority to partake in this

balancing process when it refused to invalidate the FCC's first round o f
cable regulations, the FCC has attempted t o step i n a t various stages to
:Z-15
supplement Congressional grants of rights and privileges.
Since the 1 990s, however, the FCC's regulatory incursions into the
broadcast station-cable television conflict have been minimal relative t o its
4
initial foray into the area. 2 6 The present system (and its equilibrium) is
now largely a matter of statutory grants and denials o f rights. The question
this poses for both the present regime and the proposed system of broad
casters' and cablecasters' rights is whether the FCC w i l l intervene to i m
plement or dilute these rights and the stage a t which such intervention
would likely occur ( i . e., before, concunent with, or after Congressional
24
implementation). I f the FCC's recent attempt are any indication 7 it w i l l
probably play more than just a passive role i n this ongoing debate.

IV.

RECOGNIZING BROADCASTERS' (AND
CABLECASTERS') OPEN-E N D E D PROPERTY RIGHTS:

11\II PLICATIONS & CONSEQUENCES

Having seen how l i m i ted exclusionary rights function i n the television
industry, this Part focuses on the likely consequences of introducing open
ended property rights ( i .e., broadcasters' rights) as an alternative. The
analysis here derives from some of the key attributes o f the modern televi
sion industry in an internet age, characterized by greater user autonomy
and participants' ready access to new methods of distribution.
Broadcasters, cable companies, and content producers are each inter
ested in controlling the revenue streams associated with their contribution
243. In re Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663
( 1980). This deregulation was challenged in Malrite T. V of N. Y. 1'. FCC, 652 F.2u 1 140
(2d Cir. 1 98 1 ), where the Court upheld the FCC s jurisdiction to deregulate.
244. For analyses of the FCC's more recent deregulatory initiatives, see Donald .1.
Boudreaux & Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Cable Reregu!Mion, 1 4 CATO J. 87 ( 1994).
245. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 1 57 ( 1 968).
246. Boudreaux & Ekelund, supra note 244, at 87-88.
247. Specifically in the context of the Broadcast Flag controversy, discussed later.
See il�fi·a Section l V . A .
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to the process. While content producers' contribution is by far the most

ignificant (and therefore seemingly worthy of the most ex ten ive protec

tion), broadcasters and cable companies also partake in the proces as dis

tributor . The broadcast chain thus involves d i fferent participants at each

stage. This necessitates tailoring the protection provided to the exact con
tribution that each makes to the complex process.

To qualify for protection under the WBT, entities need to satisfy t\;vo

condition . The entity must take the initiative and respon ibility for ( i ) the

tran� mission of content to the public and ( i i ) the assembly and scheduling
4
of content. 2 8
ln the case o f broadcasting, it is reasonably clear that affiliates qualify

for protection. Most broadcast programming is put together by the major

networks and relayed to their affiliates. However, affiliates retain the right
to refuse the network ' s lineup, and therefore retain control over the con

tent and its scheduling; they are also responsible for tran milling it to the
public.249 l n the cable industry, however, the matter is di fferent. While ca
ble operator remain responsible for providing individual hou ehold

with

wired connection , they have little to no control over the content of the
programming. They may, of cour e, l i m i t the channel

carried. but not the

content of the program ming in each channel, which is the exclu ive pre
rogative of cable networks. While cable networks retain control of the as

sembly and scheduling of content. they are not respon ible for transm itting

it to the public, . ince they remain dependent on cable operators for sub-

criber . The two elements of the definition of a cablcca ter are therefore

split between two categories o f incumbents in the industry, and it is not
clear which one of them will come to acquire the "cablccasters' right.'

U ltirnately it remains more than I ikely that the ulti mate beneficiaries w i l l

remain cable networks. But i f this i s the c a e, the need fo r such protection

become

even more tenuous, given that network

eldom have any direct

interaction with the public. To the limjted extent that they might be con

cerned about unauthorized interception of their communication

11'/NJ Bruudca\1

Trea�r. 'illpru note 52.

S( c l It pnl\ ides:
"'[B]roadca ting organtlation· and ·cablecasting orgamzauon· menn th� legal enuty that
takes the initiati'e and has the responsibility for the transmission to the p ubl ic of sound�
or of •mages or of tmagcs and :-.ounJs or of the rcprescntauon thereo f. and the a'>'5emb l)
and �chetlul111g o f the content or the transm•�s•on ...
.
249. -l7 c.r.R. � 76.5(j) (2004). Indeed. an affi l iat� (or full 11Ct\\Ork ...tall<)ll ) IS de
fined by it� broadca:-,t111g no Je�s than X5°/o, or its content from one or the llli'l ltlf tck�\'I<;J()Il
network�. Thi., clearly indicates that u ·tat ion. even if an affilwtc. retains cnntrol O\ cr th�
content selection and assembly prn�..·cs�.
2-HL

Set'

at

over the

.

art.

..

135�

B E RKELEY

TECHNOLOGY LAW JO

RNAL

[Vol. 22: 1303

air to c � b l e
erators for distribution. this activity is covered by an cxts
)
tent regt me. ·

�r

Additionally, under the new regime, the extent o f individual incum

bent.' contribution

i

likely to be minimal, given that broadca ters' and
251
cablecasters' rights are in a sense derivative.
This resonate with the

·'tomato juice" hypothetical that Nozick famously used to identify a prob
252
The question
lem with the classic Lockean property rights argument.
becomes: why should broadcasters' and cablecasters' contribution to the

distribution process entitle them to a proper1y right that covers content,
given that they contribute very little to its production?

In the current regime, the FCC and Congress have tailored individual

claimants' rights to reflect both the extent of their contributions and the

parties against which the rights are to be asserted, in order to enable each

party to internalize particular positive gains. This narrow tailoring reflects

the ideal of balance and suggests that extensive and unj ustified property
protection could interfere with a host o f other interests and value .

One such value is that of freedom of expression, which is enshrined in
253
The First Amendment implications of television
the First Amendment.
254
are some of the most well -documented issues in the I iterature.
The prin-

250. This would be covered by the cable theft regime, which would Lake care of an
unauthorized interception and reception of a cable service. 47 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). Ln
deed, i r cable networks are worried about their over-the-air transmissions to individual
operators, protcclion for over-the-wire cablecasting seems completely redundant.
25 1 . See supra Part (f.A.
252. Locke ·s labor theory of property postulates d1at when an individual exerts his or
her labor over something and as a consequence the labor gets irreversibly mixed with the
thing, the thing ought to become the property of the individual. Nozick high! ights the
fallacy of this argument-by asking whether the equivalent of Locke's argument meant
that i f a person emptied his bottle of tomato juice into the ocean and the juice got irre
versibly mixed with the waters there, the person could now claim ownership over the
entire ocean. Nozick of course assumed that mixing one's property (i.e., tomato juice)
with something was equivalent to Locke's idea of mixing one's labor with something.
See ROBF.RT I . OZICK, A ARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 1 74-76 ( 1 974).
253. For an overview of the free speech implications of the new regime, specifically
in the context of the European Convention Human Rights, see Patricia Akester, The Dra;;
WIPO Broadcasting Treaty and Its Impact on Freedom of Expression, COPYRIGHT BULL.,

Apr.-June 2006, at 1 , http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/OO 14/00 1464/l 46498E.pdf (last
visited Nov. 1 6, 2006).
254. See, e.g., H.C. DONAHUE, THE BATTLE TO CONTROL BROADCAST NEWS: WHO
OWNS THF. FIRST AMENDMENT ( 1 989); RICHARD E. LABUNSKI, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
UNDER StEGE: THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION ( 1 98 1 ); CHARLES H. TILLING
HAST. AMERICAN BROADCAST REGULATION AND THE fiRST AMENDMENT: ANOTHER
LOOK (2000): Jack M. Balkin, Media Filters. the V-Chip. and the Foundations of Hrvad
casl

Regulation, 45

DUKE L.J. 1 1 3 1 ( 1996): Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Pre,·s--.4
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cipal i sues relate to the basic understanding that the Fir l Amendment
255
exists to promote a free "marketplace of ideas,"
and consequently that

both government regulation aimed at controlling media companies and

private control vested in media companies are capable of impeding the

realization of that ideal. The First Amendment issues a sociated with new

broadcasters' rights are likely to be cognates o f similar debates that have
occurred elsewhere. While several of the issues discussed here do impli
cate Fir t Amendment values, they also derive their basis quite independ

ent of the same.

A.

Failing to Recognize the Emergence of a New User Dynamic
The emergence of digital technologies and the internet in the later pari

of the last century resulted in significant changes for communications me

dia. The internet made the process of information dis cmination relatively

eff011le s, cheap, and instantaneous, not only for producers. but also for
consumer . Additionally, the emergence o f digital copying clra tically re

duced the marginal costs of copying, and at the same time made the proc

e s of copying itself very simple-requiring little technological expertise
25
or financial investment. 6
For incumbent

in the television industry, though, digital technology

had both positive and negative implications. On the one hand. the ease of
dis emination meant that the costs of transmitting information to audi
ences across the world reduced dramatically. At close to zero marginal

cost, content providers could transmit i n fonnation and entertainment al

most immediately to millions of individuals on the internet. However, the

same technol ogy that gave rise to this capability also enabled audiences to
exercise greater control over what they were receiving-copyi ng, moving.

editing. altering, and sharing the content of the tran mi sions they re

ce1ved.

SeH· Firs/ Amendmelll Righi,

80 HARV. L. RE\·. 1 64 1 ( 1 967): Thomas \V. l lazlen, Physt
97 COLl'i\-1. L . Rn . 905 ( 1997}:

cal Scarci1r. Rem Seeking. and 1he Firs/ Amendmenl,

Robert B. llorwitz.

The Firs/ Amendme111 :vtee1s Some Nen· Tf!c·hnologies: fJroadcwaing.

Common Carriers. and Free Speech in 1he 1990s,

20 TIIFOI{Y & 0<. · , . 2 1 ( 1991 ):

L.A.

Powc, Jr.. Mass Commzmicalions and Lhe Firs/ Amendml!nl' An On.on •w11 ·. 55 LA\\ &

(mJTF\1P. PROBS. 53 { 1992).

255.

See. e.p,.. Red Lion Broad. Co. ' . FCC.

tdca). Sl!e al<>o T. f::.MERSO . TOW-\RD

( 1 966).

1Ju1 t:/."

-\

395

.S. 367. J90 ( 1969) ( applying the

GF.NCRAL T i l CORY 01 TilL .1-IR� I A r-. 1 1

Dt-.IFt\. r

tanlcy Ingber, The Markerplace c?f ldl'w: ...J l.egilimt=mg .\fnh. 1 9 4

Ot i K I-. L.J. I (critic11ing the idea).

256. Sec!

generul�r LAWRLNCF LF�SI(i, Till- FUTURL 01 1 0 1 AS: TH I: I· \TL OF THL

COMI\.�ONS IN i\ CONNECTED WORLD (200 1 l: Boyle .�upru nolL' 1 S.
.
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the early part of the cenrury, radio and television broadcasting revo

lutionized mass communication. By using the spectrum, broadcasters
could communicate with m i l l ions of i.ndividuals who owned a television
set . The traditional one-to-many model on which broadcasting operated,
257
Audiences
however. rested on the core principle of audience passivi(\·.
had I ittle control over the content of what they received on their televi
sions except for the ability to switch their television sets o ff. To be sure,
audience control has steadily increased over the years. Audiences now
have multiple channels from which to choose, and cable and pay television
allow more control over the time and quantity of programn1ing. Nonethe
less, the element of passivity has remained dominant.
This passivity-driven model of broadcasting is often characterized as
258
The main deficiency in this model is that it
the "market for eyeballs."
remains premised on the ideal of mass appeal and tends to ignore alto
gether the diversity of actual interests and the individual needs of audience
259
Since broadcasters' compensation derives from viewership,
members.
their concern is limited to putting together programming that attracts the
most viewership. The advent of the internet changed all o f this. It gave rise
to a whole new category of players,

users,

who controlled the quantity,

nature, and timing of information and, more importantly, o ften reworked
the information to send to others.

260

They thus sihtated themselves be

tween producers and consumers by receiving, modifying, and transmitting
information. As the

iCrave TV episode i l l ustrated, an individual could eas

ily conve1i analog broadcast programming into digital format and transmit
it over the internet to miJiions of users, who could in tum copy the stream
and retransmit it to others. When this happened, incumbents began to
clamor for greater control once they realized the threat that this posed to
their modeL

257.

Indeed, even the Supreme Court operated on the assumption of audience passi v

ity-using the phrase "captive audience" in relation to broadcast media quite often. For
an overview of the doctrine and its use by the Supreme Court, see Charles L. Black, Jr.,

He Cannot Choose But f-iear: The /)light <�{the Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 960
Redefining 1he Capti ve Audience Doctrine, 1 9 HASTINGS CONST.

( 1 953); Marcy Strauss,

L.Q. 85 ( 1 99 1 ).

From Conswners to Users: Sh!/Ling the Deeper Structures
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 5 6 1 ,

258. E.g., Yochai Benkler.
of Regulmion

564 (2000).
259.

See C. Edwin Baker,

Gil'ing 1he Audience What It

Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 3 1 1

( 1 997 ).
260.

For a comprehensive comparison between the traditional broadcast model and

Communications !nfras!ructure Regulation and
the Distribution of Control 01'er Conl�nr, 22 TELECOM M. PoL'Y 1 83 ( 1 998).

the internet model, see Yochai Benkler,
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Audience passivity thus came to be replaced by greater

interactivity.

In

the past, the e tablished i ncumbents rallied together in an attempt to elimi
nate competition from new players bearing new technologies. Each time
they sought to u e copyright or analogous property arguments to keep new
2 1
players out, a they did with the advent of cable television. 6 The reponse to the perceived threat from users is no different, and we thus see
cablecasters and broadcasters claiming exclu ionary rights over their ac. . .
?()?
ttv Jttes. - In the pa t, threats to distributors' revenue streams normally came
from commercial entities like broadcast retran mitters or cable companies,
and the argument for exclusionary rights ordinarily derived its j ustification
either from (i) perceived free-riding .for commercial gain.. or (ii) the need
to restrict player ' activities to promote overall competition. The FCC in
tum derived it rule- makjng jurisdiction fi·om one or the other of these ra.
, 1
tionaIes.-6 ·
User pre ent an altogether different situation since they are not neces
sarily commercia lly driven and do not compete \Vith broadcasters and ca
blecasters in the traditional horizontal sense. To the current incumbents,
they repre em both a

threat to it, a.

source

of additional rc\'enue. as audiences, and a

redi stributors (albeit for non-commercial purposes).

The idea of the user continues to present problems for the intangibJe
property right

discourse. For quite

orne time now, i ntellectual property

theorists in general and copyright scholar in particular have grappled with
:!64
At one end of the spec
the role or the u er in relation to these rights.
trum remain the user-focused idealists who argue that copyright is in real
ity about the ·'the use of the work," with owners being granted a special

right for a I i m i ted period and users a more general one that is not tempo-

Ranuy Ptc..·l-.cr de cribes this phenomenon a� the U!:>e of copyright as ..entry pol
.
icy .. ob�cn ing that copyright law and prcsumabl) 11� ' ariant ha' e imponanr competi
tion consequence-;. t:!:>pectatl) m relation to new entrants. Sc.>e Randal C. Picker. Copyright
26 1 .

c"

.

/:'JIIIT Polin . Tlte Ca.\C! o(JJigiwl DislrihuliOII. 47 A'TilRLST BULl. 423. 462 (2002)

( .Copyright Ia\\. bnth .JUdge-made and ·tatutory. ets kc) features or the kgal regtme for
digital dtstnhuuon entrants... ).
262. Se!e g,enera/h· I f '!PO Broadca \1 Tre(J(y. supra note 52.
263. See l ntted State�. ' · w. Cable Co .. 392 U . . 1 57 ( 1 968) ( upholdmg the FCC's
.JUrisdtction 111 connectton wnh liS propc.:ny-hkc regulation� a. deriving from 11� ancillary
tunsdicllon): L nucd "tlltes ' . :-.�tdwest \'ideo Corp .. 406 U . . 649 ( 1 972) ( upholding the
FCC� jun�d1ction 111 connection wnh cenam must-carry regulation� tmposed o n local
cable compan1c.:s) Btu '<'t' FCC v. Mtdwest Vtdeo Corp . 4-W U . . 6c 9 ( J Y71)) ( finding
that the I·CC lacked JUnsdiction tn relation to similar regulations).
264 . .)'<'<' !!.<'IH'ralh 8cnkkr. 'upro note 25�(
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� :'
rally bounded. o They thus argue for the rccogmt 1 on o f a set of "user's
rights" within copyright (and indeed all of intellectual property)-rights
that l i m i t the nonnative claims of authors for greater control and simulta

neously entitle the pub I ic to greater i n formational access. At the other end
of the spectrum are the user-skeptics, vvho argue that users' right

tend to

focus on user consumption and ignore the role that copyright plays as an
incentive mechanism in the creative process. Although the skeptics do

agree that users are entitled to

some pri1•ilege.

, they tend to d isagree with

the idealists i n believing that focusing on users dilutes the proprietary sig
n i ficance o f copyright. 266

I n any event, the key point is that the users' rights discourse has ex

isted within the realm of copyright and intellectual property for quite some

time now. The intellectual property system that exists today represents a

dynamic equilibrium between users' access rights and owners' exclusion
ary privi leges.

I n contrast, the regulatory property discourse that recognizes exclu

sionary rights in

distribution

channels has thus far never had to grapple

with the idea of non-commercial users. Given that property rights, in the

sense of

attenuated exclusionary rights,

existed exclusively between dis

tributors i n an effort to preserve a competitive balance, the regulatory re
gime recognized neither the legitimacy nor the need for such user regula

tion. This state of affairs is well i l l ustrated by the recent disputes concern
267
ing the "broadcast flag mandate. "
I n late 2003, the FCC adopted the ''Broadcast Flag Regulations," a se

ries of rules aimed at safeguarding broadcasters' and cablecasters' inter-

265. See L.

OF COPYRIGHT:
RIGHTS 1 9 1 ( 1 99 1 ); BenkJer, supra note 258; Julie E. Cohen, The
Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005). See also Joseph P.
Liu, Copyright La-...,• 's Theory ofthe Consumer. 44 B.C. L. REv. 397 (2003).
266. See Kenneth W. Dam, Se((-Hefp in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393,
394 ( 1999) (observing that users' rights advocates ··effectively emasculate" traditional
copyright principles); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and intermediate Users ' Rights, 23
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS. 67 ( l999); Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copy
right, 45 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y l ( 1 997).
267. For an overview of some of the issues involved here. see Susan P. Crawford.
The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTI 1GS COMi\1. & ENT. LJ. I (2002); Randal C.
Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the
Propertization of Copyright. 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 1 , 29 1 (2003); Debra Kaplan, ote,
A

LAW

OF

RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE

USERS'

Broadcast Flags and the War Against Digital Telel'ision Piracy: A Solution of Dilemma
for the Digital Era?. 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 325 (2004).
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2 8
ests during the trans ition to digital television. 6 The rules mandated that

television digital receivers incorporate the "broadcast flag," a digital code

that would prevent the receivers from redistributing broadcast content
2 9
once received. 6 The FCC relied exclusively on its ancil lary jurisdiction
2
for these regulations. 70 However, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the FCC
did not have authority to issue these rules since the broadcast flag only
2
came into play after the transmission was complete. 7 1 It concluded that
the Communications Act only granted the FCC jurisdiction to regulate de

vices associated with broadcasts, and therefore Congress did not delegate

to the FCC jurisdiction over devices (and uses) not engaged in actual
transmission. 2 72 Thus, actual post-reception use involving the broadcast

tlag was something the FCC's exclusionary regime could not l.egitimately

regu late. Of course, much of the concem with the broadcast flag arose be

cause the FCC's proposal was seemingly biased against consumers and
:27
ought to replicate copyright's restrictions with few exceptions. 3

What the broadcast flag case thus demonstrates is that the idea of us

ers' rights is largely alien to broadcast regulation, not because users' privi

leges are i n any sense neglected, but rather more fundamentally because

the regime does not legitimately extend to regulating their activities to be
7
gin with.2 4 Users are not regulated because doing so is extraneous to the
regime's basic purpose-creating a competitive balance and no more.

268. See In rl! Digital Broad. Content Prot., I R F.C.C.R. 23.550 (2003 ). These rules
were codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73, 76 (2003). See also ln re Hoover & Hoover Capital
Mg:mt.. Inc .. 1 7 F.C.C.R. 1 6 ,027 (2002) (inviting public comments on the idea).
269. In re Digital Broad. Contenr Prot.. 1 8 F.C.C.R. 23.550 (2003).
270. /d. at 23,563. The ancillaty jurisdiction o f the FCC derives from 47 U . . C. � 1 53
(2000 & upp. JV 2004). which in di fferent places authorizes the FCC to regulate ser
vices incidental to broadcasting. Tbe Supreme Court has in the past interpreted the scope
of the FCC"s powers under ancillary jurisdiction. See, e.g.. United States ' . w. Cable
Co .. 392 U.S. 1 57 ( 1 968) ( finding jurisdiction): FCC v . Midwest Video CoqJ .. -+40 U.S.
6X9 ( 1 979) ( overruming regulation because of lack ofjurisdiction).
?.7 1 . Amer. Lib. Assoc'n v. FCC. 406 F.3d 689. 705 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
272. /d. at 704-05.
273. See BRIA T. YEl-L Co "Ci. RF.SF.ARCH SER\' .. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF DI GI
T..-\L TF:LE\"ISION: T i i F BROADCAST V J DF.O FLAC.o (2007). ul·ai/ah/l! ul http ://opencrs.cdt.
org::"tvtsiRL33797_20070 I I l .pdr.
274. Interestingly. some argue that the regime ought to step in not at the exclusionary
nghts end. but rather at the users· access-privileges end of the debate. Thus. in situations
whet\� the market results in access bc1ng diluted, quite independent of exclusionary rights
(e.g.. self-help, technical protection measures) - regulators such as the FCC are thought
tn ha\'C a role in restonng some balance. See Molly S. Van Hnuweling, Conii1111Jiicolions ·
Cop_rri.�l/1 Polie�\. -l J. T I I. I-CO�II\ 1 . & Ill< oH T F. C I I . L. 97 ( 2005 ).
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Property in the regulatory context and traditional intellectual property

d i ffer fundamentally. I n the former, property is not temporally l i mited, but
is nevertheless con trained by the actors

against ""hom

the exclusionary

mechanism operates. In the latter, by contrast, it is tempora l l y limited, but
in rem in terms of its applicability. Limi tations on users are deemed

ac

ceptable in the intellectual property context because they ( i ) remain tem

porally limited, and ( i i ) result in long-term efficiencies that accrue back to
75
user through works entering the public domain. 2 In the context o f distri
bution-related exclusionary rights, however, the matter is di fferent. Here,
temporal limitations are absent

because

equivalent long-term efficiencies

are unlikely. Thus, limiting cablecasters' ability to retransmit broadcast

content only twenty (or fifty) years after the original broadcast is ineffi
cient principally because any value associated with the content is largely

immediate.

Consequently, a temporal limitation is likely to be of I ittle t o

no value. lt is precisely for this rea on that older programming ( i .e., rerun
programming from past seasons) is almost exclusively a part o f the syndi

cated programming market carried by independent stations and not affili
27
ates. 6 Tempora l l y l i mited, as opposed to operationally attenuated, exclu

sionary rights over the distribution process are of little utility, which ex
plains why the regulatory discourse stayed by and large clear of time

bound in rem rights.

[t is obvious that the user remains the target o f the new regime-· given

that all other incumbents are already regulated. Interestingly, though, the
new regime is structured in the nature o f a temporally limited intellectual

property right. The temporal tradeoff, however, is unlikely to be of signifi
cant value to the public, given the value of immediacy that remains central
to television broadcasting and viewership.

Users are thus relegated to the peripheries o f the new system in the be

l i e f that their interests will be served by the li mitations and exceptions of
the regime's exclusionary rights, which are analogous to those contained

275. For an elaboration on the efficiency trade-offs involved in limiting intel lectual
property terms, see WILLIAM 0. NORDHAUS, INVENTiON, GROWTH, A D WELFARE: A
T I I EO RETICA L TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 79 ( 1 969); Edmund W. Kitch,
The Nature and Function ofthe Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 284 ( 1 977): Landes
& Posner, supra note 89.
276. See Museum for Broadcast Communications, Syndication, http://www .
m useum. rv/archives/etv/S/htmiS/syndi cation/syndication.htm ( last visited Dec. 5. 2006)
( noting that the syndicated market does nor cover prime time network programmmg, live
nev.. s. and live sports events): James E. Fletcher, The Syndication Marketplace. in M ED I A
EC<>'\;OfvtiCS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 84 (Al ison Alexander et al. eds., 1 99} ).
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in traditional copyright.2 77 This approach adopt
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an overly simplistic and

outmoded conception of the user in the digital age-a a passive consumer
of information

upplied by content producer and distributors. who conse

quently cares very little about the use-value inherent in the timeliness of
2
the broadca ·t. 7 It ignores the fact that u er in an interconnected envi
ronment function as producers,

do

consumers. and distributors,

o for non-commercial purposes. By forcing u er

ised on tempora lity, the new structure neglect

and typically

into a regime prem

at once ( i ) the reasons for

which they were kept out of the regulatory property regime

and

( i i ) the

historical rationale for why the temporaJly limited intellectual property
regime stayed clear of distribution rights in the United States. At least part

of the rea on for this neglect stems from the Jack of a cohesive organiza

tional framework for the category of users. ln addition, u ers' interests are
diversified and at times seemingly incompatible.

This u er dynamic is thus one that the cunent version of the proposed

broadca. ter

·

rights regime completely glosses over. The regime remains

premi ed on the belief that through exclu ionary rights, broadca ters can

extract rent. from users and at the same time control their behavior. Situ

ated mid\\ay between authors and pa sive consumer . u ers get none of
the protective right

that authors and owner

do. nor the protection ordi

narily as ociated with consumers.

Detracting from the Benefits of a New Distribution Structure

B.

One or the consequences of the internet and the emergence of digital

tcchnoJogje · i that it decentralizes and democratizes the proce s of distri
lf
bution . 27 Broadcasters and cable companie are no longer viewed a in

dispensable agents

in the distribution proce

.

The most ob ious example of this is the emergence of companies such

as YouTubc, an on line broadcasting ( or wcbcasting) fac ility that allows
2xo l t s
member. to share their video programming with other for free.

277. See II'/PO Broadcast Trellf_1'. supra note 5:::! . a1 a11. 1-L The c\aCI nature o f 1hese
limitations and exceptton i . ho'' e'er. left to llH.li' 1dual nations to de1ennine ''bile en
acling trcal� -unplemcntmg lcgJ:.lalion.
:
(docu
278. See genem/1\ ERIC \ 01' HIPPEL. 01:\tOCRAl l/.1'\10 l'I'OvATIO:--. I C W05)
mcming thl' di iTcrcnl tom1s of user innovation rhat occur and noting thai " j u]ser-centercd
innovation pmcec;:.c� offer great advantages O\ er the manufacturcr-centnc innovauon
devclopmcnl sy-..tems that have been rhe mamstay or commerce for hunured� of years'·).
27Y. For a detailed elaboration nf 1h1s argument and an analysi. of the p01cnunl benc
fil� assncinted "' 1th 1his decentrallntion. sec Yoc I I A I BrNKLLR. Till WJ r\LTH OF �I.:T·
\\ OR K '>: I IO\\ St WI:\ L PROOl I(
no

1 101\ TR ·\ NSI-ORI\IS M \Rio-. FTS A '\11) fR F I. DO I\.I ( 2006 ).

It d(':-.crtb�:' it�elr <b follow-..:
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company slogan-''Broadcast Yoursclf' --is aptly indicative of its goals.
Producers and directors of original videos merely upload their videos onto
the service, and users of the service view the videos there for free. Ser
vices such as these are not targeted only at independent producers, who
produce videos not necessari ly meant for mass audiences; YouTube is to
day viewed as a major distribution base for commercial producti o n as
wel l . \Vith more than 1 00 rn.illion viewers each day and 65,000 new vid
eos added daily, YouTube presents advertisers and programmers depend
281
Not surpris
ent on advertising with an additional source of viewership.
ingly, commercial sports leagues have begun forming strategic alliances
282
with the service-previously relegated exclusively to broadcast stations.
Most importantly, though, broadcast networks have come to view
online broadcasting as providing them with additional indirect benefits. I n
October 2006, C B S began supplying YouTube with programming. Within

a month, C B S ' content on the website became the most viewed, and C B S
soon acknowledged that online distribution actually increased the ratings
283
for its traditional program m i n g content.
Google's recent acquisition of YouTube reemphasized the growing
284
Some have argued that the
importance of online broadcasting services.
growing importance of online broadcasting is likely to eat into television

YouTube is a consumer media company for people to watch and share
original videos vvorldwide through a Web experience. Everyone can
watch videos on YouTube-both at YouTube.com and across the
Internet. People can see first-hand accounts of current events, find vid
eos about their hobbies and interests, and discover the quirky and un
usual. As more people capture special moments on video, Y ouTube is
empowering them to become the broadcasters of tomotTow.
YouTube, YouTube Fact Sheet, http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet (last visited Nov.
24, 2006).
28 1 .

YouTuhe

Serves

Up 100 Million Videos a Day Online,

USATODAY.COM, July

1 6 , 2006, http://www. usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-07- 1 6-youtube-views_x.htm.
282.

See YouTube in Web Video Deal with National Hockey League,

REUTERS.COM,

Nov. 1 5 , 2006, http://www.reuters.com/article/sportsNewslidUSN 1 54869342006 1 1 1 6.

YouTube Clips Boost CBS Ratings, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN,
available at http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/business/story.
h tm l? id=2e7b9c59-aebe-4206-b3 1 5-3 1 cd5bec9c8 1 ; Chris Tew, CBS Happy with You
Tube, PVR WJRL Nov. 22, 2006, available at http://www.pvrwire.com/2006/ 1 1/22/cbs
283.

See

Vito Pilieci,

Nov. 23, 2006,

happy-with-youtube.
284.

See

Michael Liedtke,

DA Y.COM, Nov.

Coogle Holds Back Stock in YouTube Deal,

USA To

1 5 , 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/techinvestor/corporatenews/

2006- 1 1 - 1 5-google-youtubc-cushion_x.htm?POE=TECISV A.
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broadcast advertising revenues, which is already affected by competition
85
from cable advertising. 2
Content producers can enter into distribution contracts directly with

these services, thereby bypassing broadcast and cable intermediaries alto

gether, which is precisely what the sports leagues and CBS have at

tempted. Additionally, advertisers can now contract with the e services for
similar chunks of the viewership pie. While it may be premature to predict

the likelihood of this occurring, the mere possi bility drive

home the point

that online distribution services present a threat to broadcasters' and cable
companies' revenues in more ways than one.

Online broadcasting allows authors to play a more active role in con

trolling the dis emination of their work. Historically, copyright 1aw has

long recognized the exclusive right of public distribution to be one of the
2x
fundamental clements in the constituent bundle. 6 Online broadcasting

offers authors the chance to resurrect direct distr.ibution and thereby di
rectly internalize the benefits of their creations. 287
Scholarly debate on the value of direct distribution ha

been both

overly optimistic and overly pessimistic. Jane Ginsburg' po ·ition reflects
288 She argues that the emergence of the digital world equips
the fom1er.

authors with the opportunity to disseminate their work · to the public and
thereby internal ize the incentive framework more directly. without having
to submit to control by intermediary media companie 2)\9 According to
·.

Ginsburg, this is likely to have two impl ications. Fir t, it enhances the le
gitimacy o f copyright as an exclusionary framework by remaining prem
ised on generating creativity, and second, it offers the public access to an
285.

See Bob Garfield.

YouTube vs. Boob Tube. WIRED, Dec. 2006. at 226. available

ar http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/ 1 4 . 1 2/youtubc.htrnl?pg 2.
286.

See generally LYMAN RAY PAITERSON. COPYRIGHT IN I l l lORIC A L PERSPEC

TIVE ( 1968).
287.

What exactly constttutes ·'direct distribution" might of' course be u mauer of

orne contention. It certamly would encompass the case of the author producertmustc ian
di seminaung the work to the public directly. under ome kind of a revenue model.

See

MARK W. CURRA . SLL.I YOUR MUSIC!: l-10\\ TO PROFITAIJI \

RE

· 1 L1 YOUR Ow

(ORDI 1GS ONLI 'E (200 1 ). Increasingly. however. authors producer::. are also making use
of free dtstribution channel . such as free webcastcr::. (e.g.. Googlc Video or YouTube ).

IIere, authors retain complete control o,·er the production process and the content of thetr
work. but ne' erthele s reach the general public via free dtstnbuuon channels that operate

on business (i.e. . revenue) models mdependent of subscnption fees. TillS would qualify as
dtrect distnbution in the traditional sense simply because the procl!s� mvolvcs the same

clement of authorial control O\'er the process that
288.

rrue direct distnbutJon would ematl.

Jane C. Ginsburg. Coprrighr wul Conrml On'r Ne11 TechnologieS (4'Disw!mino

rion, 1 0 1 Cot UM. l. RE\'. 1 6 1 3 . 1 6 1 9 (2001 ).

289. /d.

at 1 6 1 7- 1 8.
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increased eli vcr ity of works?m . However, others argue that although the

authorial control argument i- laudable, it remains only an ideal given that

the majority of creative works today are either

mmed by

media companies

through the work-for-hire doctrine or procured by them through assign

ments of copyright, and these intermediaries have a significant compara
tive advantage by specializing in the distribution process.29 1
The answer probably lie

omewhere between the two extremes. Web

casting has begun to assume a major role in the overall market for creative

works only in the past year. 292 Online distribution is thus unlikely to

elim inate the role o f the intermediary di stributor anytime soon, but authors

are beginning to see a resurgence in their ability to communicate with the

public directly. It is precisely this outlet with which the expansive set o f
new broadcasters' rights is I ikely to interfere.

The first thing to remember about the proposed bundle of broadcast

ers' and cablecasters' rights is that it extends beyond just the

casting.

l n other words, the rights are not restricted to

missions or

inte1_lerences

act of broad
concurrent retrans

with an ongoing broadcast, but extend to fixa

tions o f the broadcast and uses o f the fL-'<.ation a fter the actual broadcast

ends?>3 l n this latter respect, it obviously extends beyond just protecting
the ephemeral
l n thi

ignal to contro lling its manifestations in a fixed a fter- l i fe.

respect, the proposed rights are more analogous to exclusive copy

right in granting broadcasters absolute control over a l l

tied

current

and

paten

uses o f their signals. Furthermore, given that the signal is physically

indistinguishable from ( and indeed, dependent on) the underlying content,

control over the signal after its ephemeral existence amounts to control
over the underlying content.

290. fd.
29 1 . See Wu, supra note 157. at 339-4 1 (noting the existence of "reasons to suspect
that development· like the Internet . . . are unlikely to elim inate the central role of dis
seminators. ' ) .
292. The fir · r phase o f online distribution involved the webcasting o f music by online
companies, which raised a plethora of issues related to the compulsory licensing scheme
under 1 7 U . . C. � 1 1 -J. (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). It eventually resulted in the Small Web
caster Settlement Act. Pub. L. I 07-32 I , 1 1 6 Stat. 2780 (2002). For an overview or the
debates in this area. which are largely related to our present debate, see Lydia Pallas
Loren, Unwnglin� the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CAS!:. W. RES. L. REV. 673 (2003).
See also Mark A . Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govem
Information?, 85 TF.X. L. REV. 783 . 827-29 (2007) ( providing for a theoretical analysis of
the regime introduc�.:d).
293. See WI?0 Broadcast Treaty, supra note 52, at arts. 1 2 - 1 5 .
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Recall the hypothetical involving Walter and

X B C the exclusive right to control the

broadca t of

Quakes

Quakes . 294 Granting
post-transmission fixation of its

and distribute copies o f the fixation effectively gives

XBC control over the work itself. Even i f Walter were to make his work

available free of charge on the internet. a user is unlikely to be able to de

termine whether a given version originated from Walter (legally) or from

X B C ' s broadcast (illegally), which w ill most likely deter actual viewing o f

Quakes altogether.

l f the skeptics are right, and Walter continues to remain dependent on

XBC to distribute his work, the addition of this new set of right

to X B C ' s

existing arsenal i s clearly a step i n the wrong direction-away from

greater authorial control. I n describing the emergence of a new paradigm
of copyright Jaw, which he calls "copyright's communications policy,"
Tim Wu notes that giving an existent incumbent exclusionary control

places the development of technologies of dissemination in the incum
bent's hands.

Assuming that the pioneer controls the creation of content (either
by controlling copy1ight. vcnical integration, or through

imple

economic dependence). it can dictate what happens and what
doe

not. . . . Everything then depend

on whether policymakcr ·

believe that an incumbent can be tru ted to promote, rather rhan
295
destroy, its technological rivals.

He proceeds to argue that this often militates against the recognition o f
broad initial entitlements in the incumbent ? 96
Broadcasters and cablecaster

cannot be expected to act except with

their own private interests in mind. Throughout the history o f U . S . televi

sion broadcasting, they have sought to curtail the development of new
technologies of dissemination, for fear that the technologies would cut into
their source of revenue. The mo t obvious instance of thi

wa , of course.

the emergence of cable televi ion. Con equently, author ' di tributive in

tcre ts can hardly be left exclu ively to their noble intentions. The new set
of rights thu

aptly i l lu trates w u ·

point regarding the nature of the enti

tkment and individuals again t whom it is to operate.

ee .\upm text accompanying notes 1 8-2 1 .
295. \Vu . supru note 1 57. ar 338. He also notes that in the example or broadcasL if
copyright in programming had clearly included future technologic� like t.:able and satel
lne Iran�mts ion. the deciston to allo" rhe ·e di seminal ton tcchnologtes to de' clop would
.
ha' e re�ted wnh the broadcast industry .. Ironically. it is pr�ctscly copyright m broadcasLs
that the new regime . cek to introduce. See also Trotter Hardy. Cop1·rip,lu aJI(/ "New
l ·'� . . Technologie\, 23 'OVA L. RF\ . 657 ( 1 999).
296. W11. supra note 1 57. at 338.

294.
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Thu , quite apart from the effecL the new regime is likely to have on
the user, ir also detracts more fundamentally from the ba ·is of traditional
copyri ght-and the central role of the author therein. In the past, when
broadcasters sought exclu ionary control against a new entrant (e.g., ca
ble), authors were never directly implicated because of their almost com
plete dependence on intermedi ary distribution. At present, the i nternet w i l l
probably decentralize distribution and m i n i mize this dependency. Thus.
moving to a regime that nc:: g atcs the benefits of this decentral ization w i l l
only st i fle further creativity.

C.

The Paradox of the "Public Interest"
This Section examines what rhe phrase "public interest" means in the

broadcasting industry and how that understand ing might impact or be i m
pacted b y t he new regime of broadcasters' rights. Few term

have gar

much ignominy a the phrase "public interest" in the context o f
Q
televi ·ion broadcasting. 2 7 It i s therefore not surprising to see a significant

nered a

amount o f cynici m characterize discussions of public i nterest over the
years. While it may indeed be di fficult to construct a single coherent defi
nition o f public interest applicable across time and technology, one tincts
the semblance of a pattern in regulatory decisions premised on the ideal.
The FCC is mandated by law to use some standard of public intere t i n
connection with innumerable regulatory and policy-making function · as

signed to i t under the Communications Act of 1 934.298 Attempts to attrib

ute meaning to the phrase by scholars over the past several years exhibit a
significant amount of ideological variety and seemingly conflicting no
tions.
One of the earliest conceptions of public interest adopted by re g u lators
299
reflected what came to be known as the "trusteeship model. "
This
297.

For general

studies on rhe topic. see

PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE. COMMUNICA riONS

POLICY J\ND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THI:. TI::L ECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 ( 1999);
MIKE FEINTUCK, "THE PUBLIC INTEREST" IN REGULATION (2004); LAURA R. L i 1DER,
PUBLIC

ACCESS

TELEVISION:

Aivii:.RICA ' S

ELECTRONIC

SOAPBOX

( 1999);

Dt:.N

IS

MCQUAIL, MEDIA PERFORMA CE: MASS COMMUNICATION AND THE PUBLIC INTI:.REST

( 1992).
298. See. e.g., 47 U.S.C. § � 1 54. 1 57-6 1 . 20 1 , 2 1 4, 229, 25 1 , 257, 259. 2 7 1 -72. 303,
307, 309, 3 1 0-1 I, 3 1 5, 3 1 9 , 325, 332. 335-36. 362, 396, 533-34, 543, 548. 572-73. 60506, 6 1 0 (2000). Of course, the standard applies to almost all of the FCC's functions. For

an excellent overview of the standard"s origins and its evolution, see Erwin G. Krasnow
& Jack N. Goodman, The "'Public Interest ·· Standard: The Search .for the Ho�,. Gruil. 50
FED. COMM. L.J. 605 ( 1998).

299. For apt examples o f this model. see, for example, the FCC's in li:u nous 1 9...J.6
Bluebook, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N. PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST
LiCJ-:NSI:: E S ( 1946), and for the policies that fo llowed its adoption, see Mark . . fovvler &

20081
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premised on the need for governmental guidance over all as

pects of broadcast decision-making, including content-related decisions.
300
Thi '"a indeed the approach adopted by the FCC early on.

Over time, an expansive reading of broadcasters' First Amendment

right and various statutory amendments diluted the rigidity of the trustee-

hip model. In the 1 970s the FCC began to move away from this model,

preferring instead to adopt a distinctively market-driven approach to defin
301
ing the public interest.
FCC Chainnan Mark Fowler made this position

explicit in his well-known law review article expounding on the virtues of
the new approach, where he noted that "the public's interest . . . defines
02
the public interest." 3 This model adopted a decentralized marketplace

approach to broadcast regulation, in the belief that broadcasters. driven by

advertising revenues, would structure their activities and programming
30
depending on public demand. 3 A t least part of the rationale for this ap

proach derived from the belief that any monopoly over content distribution
304
wa likely to be d i luted by new technologies of content delivery.
The

1 980 witne sed a spate of FCC action deregulating indu try players ( most

notably cable television) under this rnode 1 .
I n the 1 990

.

305

with the enactment of the Cable Act of 1 992. the FCC

began to realize that the pure marketplace approach was suboptimal. The
FCC Chairman at the time, Reed Hundt, reiterated that the television in

dustry was subject to obligations distinct from other media and advocated

the introduction of specific content-related regulation, all purportedly in
06
the public interest. 3 The general consensus that emerged by this time was
that equating public interest with private control ( in the la issez-faire sense)
resulted in significant welfare los es, which in turn necessitated remedial

Daniel L. Brenner, A J'vfarketplace Approach 10 Brvadcust Regulation. 60 TEX. L. REV.
207 . 2 1 3- 1 7 ( 1982).
300. See Robert K. A'ery & Alan G. wvitsky. Tht� FCC and the J>ub!Jc Interest: A
Se/ectil·e Cri/Jqul:' of C.S. Te!l:'commllnications Po/l(:r-.\1akmg. 111 PUBLIC 13ROADlA Tll':G
\ D HI I.:. PUBLIC INTEREST 52 ( Michael P. Mc Cau ley ct al. cd . 2003 ).
30 I . The fCCs subsequem deregulation of cable tele' 1 ·1on cxemplifie this approach.
302. Fowler & Brenner. supra note 299. at 2 1 0.
303. !d. at 230.
304. /d. at 225-26.
305. See :mpra notes 243-244 and accompanying te:--t.
106. Reed E. Hundt. The Publil· ·s .4innm>s: What Does the Public lntl!rest Rt.?q11ire
of Tele1·ision Brow/custer.,·?. 4- DUKE L.J. I tHN. I 090 ( I 996) ('"Clearly. broadcasters are
sub.iect to dtstmCI public interest obligations 1101 nnposcd on other media.").
,
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measures, and that these market fa i l ures could be avoided by a form o f
3u7
''progressive paternalism" towards the industry.
Regulators have thus gone back and forth in their conceptualization of
the public interest as an ideal. Many have started to question whether the
concept is worthy of any application at a l l , given both the readiness with

which regulatory decisions have in the past been justified by appeal to the

concept and the remarkable rapidity with which the philosophical basis of
the idea has varied over the years.

Thomas Streeter, in his vitriolic critique of domestic telecommunica
tions policy, argues that the FCC's regulatory approach is driven by an

ideology of what he terms "corporate l i beralism," which is premised on

the ideas of property, markets, rights, and bureaucracies . .lof< Using the
largely left-leaning philosophy of the Critical Legal Studies movement, he

argues that over the years the phrase has come to mean little except when
used in a functional sense as an ex post justification for regulators to reach
3 C)
decisions modeled on the premi es of classical liberal thought. 0
Streeter's cynical position reflects the general understanding that the
public interest ideal remains an elusive palliative-one often used by regu
lators to justify whatever decision they reach. Indeed, attempts to generate

a policymakers' definition through interviews with individual FCC offi,1
cials aptly reflect the same.-> 0
However the idea o f public interest extends beyond content regu lation

into areas such as cable television regulation. Starting in the 1 9 70s, the

FCC i ntroduced several mles and regulations for cable television, many o f

which were aimed a t balancing competition between cable companies and
local television broadcast stations. I nterestingly, the FCC rationalized al

most all of these regulations as instantiations of the Commission's public
3
interest ideal. 1 1 In relation to cable television, the FCC often invoked the

public interest to argue that its regulatory measures were directed at ex
ploring the benefits of emergent and developing technologies for the pub-

307. See James T. Hamilton, Private Interests in "Public Interest · · fJmgramming: An
Economic Assessrnent o.f Broadcaster Incentives, 45 DUKE L.J. 1 1 77. 1 1 78 ( 1996) (re
viewing Chairman Hundt's proposal ) .
308. See STREETER, supra note 233, at 22.
309. See Thomas Streeter, Beyond Freedom o.f Speech and the PuNic Interest: The
Relevance of Critical Legal Studies to Communications Polic.�v. 40 J . COMM. 43 ( 1990).
See also ERWIN G. KRASNOW & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THI:: POLITIC'S Of BROADCAST

REGULATION 1 9 2 ( 1978).
3 I 0. See Dean M. Krugman & Leonard

FCC Policy Makers, 24 J . BROAD.
3ll.

ld. at 3 1 2 .

. Reid. The "Public /mere.' I · · as Defined by

3 1 1 ( 1980).
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Such policies represent a move away from a content-based approach

to a process-driven one. Studies of the FCC's public interest goal in rela

tion to cable regulation seem to indicate that i t merely referenced a loose
set of procedural ideals: ( i ) balance between di fferent intere ts; ( i i ) diver

sity of content and ownership; ( i i i ) dynamism of approach across di fferent
1
issues; and ( i v ) localism o f content. 3 3 At the center o f the FCC's concep
tion of public interest in relation to cable television thus seemed to be the

idea of balance-that its decisions needed to reflect the interests of the dif
14
ferent p layers i n the field, even i f to different degrees. 3
One o f the major flaws with the discussions o f public interest and bal

ancing in the context o f cable television was that one party directly a f

fected by policy changes was often without effective access to the policy
1
making process. This was the consumer. 3 5 While every incumbent in the
process argued that it was acting in the best interests of consumers, con

sumers' direct inputs were rarely ever considered. Representational issues
and collective action problems were largely responsible for this absence.

Nevertheless, consumers' interests remained at least notionally at the fore

front of pol icymakers' agenda, and their interests were afeguarded in a
:;
majority of instances through indirect representation. 16 What rendered

this possible was of course the fact that ( i ) con�umer protection was

viewed as an aspirational ideal, for it aptly captured the idea o f public in

terest, and more im pot1antly that ( ii) consumers were never likely com
petitors

or

the possible targets of a regulatory regime.

Enter the debate on broadcasters' rights. As noted earlier in Part l l and

Section I V . A , these rights are structured as in rem rights and remain tar

geted at the user. Much like consumers, users are unlikely to be effectively

represented in the balancing process, but it is d i ffi e ul r for them to organ
31
ize. 7 In addition, given that users remain the targets for the new rights, it

is unlikely that any of the other pat1ies will give their interests due consid

eration. Their only hope, then, is for regulators to take their concerns into

3 1 2. See. e.g. , FED. COMMC'1 S COMM'N, CABLE TELFVISION R E PORT -\ND ORDER
AND RECONSIDERATION 4-5 ( I 972).
3 1 3.
3 1 4.

Krugman & Reid. supra note 3 1 0, at 3 1 9-20 .
See generally Patricta Aufderheide. Cable Tl?le,·ision and the Puhlic lllleresl. 42

J. COMM. 52 ( 1992).
31 5. Krugman & R e i d . supra n ote 3 1 0. at 323 (noting that the ··most likely place for
general publtc input is to the complaint service of the Cable Bureau··).
3 1 6. For example, note that the Cable Act of 1 992 was actually termed the ··C.1blc
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act'·. Set? supra note 2 1 5.
3 1 7. For an overview of the collective action problem. see M r\. CUR OLSO"'. Til l:
LOGIC or COL L ECT IV E At 'TIU
1 97 1 ).

:
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consideration. However, the recent Broadcast Flag regulations issued by
the FCC, which failed to adequately addres
318
sad reality that this i yet to happen.

users' interests, reflect the

The broadcasters' rights debate i s thus 1 ikely to create an entirely new
3
dynamic for the public interest. 19 Far from creating measures premised on

a trusteeship ideal of broadcast regulation, incumbents advocate for mea ures

which directly restrict user 's rights

to use broadcast signals, by argu

ing that those restrictions are in the public's best interest. The rhetoric

seems to have thus come full circle- starting from a position where the

public interest supposedly restricted private actions (trusteeship), to one

where the public interest was considered to be in al i gnment with private
interests ( marketplace approac h), to finally one where the public interest

purpo11edly dictates rules directly limiting the public's use privileges. Se

mantic and philosophical skepticism apart, this shift is at once easy to

identify , yet hard to ignore, given the extent to which the notion of public
3
interest remains entrenched in the industry's regulatory framework. 20
One might argue that any property-based exclusion is actually in the

pub! ic interest,

in the long term.

Arguments along these l i nes-that shoi1-

term restrictions involve long-term efficiency gai ns-certainly are not new

to intel lectual property, which is premised on the idea that temporally lim
ited use-restrictions can produce long-term LLSe-gains. The notion of public
interest, however, has never sought to place short-term detrimental limits

or restrictions on the public in order to ensure long-term gains. Thus, for
instance, the FCC has never in the past entertained regulatory measures

that would allow cable television prices to rise exponentially i n the short
tem1 to ensure an eventual long-tetm price equili.brium. A distinction be
tween short- and long-term public interest goals is both meaningless and

3 1 8. One o r the major problems with the broadcast tlag regulations that public inter
est groups highlighted was its failure to provide for use-exceptions along the lines of
copyright's fair use doctrine. See, e.g., Comments o f the Electronic Frontier Foundation
ro the FCC, In the Matter of Digital Broadcast Copy Protection, M . B . Docket o. 02230, Dec. 6. 2002, at 1 3 . See supra note 273 and accompanying text. The idea has since
taken the fonn of a Bill (H.R. 5252) currently before Congress. See Communications
Opportunity. Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 1996, H.R. 5252, 1 09th Cong. (2006).
3 1 9. See generally Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 298, at 630 (noting that the
emergence o f the digital world does not require a radical change i n the meaning of the
standard, given that its "genius . . . is its breadth and flexibility").
320. Indeed. some argue that the "public interest" ideal is unconstitutional to begin
with, given that it is indeterminate and amounts to an abdication of Congressional re
sponsibility. Randolph J. M ay, The Public Interest S1andard-ls it Too Broad to be Con
stitutional?. in COMMUN ICATIONS DEREGULATION A 'D FCC REFORM: FINISHING THE }013
1 85 (Jeffrey .'\. Eisenach & Randolph J . May eels 2001 ) .
..
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self-defeating within the context of the television industry, particularly
given ( i ) the rapidity of technological innovation in the telecommunica
tions industry and ( i i ) the changing socio-cultural preferences of audi
ences.
For example, consider the case of devices such as TiVo, which enable
users to time-shift and space-shift broadcast programming, and to fast
321
forward through advertisements.
Under a broadcasters' rights regime,
its manufacture, sale, and use would presumably a l l be ill egal, unless one
was to wait fifty years before watching recorded programming. This k i n d
of time-shifting a n d space-shifting i s meaningful only because the shifting
322
is within relatively short intervals.
Thus, Ronald, a busy banker, prefers
to record Monday's episode of Heroes to be viewed later i n the same week
( o r at most a week later), since he's always tied up i n meetings on Monday
nights. Sometimes, he views the episode on his computer at work, instead
of his television set, the fo llowing day over lunch. The broadcasters' rights
regime would now allow h i m to do al l of this only for programming that
t
aired at least fif y years ago-all in the name of an attempted trade-off.
The converse is that, in relation to the

Heroes

episode, the recording and

transmission would be permitted fifty years from the Monday on which it
aired-meani ng that if someone missed it live, they would have to wait a
l i fetime to see it again on their television sets in the comfort o f their
homes.
It is precisely the in rem and user-targeted nature of broadcasters'
open-ended rights that results i n this outcome. And it is probably for this
reason that debates are typically couched i n intellectual property

or

copy

right tetms, given that the copyright law framework readily accepts the
temporal l imitation trade-off. The public i n terest at stake in the copyright
debates at the international level ( i . e., at the WIPO) has little relevance to
the current regulatory framework ( i .e., retransmission consent, compul sory
licensing, etc . ) . Policymakers might require more forceful judicial inter
vention in order to realize that the regime is actually about
32 1 .

broadcasting

for an overview of rhe TiVo and its technological capabilities. see TiVo.com.

Service features, http://W\vw.tivo.com/1 .6.4.asp (last visited Dec. I 0. 2006). for a de
tailed overview of the copyright-related issues that the TiVo technology ( O V R ) raises.
see Ned Snow, The TiVo Question: Does Skipping Commercials Vio!at£' Copyright Law!.
56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 35-38 (2005) (noting that unlike with the VCR. over 90% of
DVR users actually do skip commercials): Matthew W. Bower, lore. Replaying the Be

tamax Case for the New Digr tal VCRs: lnTroducing Ti l'o ro Fair Use. 20 CARDOZO ARTS

& ENT. L.J. 4 1 7 (2002).
322.

Time-shifting and space-shifting as legitimate forms of content ··fair use·· are

normally traced back to the Supreme Court's holding in the Beramax case. See Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Un iversal City Studios. Inc . . 464 U.S. 4 1 7 ( 1 984 ).
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arenas where the public interest ideal ( i n whatever form)

remains inescapable. The central question then is to what degree the public
interest w i l l be spli t into its short- and long te nn variants.
-

A BALANCED llVIPLElVlENTATTON PROPOSAL:

V.

STAGG E R E D EXCLUSION
The new regi me of broadcasters' rights is wi thout a coherent justifica

tion, ignores much of what exists as regulatory mechanisms in the televi

sion industry, and is likely to have serious detrimental consequences for

both emergent technologies and the dynamic to which they seem to be giv



ing rise. Broadcasters' and cablecasters' primary motivation for the new

regime derives from the emergence o f the internet as a decentralized dis

tribution mechanism, and with it digital technologie s of copying and
23
transmission. 3 Claims of signal piracy are in reality claims that broad
casters' de fac to exclusivity over distribution is now being eroded

.

But m ight there be a rationale for introducing a regul atory framework

thar at once both alleviates some o f the concerns of broadcasters and at the

same time is ful l y cognizant of the p i t falls of straying too far i n the direc
tion o f propetty protection? This Part argues that there might indeed be,

drawing from the discussion of attenuated rights in the current regime, and

outlines the structure such a solution might take.

A.

U n fa i r Competition as a Regulatory Basis
regime

A

premised on the ideal of unfair competiti on- aimed at re

creat ing a level playing fie ld between competitors-might represent a
suitable alternative. Historically, the principle o f W1fair competition has

been associated with the doctrine o f misappropriation and notions o f "free
riding."324 However, the basis o f the unfair competition regi me proposed
here derives not from these notions, which are proprietary, or at best

quasi-proprietary, but rather from the ideal o f unjust enrichment- that an
individual benefiting from a system in which others bear costs for analo
gous benefits ought to also bear some of the costs.

See supra

Section I I .D.
324. See Rudolf Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrich
ment in the Law of U1�{air Competition, 55 HARV. L. REv. 595, 6 1 2 ( 1942) (''[O]ne who
has used his intellectual, physical, or financial powers to create a commercial product
should be afforded judicial relief from a competitor who seeks to ' reap what he has not
.
sown
): Miguel Deutch, Unjctir Competition and the ''Misappropriation Docmne "-A
l?em:m!d Analysis, 48 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 503. 545 (2004) (arguing that misappropriation
doctrine must balance the "free-rider" problem with economic efficiency).

323.

.

..
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The tmfair competition in the context of broadcasters does not derive

from any value broadcasters add to the broadcast. Even i f broadcasters add

some value, determ ining the amount added by distribution, which would

be necessary in order to limit the extent to which they can internalize the

benefits that others pay for, is near impossible. A claim based on value

added would track the unfair competition ideal in its misappropriation

sense. The ideal of unfa i r competition that works best here is instead one
that i s uncoupled from misappropriation and tied to a notion o f unjust en
richment. Specifically, one party must compensate another

onZv

because

others are required by law to do so, and permitting the first party to avoid
325
this result would enable it to compete on unfair terms with those others.
Under the current system, broadcasters remunerate content producers
326
for use o f their creative works in broadcast programs.
Analogously, ca

ble companies also compensate content producers when they use broad
casters' programming. Indeed, the very basis of the current retransmission

consent regime, which requires cable companies to compensate broadcast
327
The
ers for use of their signals. is premised on a restitution.ary ideal.
basic idea is that since the regulatory framework requires current distribu

tors to compensate the creator, a new distributor who seeks to use the

same creative work ought to be subject to the same regulatory framework.
Broadcasters, cable companies, and reh·ansmitters all

compensate

authors

for their work because to do otherwise would be unjust not in a property
rights sense ( i .e., because incumbents

own

their broadcasts), but in an eq

uitable sense ( i . e., in the interests of fa irness and to create a level playing
328
field between competitors).

325. Unjust enrichment, as a general principle, is based on the idea that where one
person derives a benefit from the act tons of another, he is mandated by the principles of
equity and natural justice to pan with his benefit or at least a patt thereof. See Peter Birks,
Unjust Enrichment and Wrong/it! Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1 769 (2001 ). Scholars
often wlk about the idea of '·restirution for unjust enrichment," which is of direct applica
tion here. In the ca. e of restitution for a wrong. restitution derives from a primary wrong.
independently actionable under tori. contract. or property law. Restitution for unjust en
richmem. however. is a principle of equity, for an action that is otherwise perfectly le
gitimate (or damnum sine iniuria) at bw. l n other words, the restitution concept used here
derives from the unfaimess or tnequity 1nherent in the parry·s gain.
326. As an element of traditional copyright law, given that broadcasting has always
been considered a ··public perfom1ance. ··
"'27. See general�\ Allard. supru note 2 1 5 .

32B. Indeed. the unjust enrichment argument formed the basis of some of the broad
casters· early claims for property nghts during the emergence of cable tclcv1sion. How
ever. i1 is surprising that during discussions for the new regime at W L PO·s SCCR, unjust
enrichmem arguments were never raised. For an out of contcxr application of the unjust
enrichment arg.ument 10 pri vale copying.. see Bumcrt. supra note I 07, at 40.
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eek to make

use of the same creative works for which broadcasters and cable compa

nies must pay. l f, like broadcaster , webcasters do so for a commercial

motive, the principles of equity seem to require that they be subjected to
similar regulato1y restrictions. However, this argument is valid only i f the

online webcaster, or other party making use of current incumbents' pro
gramming, does so for commercial purposes. 3 19 This concept alone re
mains absolutely central to the notion of unfair competition. The entitle

ment is not in rem in an absolute sense of the term but in rem only against
a specified class ( i .e., competitors in the distribution market, however de
fined).
Regulatory proposals restricted Lo competitors certainly are not novel,

nor restricted to the judicial context. In 1 999, Congress considered intro

ducing legislation aimed at protecting electronic databases from copying
0
by compe titors . 33 The legislation was aimed at disallowing compilers of
databases from avoiding the burdensome process of compiling their data
bases independently, by relying on the efforts of others. 33 1 lt thus sought to
subject new compilers to a similar detriment or a monetary equivalent.
However, it d i ffered from the proposal here, because it remained premised

on copying or misappropriation by vesting the entitlement in the original

compiler. An unjust enrichment rationale, on the other hand, would have

vested the entitlement in some other party, such as the owner of the under
lying content. Nevet1heless, the legislation is aptly i l lustrative of a system
limited to competitors.

Limiting the regime in similar manner, to new

commercial distribution

intermediaries-entities seeking to derive their profits through the distri

bution of content onli ne-serves several purposes. It leaves intact the user

dynamic of the internet and in a majority of instances would not interfere

with the activities o f individuals engaged in non-commercial activities,
even if they involved the copying of current broadcast programming.

329. Copyright law already employs the commercial/non-commercial distinction as
part of its standard fair use analysis. See 1 7 U.S.C. § I 07 (2000 & Supp. l V 2004) (re
qutring cour1s to consider "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nanrre or is for nonprofit educational purposes"). The distinction
has been applied fairly straightforwardly here and there seems little reason to believe this
might present problems elsewhere.
330. Consumer and Investor Access to lnfonnation Act of 1999, H.R. 1 858, I 06th
Cong. § I 02 ( 1 999); see also H. R. REP. lo. I 06-350, pt. 1 ( 1999) ("Congress must en
sure that database publishers have sufficient protection against unfair competition.").
3 3 1 . For a comprehensive analysis of the Bill, see Yochai Benkler. Consritulional
Bounds of Database Protection: The Role o(Judicial Review in the Creation and De.fmi
tion o_(Pril'ate Rights in ll1forma1ion. 1 5 BERKELEY TECH.

L.J. 535 (2000).
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accessing and copying programming for their own non

commercial purposes, public or private. would not be subject to this regu
latory framework. Furthermore. mere u e

• .

commercial or not, that are not

accompanied by acts of commercial distribution would remain outside the
reach of this regime, since the framework extends only to competing
commercial distributors. (Copyright law might, of course, provide content
producers with an independent remedy against such uses.) Lastly, if the
regime employed a statutory licensing mechanism, it would also exclude
from it scope developers of new technologies directed at non-commercial
end users, like TiVo, since such developer , even if commercial, would
not be competing i n the distribution segment of the market.
U n fair competition thus offers regulators a rich body of work from
which to

tructure a regime that merely

ecks to ensure the creation o f a

level playing field between entities u ing the same content for their prof
it . H:!

uch a regime will o f course entail ignificant administrative and
333
other related transaction costs.
H owever, minim izing these costs by
adopting an open-ended, decentralized enforcement regime of property
334
right would give rise to a plethora of other costs, as noted previou ly.
Thi

framework enables regulator to avoid most of tho e pitfalls.

B.

Optimizing the Regulatory StructUJ·e: Taking the Past
eriously
How might a regulatory regime for the reuse of broadcasts (and cable

ca ts) be ·tructured? In specific. who should compensation, if any. go to
and how might this work? The regulatory battle between broadca t and
cable television that eventually ended about a decade ago and re ulted in
33:;
the current regime is instructive.
The very same arguments for property
rights were made by broadcaster
Congrc

i n that context. Yet both the FCC and

rejected the e argument . and instead adopted a

taggered regu

latory regime of exclusion. The result \.vas the emergence of a burgeoning

.13 2 .

L.nfmr competition and unJUSI ennchmenl ha' c been 1 ied toge1hcr m 1 h e past.

hu1 m different contexts and. more imponaml). as common law ( 1.e .. judicial) solution�.

s·ee A'\\H.\1 K'\\IPER�IAN

A'\DER<;. Ur-... r-\IR CO\tPCTITIO'\ LA\\ : T111 PRCHI-r l iO'\t or

1'\ rL I Lrt n ·\I '\l'\1) l'IDL•STRIAL CRE·\ 1 1\"1 n 1 34 ( 1997) (argutng for the creation of a

ne'' doctrine of ·'mnltgn competition··).

Bill we

Cald\\ ell. supra note I I . at I I I I ( noting

that h�· has "no fallh 111 t he lHlJUSt enrichment theory").

33.1. Many of which might. of course. be rnimmizcd through a ystcm or collectin�
ltccrhtng a-.. J!-t currently tn play. S£>e ranley M . Bescn ct al.. 'Ill l::conollli< lnolnis t?f
Cof>\ ng./11 Colleclil'<''. 78 V \. L . . RF\ . 3 1< 3 ( l <,)92 ).

J."-1.
) 1 ."

See wpra Pan I V .

.\"('<' f.!.\'llaalh Lt Dt 'C s11pra note I 42.
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cable industry that has a l l but replaced broadcast television as v 1 ewer
primary source o f programming.

The h i story outlined in. Part u r reveals a gradual pattern in the devel

opment of broadcasters' current exclusionary rights. When cable televi

sion first emerged, broadcasters paid little heed to it. l t was viewed as a

mechanism to enhance broadcast viewership, and the retransmi sion o f
broadcast signals was a l lowed without any re trictions. I t was only a few
years later, when broadcasters began to realize that cable companies were

competing with them and actually a ffecting their revenue model, that they
began lobbying regulators for controls on cable. Their principal argument

remained that while they were forced to contract with content producers

for work, cable companies were able to short-circuit this requirement alto

gether. Both the courts and the FCC stayed away at first until Congress
6
intervened with its copyright law revisions in 1 976. 3 3 Congres made ca

ble transmissions a form of public perfotmance and introduced compul
sory statutory licensing for

econdary transmissions of broadca t signals

carrying copyrighted content. '37 Additionally, i t granted broadcasters
standing to sue competing cable companies within their local jurisdiction.

The new statute and the F C C ' s interstitial regulations allowed cable to
flourish and compete with broadcasting on a level playing field. It was not

until 1 992, by which time cable revenues were substantial enough to com

pete with broadcasters' advertising revenues, that Congress introduced the

system of retransmission consent, which granted broadcasters exclusion

ary rights over their content -carrying signals, but
.
.
.
1 8
parues seek mg to retransmit t I1em: 3

only against cable com-

Of course, it was not owing to any lack of analytical foresight that

policymakers consciously chose not to i ntroduce property protection early

on. The idea of "retransmission consent" was proposed in 1 968 for the
fi rst time and rej ected because of the nature of the industry. 33 9 Regulators

336.

See supra Section 1 1 1 . 8 . 2 .

337.

!d.

338 .

For a historical overview of this, see LE Due, supm note 142, at 86. See also

ROBERT W . CRANDALL & HAROLD W. FURCHTGOTT ROTH, CABLE TV: REGU LATION OF
COMPETITIO

( 1996); LELAND l. JOH SON, TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE TELEVI

SION ( 1 994). Jn addition, Congress also introduced a set of sh011-term liability rules to
supplement these rights in 1 992. The rules were to be reviewed periodically and extended
1 f necessary. and were meant to operate in lieu of full-blown property regimes. See Lem
ley & Weiser, supra note 292. at 821 (analyzing these "program access rules·· as modifi
cations of traditional liability rules).
339.

fn re Amendment of Pan 7-t Subpart K. of the Comm'n's Rules & Regulations

Relative to Cmty. Antenna Television Sys.; Notice of Proposed Rulcmaking &
Inquiry. 1 5 F.C.C.2d 4 1 7

� 38 ( 1 968}. See

otice o f

Veraldi, supra note 225. at 480 ( ''Such consent
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recognized that property rights could re ult in holdout , which would tn

tum impede access to programming and the media.
Figure 2: Exclusionary
Pha c 1

Protect io n in

the Broadca t-Cable Tussle

No regulation of cable television: FCC and couns decline j u risd i ct i on

Congress iona l i n te r ent ion :

Pha c 2

v

able transmissions rendered perfonnancel-J

B roadcasters gTanted limited beneficial ovmcr hip

Compulsory licensing introduced for retransmissions
FCC issues exclusivity regu l ations to supplement these
Phase 3

FCC regulations relaxed considerably to promote c able

Phase 4

Retransmission consent introduced

One Je �on to be learned from this phased approach to exclusionary

protection is that although full-blown, exclu ionary protection early on

would have minimized admin istrative costs as ociated with the regime and

decentralized enforcement to individual broadca ter . doing o would have
killed the development of cable television a

a \·iable alternative. ]t i

likely that e\·en the limited retransmission consent \'ariant of exclusionary

protection would have unduly stifled cable had it been introduced too
-l
early, which i one reason why its introduction wa put off. 3 0 Jt was not
until cable grew to a level where i t wa

recognized a

capable of comper

ing with broadcast independently that full blown retransmis ion consent

( i .e., exclu ionary protection) was introduced.

A similar staggered approach has much to offer in the context of

broadcasters' current concern that online transmissions of their signals is
in some sense unfair. The past several decade. of it

vide a workable ba i

functioning do pro

on which to structure a new regime aimed at regu

lating an altogether new medium of distribution.

C.

A
Thi

t aggc•·ed Approach to Regulating Online Retransmissions
section outlines a

taggered approach to regulating \Vebca ting

ba ed on three central principle . Fi rst. that the ba i

of the regime be nei

ther proprietary nor wrong-ba ed. but rather ba ed purel) on unfair com
petition and the belief that equity require

a level playing field.

econd.

given the centrality of unfair competition. that it be re tricted exclusive!)
to commercial \\ebcasting. and thu

thar indiYidual u

req u m.'ment � rrobabl) \VOuld h<n e prev en ted any competition

tems.'·).
340 .

.')<"<' VL' ra ld i . '"fWu

note 22:\ at

4XO.

cr

at

would remain

all from

cabl e

-;ys
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exempt from the regime altogether. Third, that it forecloses courts from
inventing causes of action to supplement the regime since such interven
tion would likely upset the balance of interests.
The webcasting industry is today at a nascent stage in its development
and only recently has begun to emerge as a viable alternative to traditional
341
However, its success as a
over-the-a i r and over-the-wire transmissions.
business model is I ikely to depend on several factors. The most i mportant

factor is, o f course, determining the exact revenue model that these struc
tures are likely to adopt: advertisi ng-based, subscription-based, or a hybrid
34
of the two. 2 A l l the same, the internet as a distribution and communica
tion medium has been around for close to two decades now, and digital
copyright liabil ity for copying and distribution are fairly well settled.
Thus, the webcasting regulatory regime must take as a given that it is an
act of infring� r�ent for a company or individual to distribute or perform
4
works online:' J

1.

Phase l: Statutory Content Licensing/or Retransmissions

Because broadcasters, cable companies, re-broadcasters, and cable re
transmitters a l l have to pay to use authors' creative content, commercial
webcasters ought to do so as well. This requirement can be achieved in
one of two ways. The first mechanism is through voluntary licensing,
which would require webcasters to negotiate with copyright owners for
licenses to usc their works in online transmissions. The problem with t h i s
solution i s that content producers today depend o n incumbent intermediary
distributors for royalties, and most of the works they create are produced
either under a work-for-hire clause or have had their copyright transferred
344
Under these condito the intermediary as a precondition to distribution.

34 1 . See generally JESSICA KEYES, WEBCASTING: How TO BROADCAST TO YOUR
CUSTOMERS OVER THE ET ( 1997); PEGGY MILES, l TERNET WORLD GUIDE TO WEB
CASTING (Robert M. Elliott ed., J 998). See also Matthew J. Astle, Will Congress Kill clze
Podcascing Swr?, 1 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 6 1 (2005); Susan A. Russel, The Struggle
Over Webcasting- Where is the Stream Can)1ing Us?, I OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 1 3 (2004).
342. For an analysis of a few potential business models, see Sylvia M. Chan-Olmsted
& Louisa S. Ha, Internet Business Models for Broadcasters: How Television Stations
Perceive and Integrate 1he Internet, 47 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 597 (2003); and Ashok

Ranchhod & Oilin Gurau, lmemet-Enabled Distribution Strategies, 1 4 J. INFO. TECH.
333 ( 1 999) (studying di fferent models in existence). See also INTERNET TELEVISION (Eli
Noam et al. eds., 2004) (analyzing the different regulatory and business models that are
likely to evolve in the context of internet television).
343. For an overview of some of the issues in relatjon to this area, see JESSICA LIT
:v!AN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (200 I ). See also Pamela Samuelson, Toward a "New Dear
for Copyright in rhe li![hrmation Age, 100 M ICH . L. REV. 1488 (2002).
344. Wu, Sllflra note 157, at 339-40.
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tions, a voluntary licensing mle would require webcasters to negotiate ei
ther with powerless content producers or with powerful content distribu

tors with whom they seek to compete directly. ln the latter situation, hold
outs are very likely.
A compul sory licensing mechanism, on the other hand, would largely

avoid the holdout problem and have the added advantage of al lowing the

benefits to accme back to content producers-the sole contributors o f
creativity t o the entire process-who today Jack independent negotiating

power. In addition, it would also allow the system to take advantage of
collective licensing schemes that currently exist for content, thereby

minimizing the transaction costs associated with individualized l i cens
345
Of course, licensing here is not for works directly from the content
ing.
producer, but rather for works

originating from

the producers but

obtained

from the capture o f broadcasters' or cablecasters' signals. In other words,

it is restricted to retransm issions and does not incl ude primary transmis
sions, for which a regime already exists under traditional copyright law.

The compulsory licensing scheme would thus require commercial

webcasters to pay a statutorily determined royalty fee for content con
tained in the broadcast signals they seek to use in their webcasts. 1 f web

casters fa i l to make royalty payments, they would open themselves up to
full copyright liability from content producers and their transferees. Sec

tions 1 1 1 and 1 1 4 of Title 1 7 might provide policymakers with additional

lessons, since they already contain similarly structured provision. -- one
-' 1<>
for cable retransmissions and the other for webcasts of musical works. l n this structure, commercial webcasters would be able to get access to

creative content via the primary i nte1mediaries-broadcasters and cable

companies-but would have to remunerate the producers rather than the
distributors of the content. This structure is analogous to the regime in

Section 1 1 1 because its emphasis is on creating a level playing fi eld. The

effect of the statutory license here is thus that it enables webcasters to ac
cess content contained in traditional broadcasting without having to nego

tiate with either the producer or the distributor. A license under this re

gime would exempt a webcaster from a l l liability to both the broadcaster
(should any exist) and the content producer (under traditional copyright ).
However, since o n l y

commercial

webcasters can use this regime, non

commercial uses might still be subject to liability under traditional copy345. Such as those organized by the ASCAP and B M I . For an overview of copyright
collectives and their functioning. see ABRAHAM 1-!0LLA.NDER, MARKET STRUCTURE AND
PF.RFORMA "CF. IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE CASE or COPYRIGHT COLLF.CTI\ l:S

( 1 983).
346.

See 1 7 U.SC. � I l l ( d ) ( 2 ) (2000 & Supp. I V 2004).
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right. This Article leaves unanswered the broader question of whether the
3
rules o f online i n fringement need to be re-appraised. 47
In

1 997, the Copyright O ffice considered compulsory licensing for

online retransmissions and concluded that compulsory licensing was best
48
introduced C{/ier market experimentation. 3 Although the cable industry's

compulsory licensing scheme did come into play

c�fter

the industry had

developed tor over a decade, the industry in that case was not subject to
copyright liability to producers or broadcasters. I n the present scenario,

this immunity does not exist, and consequently the market is not free to
34
begin with. 9 Fwihermore, were the compulsory license mechanism in
troduced with

a

legislatively determined time l i mitation in mind, the reali

zation o f a truly free and equitable market might be significantly more vi
350
able.
The objective should be to bring commercial webcasting on par
with broadcast and cable television for it to compete, not to d i l ute the

rights o f content producers.

Enabling webcasters to retransmit creative works carried by broadcast

ers and cable companies should allow webcasting to develop as an inde-

347. A recent development in this regard that pits the cable industry against webcast
ing is the case brought by Viacom against YouTube for direcr and indirect copyright in
fringement. Much of the balance betw�en commercial webcasting and the cutTent incum
bents ( i.e., broadcasters and cable networks) is likely to be detennined by the outcome of
this case. See Vlacom lnt'l lnc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 1 :07CV02 103 (S.D . . Y . filed Mar.
13, 2007). For commentary on the case and its potential impact, see Lawrence Lessig,
A'lake Wayfor Copyrighl Chaos, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 18, 2007, sec. 4, at 12.
348. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT LICENSING REGIMES
COVERING Rt:::T RA SMISSION OF BROADCAST SIG ALS 97-99 ( 1 997) (concluding that a
license along these lines was likely to interfere with content owners' access to the inter
net"s capabilities). For past suggestions i n this vein see Baoding Hsieh Fan, When Chan
nel .)'wfers Flip 10 the Web: Copyrighl Liability for Interne/ Broadcasting, 52 FE D .
COMM. L.J. 6 1 9 (2000) (recommending a compulsory licensing regime for online web
casting); Michael Wirth & Larry Collene, Should Congress Establish a Compulso1:v Li
cense .for Internet Video Providers to Retransmit Over-/he-Air TV Station Programming
1·ia the fnrernet?, in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY I N TRANSITION: THE I TERNET AND BE
YOND 397 ( Benjamin M . Compaine & Shane Greenstein eds., 200 I ) ; Barbara S. Cohen,
'ote, A Proposed Regime for Copyrighr Protection on the Internet, 22 BROOKLYN J .
l. T'L L. 40 I ( I 996). But see fred H. Cate Cable Television and the Compuls01:1' Copy
nght License, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 9 1 ( l990).
349. Many of these arguments were made during a congressional committee hearing
on rhe subject in 2000. See Copyrighred Wehcast Programming on the Internet: Hearing
Bejore !he Subcomm. on Courts and fncellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judici
w:l·. I06th Con g. (2000) [hereinafter Webcast Hearings].
350. See Picker, supra note 26 1 , at 462-63 ("The modem stmcture of racilitating dis
tributional entry by validating or conferring rights in copyright holders yet coupling those
rights with statutory licenses has the virtue of mitigating the exercise of monopoly power
and minimizing the transaction costs of negotiations.").
..

,
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pendent distribution service. At the ame time, it po es no threat to content
producers who either seek to enter the wcbcasting world (e.g., YouTube)

themselve or create content specifically for digital transmission. By creat
ing a market for webcasting. the proposed Phase J regu lations would in
51
duce producers to develop content specifically for internet audiences. 3

Phase I i s meant to track t h e boom that cable television experienced i n

its first two to three decades of existence. With the issue of copyright l i 

ability re. olved by the 1 976 Act, content producers began t o develop con

tent exclusively for cable television. Both cable networks and an entirely

new segment of the television market soon emerged, all because of the

realization that cable television was a viable alternative to broadcast tele
vision, and one for which independent content could be produced with an
35
expectation of returns. 2

2.

Phase 11: StatutOJy Retransmission Consent

Once commercial webca ting reaches a stage where it is capable o f

competing w i t h traditional broadcast and cable media, P ha e I I should be

put into place. Phase II involves a licen ing mechanism analogous to re
tran mis. ion con ent. but with liability rule protection in tead of proper1...

rule protection. Phase I 1 is structurally similar to Phase I, as a statutory
mechani m that enforces broadcasters' and cableca ter

·

consent for re

transmission through a "compul sory authorization" rule that would operate
as a

tatutory licensing scheme to fix the payment

make to obtain rctransmi

webcasters need to

ion authorization from broadca ter .

A mechanism such as this serves more than one purpose. First_ by re

quiring wcbcasters to pay broadcasters and cable companies for retran -

missions and copyright owners for their works, it forces webcasting as an

jndu try (which ought to have developed substantially by the time the

Phase

lJ

regime i

introduced) to move toward creating an independent

market for webca ring content. By

35 1 .

,ome argue thm th1

penali:::ing

IS already occUlTing.

webcaster who seek to re-

See Jeff I lowe. \'lllsi-Siream TI ·.

WIRI L>. Feb. 2007. at 54 (noung ho\\' intemct tl'Je, ision . hO\\S arc ancmpung to break
into the world of tcle' 1s1on ).
352.

Once tim. happens for the internet. and content producers begm to contract l llde

pendentl) " tth commercial ''ebca·ten;, the reg1me in Pha5e I m1gh1 be pha�ed out. 1-lu\\ 
ever. the dismantling ought ro reflect rhe extent to wh1ch '' cbcast ing has de' eloped ,·is-a
VIS brouJca:-t111g and cablecasting in the market li.)r independent onginal programming.
Thus. 1f all or a substantial pan of webcasters· contenl is onginal programming. it would
be an llldlcalwn that the ume IS npe for the dismantl111g. Another �11tcrnative is to phase
Olll the Cl)lll\:llt 11Ci.!I1SC O\'er a period of time. lronicall), in Spite of cabk 1ekvis1011 ha\ ing.
become a dom1nant force in the television mdustry. the <;talutory ltcen:'ing reg1mc re
mams 1n place lor no apparent reason.
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main dependent on traditional broadcasters and cablecastcrs, it creates in
centives for them to contribute in the development of an independent con
tent market. A l l the same. since new entrants into webcasting are unlikely
to have content made specifically for them, i t a l l ows them to develop
through a statutory I icensing regime in the absence of potential holdouts,
which a property model would ordinarily entail.
l t is likely that the period between Phase 1 and Phase ll w i l l be quite
significant, given that in the context of cable television it took nearly ix
353
However, cable regulations moved directly from statu tory
teen years.
content licensing (the same as in Phase l ) to a full property rights regime
o f retransmission consent. The proposal here is not quite the same. A re
transmission consent regime would allow broadcasters to determine the
prices they charge for retransmission and additionally enable them tO re
strict access to their content-carrying signals in the event that negotiations
35..J
In the decade and a h a l f since its adoption,
with cable operators fai i .
conflicting reports exist on the effects of the retransmission consent provi
sions, with broadcasters continuing to assert that all is welL wh i l e cable
operators argue that they arc being forced to pay extottionate retransmis
sion fees . 355 The rule proposed here operates midway between fu l l re

transmission consent and no liability and alleviates both holdout and pric
ing problems on the one hand, and inequality concerns on the other.

The retransmission authorization regime of Phase I I comes c l osest to
fu l l -blown propetty protection, but would still operate again t a limited set
of actors and never in rem. One might argue that recogn izing broadcasters'
entitlements in term o f a property right, even in this limited sense, moves

353. Statutory coment licensing was introduced in the cable industry in 1 976, whik
ful l retransmission consent was introduced only in 1992.
354. ln 2005, the FCC reviewed the functioning of the retransmission consent regime
and concluded that it had worked without any problems, therefore requiring little to no
alteration to the basic mechanism. See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, RETRANSMISSION CON
.
SENT AND EXCLUSIVITY RULES: REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUA1 T TO SECTION 208 OF
THE SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION A D REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2004, at 4 1
(2005) , available at http://hraunfoss. fcc.gov/edocs_publ ic/attachrnatch/DOC-260936A \ .
pdf.
355. Compare National Association of Broadcasters, Retransmission Consent, http ://
www.nab.org/AM!Template.cfm?Section= Resources&TEM PLATE=/CM/ContentDispla
y.cfm&CONTENTI D=7147 (last visited Nov. 27, 2006) ("Retransmission negotiations
are fai r and market driven when exercised.") with Am. Cable Ass'n, Report fdent({les
Economic Harm Caused by Media Consolidation and Retransmission Consent Ahuse
Reinforces ACA ·s Col/for RegulatOI)' Re.foriJI (2006) (on file with author): see also Rich
ard A. Gershon & Bradley M. Egen, Re1ransmission Consenl. Cable Franchising. and
Markel Failure: A Case Sllld_r Anulysis of Wood- TV 8 Versus Cahle1•ision of J'vlichigan.

1 2 J. M E DIA ECO . 20 I ( 1999).
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the justification away from unfair competition/unju t enrichment towards
a property-based one. The use of a liability rule ( tatutorily mandated au
thorization) in tead of a property rule (voluntary authorization) ensures
356
The justification for compensating broadcasters
that this is not the case.
and cablecaster

under this rule is not because their

property

has i n any

sense been used or their faci l i t ies have been transgre sed upon, but rather
for instrumental purposes closely related to the development of commer
cial webcasting a an independent channel of distribution.
Additionally, the unfair competition argument derives from the current
regulatory framework, which already requires an incumbent with an inde
pendent source of content ( i .e., cable companies) to negotiate with a

broadcaster for the use of the latter's content. To fa i l to require the same
of commercial webcasting would in a sense be unfair to cable companies

that today require broadcasters' consent for retransmi sion as a matter of
357
The u1�jus1 element of the rationale therefore operates both vis-a
law.
vis broadcasters and cablecasters, both of whom are regulated and contrained by the cun·ent regime. The use of a liability rule instead of a prop
erty rule, however, ensures an optimal and equitable elution that does not
impede the overall Dow of i n formation and contenL

D.

S u mmation
The proposal described above i s a conceptual overview of the di rection

a new regime aimed at developing webcasting as a viable distribution me
dium might take i f it seeks to preserve the other beneficial characteristics

of the internet . Phase 1 1 will certainly require fine-tuning and p ossi bly
358
regulatory in tervention by the FCC, as it did for cable televi sion,
assum

ing of course that the FCC decides to assume jurisdiction over web-based
359
In addition, the statutory licensing and consent models

retransm ission.

356. For debates on whether protecting a right through a property rule in the
Calabrcsi-Melamed fonnulation renders the framework ..propcny"· or not. see 1 Jenry E.
mJlh, Proper{} und Propen.1· Rules. 79 N.Y.U. L. RJ:.\ . 1 7 1 Y (2004 ): Richard A. Epstein.
A Clear View of llw C01hedrul: The Dominance of Properly Rule.�. I 06 YAL[ L.J. 2091
( 1 997).
357. The corollary �� that if Congress were to relax the retransmiSSion consent rules
the ··Jc,·el playmg field.. rmionale for webca ter would as a consequence di appear.
ec Webco.\t Hearmg.\. supra note 349. at gs-89. I n panicular, the Chatrman of
35 .
the International \\"ebca ting Assoctation (I WA) offered to work wtth regulators to intro
duce stmilar e:<clusi' tty-based restnctions (along the lines of the :,yndicated exclusivity
rules). should the compulsory licensing scheme come to be adopted.
359. The FCC� jurisdictton over 1ntemct-related activity is an issue that itself has
generated a livcl;. debate. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 seemingly lorbids the
FCC from entcnng the domain of internet regulation. See 47 U..'.C. � 230(11)(2) ( 2000 &
Supp. I V 2004) (statmg that 11 i:-. the policy of the United State!-. to . .tO preserve the vibrant
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that currently exist w i l l of course have to be a ltered to accommodate the
360
The exact time frame for the implemen
specifics o f the internet world.

tation of each phase will largely depend on the future direction of technol

ogy and the way in which the market develops.

More importantly, though, if the United States signs the W I PO Broad

cast Treaty in its current format, it is unlikely that the above proposal will

satisfy the mandate of the new treaty, which requires ful l -blown exclu
sionary protection intended to operate in rem. much like traditional copy
61
right. 3

and competitive free market that presently exists for the l.nternet and other intcracti ve
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation''): Jason Oxman, The FCC
and the Unregulation of the lmernet (FCC Office of Plans & Pol'y Working Paper Sct·ies
No. 3 1 , 1 999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/
oppwp3 1 .pdf; Kevin Werbach, Digital Tornado: The !nternet and Telecommunications
Policy (FCC Office of Plans & Pol'y Working Paper Series No. 29, 1997), available at
http://www. fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/ working_papers/oppwp29.pdf. More recent commen
tators argue for the FCC to step in on a case-by-case or limited basis. See James B . Speta,
FCC Authoriry to Regulate the !nternet: Creating it and Limiung it, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
15 (2003) (arguing for the introduction of Congressionally delegated authority to the FCC
to regulate the intemet); Philip J . Weiser, Toward a Next Generation RegulatOJ)' Strat
egy, 35 LOY. U . CHI. L.J. 4 1 (2003) (arguing that the FCC can regulate the intemet using
its ancillary jurisdiction). Some also argue that even if the FCC was found to be without
jurisdiction in relation to the broadcast flag debate, it nevertheless remains the most com
petent body to regulate the area, given its expertise in the television industry. See Van
Houweling, supra note 274. at 1 14.
360. One sees the creation of a similar regime in the context of satellite television.
With the emergence of satellite television in the mid-1 980s, Congress stepped in to regu
late its use of broadcasters' signals, when the satellite television industry moved from
being one that merely provided service to areas not covered by broadcast and cable to one
that began to compete with them. Congress' first move was the introduction of a compul
sory licensing mechanism. The Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 1 00-667,
tit. 2, 102 Stat. 3935, 3949 (codified at 1 7 U.S.C. § 1 19 (2000 & Supp. LV 2004)). In
1 999 Congress amended its regulation of satellite television again, with the realization
that the segment had grown commercially, to now subject it to the retransmission consent
rule, but with numerous exceptions. The Satellite Home Viewer [mprovement Act of
1999, Pub. L. o 106-1 13. app. !, tit. 1 , 1 1 3 Stat. 1 50 1 , I SO I A-523 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 325(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)). An interesting question is of course whether web
casting qualifies as a ''multichannel video programming distributor." as defined under the
section. If this were indeed the case, much of the present debate would be rendered moot.
For a recent interpretation or some of these provisions and their purpose, see CBS Broad.,
Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 265 F.3d 1 1 93 ( l ith Cir. 200 1 ) (concluding that the
SHVA does not violate a carrier's First Amendment rights).
3 6 1 . In an elaborate study examining the compatibility of the § I I I statutory licens
ing standard with the United States' obligations under intemational copyright law, David
Brennan concludes that the compulsory licensing regime would indeed be in violation of
both the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement. both of which recognize content
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The current U.S. regime with its exclus ionary rights for broadcasters

emerged in spite of the U . S . not being a party to the Rome Convention.
That the United States participated in the Convention'

drafting and yet

chose not to sign i t hints that the U.S. might trategica l l y favor implement
ing exclu ionary privileges without being mandated to do so by an interna

tional treaty, especi a l l y given that the current regulatory regime arose

from the unique characteristics of television broadcasting in the United
States. 362
Vl.

CONCLUSION
ln h i s now classic study of the reasons why individuals seek to create

or modify property rights regimes over resources, Gary Libecap argued
that the primary motivations were often ( i ) shifts in relative prices: ( i i )
changes i n technology; o r ( i i i ) shift in parties' political influence.363 In

some form. all three reason
recent claim

seem to have motivated incumbents' most

lor open-ended property right

nals. The emergence of the internet a

over their transmi sion sig

a low-cost medium o f di tribution,

the ea e with which broadcasters and cablecaster

ences aero

can now reach audi

the globe with few regulatory problems, and the ri ing eco

nomic power of the cable and broadcast industries are all responsible for

the recent pu h towards a new regime.
Thi

At1iclc has attempted to show that much can be learned by exam

ining the history of exclusionary rights regimes in the television industry,

the political process through which they evolved. the compromises that

producers· exclusive righ t to broadcast the work in question. The United States is a party
to both trcaue -but continues to retain the c omp ul sory l icensmg fi·amework and its ex
tensions to additional di tribmion channels ( i . e satellite broadcasting). Interestingly. the
study doe· not analyze the issue of broadcasters · rights in an y detai l . DA\"IO J . BRENNA ·
RETRANSI\ItSSIOf\ AND US COMPLIANCI:: \\ ITH TRIP 305 (2003).
362. In th 1 s context. note rhat the United States i one of the ma i n countries at the
\ IPO that 1s pushing for the extension or the current \V I PO Broadcast Treaty's provi
Sions to webca!)tmg-ironically enough. in order to grant webcastt.:rs propeny rights o,·er
their 1nternet-ha ed transmts ions. This would allo" commercial webca ters to exercise
full C'>dusionary protection agai ns t indi,·iduals makmg use of their ''ebcas�:- online and
mterferc more directly v. ith the user dynam1c dtscussed be fo re. A-. the treaty heads to rhe
Gen�ral As. embly . the United States remains the only country sui I adamant about the
webcasting proposal and there remams a strong likelihood that the non-Inclusion of thts
aspect alone could result 111 1t::. not signing on to the final vers1011. Set! WI PO. Submission
..

of tht! Unired States £?( 1/merim to rht! W!PO Swndmg Comm irtee on Cop_1-righr ond Re
fcllt!d Ntp,hrs. \\'I PO Doc . �o. CCR 1 5/1 ' F 2 (Aug. 22. 2006). o\·ailohle at http:1 www.
wipo. lntlcdot·:-. mdocslcopynghtlent sccr_ l 5'sccr_ 1 5 inf_2 .pdf.
36). (j •\ tn D. I I Bl < -\P. Co TR.A.C rt'-1< i FOR PROP I· Rl Y Rt< .trl'> 1 6- 1 9 { 1 9X9).
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they represent, and the doctrinal structures through which they carrte to be
implemented. Even though the United States never implemented a system

o f broadcasters' rights, its domestic television industry did not develop

without the idea of property rights a Itogether, despite the fact that the

United States was never a signatory to the Rome Convention. For nearly

four decades, however, policymakers and regulators have continued to de

ploy property institutions to regulate competition between di fferent play
ers in the industry-broadca ters, cable operators, and content producers.

Not surprisingly, the beneficiaries at each stage sought more expansive

rights than they were eventually given.

Attenuated exclusionary protection

thus formed the backbone of the system, which over the years came to de
velop an equilibrium-one characterized by sporadic regulatory interven

tion-a l l in the name of the ideal of "public interest" that at least notion
ally guided lawmakers.

The new regime that current incumbents are seeking is a continuation

o f this process, except that, perhaps for the first time, the right being
sought is in rem in nature and aimed at the activities of the principal bene
ficiary of the internet revolution, the

individual user.

U n l ike in the past,

the primary target of the exclusionary regime is the public, and the public
is without direct representation in the negotiation process.
This Article has argued that there is very little justification for the

broad and open-ended excl usionary regime that broadcasters and cable
companies now seek. To the extent that a justification exists, it i

I imited

to the inequity of the current regulatory framework, which subjects the
curTent incumbents to liability inter se but exempts new commercial ven

tures I ike webcasters. This result i

especially inequitable since these ven

tures employ similar revenue models and additionally capitalize on the

v i rtues of the internet. A staggered implementation proposal that employs

the same concept of attenuated excl usionary privileges to at once enable

new incumbents to develop and subject them to the same staggered ap
proach that each of the current incumbents went through i n the past w i l l

remedy this seeming inequity and re-create a level playing field. This re
gime derives from the ideals o f unfair competition and unjust enrichment

rather than from a property right, thereby foreclosing the possibility of any

in rem claims while ensuring that competing distribution channels are not

treated dispara tely.
ln t h e end, a l l o f this may come to mean very little, if the United States

should choose to refrain from signing the ftnal instrument of the WBT, in

spite o f its active participation in the drafting and treaty-making processes.

Indeed, its past record in this area, with the Rome Convention, as well as
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6
other more recent instances, such as with the Kyoto Protoco1 3 4 and the
3h�
make this a distinct
Rome Charter of the International Cr1mjnal Court,

po sibil ity. Neve11heless, should the idea of property rights in broadcast

signals ever raise its head i n domestic policy discussion , regulators and

policymakers w i l l hopefu l l y study the long and relatively complex history
36
of the idea, for ··a page of history is [often] worth a \'Oiume of logic." 6

364. See ge11eral�1 J on Hovi et al.. The Persistence o.f 1he 1\yom Prowcul: Why Other
A1mer I Countrie,· \lol"l� On Wit/rout the United Sw1es. 3 G l OfML EP\\ . POL. I (2003)

(trymg to under tand reasons for the United States' re l uc tance to s1gn the Kyoto Proto
col).

365. Set! ge111'ra/h· SARAH B. SEWALl & C�RL KA 't .

c'.

TilL U'\ITl D , T,\TE'> -\ '\0

THF I'\1 1- R "ATIO .<\L CRIMI 1AL COURT (2000) (ancmpung to under tand \\ hy the United
State. ha!:> not

1gned the ICC Chancr in spite of the fact that the ICC represents the '·rri 

um ph of American \ <llucs in the international arena").

366.

Eldred v. Ao;hcroft, 537 U.S. 1 86. 1 88 (2003) (quoting .lu$l1Ce Holmes· dictum

in N. r. Trust C(J. ,.. f:J, ner.

2.56 U.S.

345. 3-t9 ( I 92 1 )): � Bay. I nc . v. MereExchange.

L.L.C.. 1 26 ..... Ct. 1 X37. I 42 (2006) (same). lntcreSIJilgly. hnth the Eldred and eBay

case!'> mvolved intcllectu;1] property i. sue . . the former copyng.ht term and the latter parent
111J U11Cli011S.

